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Abstract 
 
Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) calls 
Participating States to develop risk assessments periodically and make the summary of 
their National Risk Assessment (NRA) available to the European Commission as a way to 
prevent disaster risk in Europe. In order to facilitate countries on this task, the European 
Commission developed the Guidelines on risk assessment and mapping. In spite of these, 
the summaries received have revealed several challenges related to the process and the 
content of the assessments.  
The current report aims to provide scientific support to the UCPM participant countries in 
their development of NRA, explaining why and how a risk assessment could be carried 
out, how the results of this could be used for Disaster Risk Management planning and in 
general, how science can help civil protection authorities and staff from ministries and 
agencies engaged in NRA activities. The report is the result of the collaborative effort of 
the Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre team and nine Joint Research Centre 
expert groups which provided their insight on tools and methods for specific risk 
assessment related to certain hazards and assets: drought, earthquakes, floods, terrorist 
attacks, biological disasters, critical infrastructures, chemical accidents, nuclear accidents 
and Natech accidents. 
The current document would be improved by a next version that would include scientific 
guidance on other risks and the collaboration of potential users. 
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Executive summary 
The purpose of this report is to provide a scientific support to Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism participating states and national authorities in charge of the preparation of 
National Risk Assessment process as well as disaster risk management planning in 
general. The scope of the report is to collect scientific contributions to the potential 
update of the guidelines "EU Risk Assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster risk 
management" (Commission Staff Working Paper, 2010). The focus of the report narrows 
down into recommendations in terms of instructions for robust and usable approaches for 
the risk assessment process in the context of National Risk Assessment to inform disaster 
risk management planning. Potential users of the document are civil protection 
authorities and ministries at European countries engaged in the National Risk Assessment 
process, and indirectly also technical staff and policymakers from agencies as well as 
research groups dealing with disaster risk reduction issues. The overall aim is to 
maximize the national capacity of a country in achieving the objectives National Risk 
Assessment process with the current knowledge, best available data, and already 
existing risk information.  
Policy context 
Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism1 (UCPM) calls 
participating states to develop risk assessments periodically (by 22 December 2015 
and every three years afterwards) and make the summary of their National Risk 
Assessment (NRA) available to the European Commission every three years.  
National risk assessment processes should be fully embedded in the national sustainable 
development strategies, and they should address all relevant issues and EU 
directives/policies, such as: 
● The EU Flood directive (Directive 2007/60/EC) 
● The Seveso III directive (Directive 2012/18/EU) 
● The European programme for Critical Infrastructure (Council Directive 
2008/114/EC) 
● EU Solidarity Fund (Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002) 
● EU strategy on adaptation to climate change (COM(2013)216) 
● Directive on serious cross-border threats to health (Decision No 1082/2013/EU) 
● The European programme for Critical Infrastructure (Council Directive 
2008/114/EC)  
● Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom laying down basic safety standards for 
protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation 
● Council Directive 2014/87/EURATOM amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom 
establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear 
installations. 
At a global level, by reinforcing a risk-informed approach to policy-making, the EU is 
contributing to the implementation of the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, the Paris Agreement on climate change, the New Urban Agenda, and the 
overarching UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  
                                           
1 UCPM legislation is undergoing the revision process to strengthen EU civil protection response capacities to 
disasters with rescEU and stepping up disaster prevention and preparedness. 
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Main findings 
National Risk Assessment (NRA) is a demanding process and presents a challenge for 
each and every Member State in terms of resources, time and complexity. The 
complexity is introduced through the multi-disciplinary nature of the disaster risk 
assessment that requires the involvement of many affected sectors and parties from 
different communities to consider their perspective, information, experiences and 
knowledge. The NRA process aims to find a common understanding with all relevant 
stakeholders of the risks faced and their relative priority in a transparent way to make 
disaster risk management (DRM) planning efficient and to increase the country's 
resilience in a steady but timely manner.   
National Risk Assessment is a compound of many processes of risk assessment. 
Different hazards as well as different assets require very different analysis of their risk. 
In order to support the integrated DRM approach there is a need to compare risks across 
hazards and to understand the different drivers of risk. From a scientific point of view we 
are facing two main challenges: 
1. having consistent disaster risk assessment processes where risks arising from 
different hazards as well as the consideration of different assets can be compared or 
aggregated;  
2. having the understanding of how underlying risk drivers and capacities define the 
level of risk.  
Key conclusions 
Risk comparability should be treated in the context of risks in a multilayer single-
hazard framework. Knowing the differences among risk assessment approaches related 
to different hazards/assets will eventually help us to find the most appropriate framework 
covering all hazards/assets in terms of terminology, set of methodologies, risk metrics, 
data needed and results required for further treatment of risk. Harmonising and 
standardising the assessment as well as the risk metrics among different hazards is the 
first step towards a multi hazard assessment. For multirisk assessment approach better 
understanding of the interactions between the hazard (cascading effects) and the 
different vulnerability levels is required.  
The issues regarding better understanding of underlying risk drivers and 
capacities can be dealt with a better knowledge base of the risk, the availability of data 
to describe the hazard, the exposure and vulnerability as well as the development of the 
risk analysis methodologies that enables to model the links between underlying risk 
drivers and capacities, risk components and risk levels. The disaster loss databases are 
of major importance. For example, by using losses from past events it is possible to 
identify and quantify a wide range of socio-politic-economic as well as physical drivers 
associated with the vulnerability. 
Related and future JRC work 
The Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre (DRMKC) aims to provide Participant 
States in the UCPM support to carry out disaster risk management activities. This report 
starts the process of involving the scientific community to help overcome obstacles that 
national authorities in charge of the preparation of the NRA process are confronting. 
DRMKC is providing also a database of DRM research projects and results (Project 
Explorer), running a process of publishing periodic Science reports (Science for DRM 
2020) to create a collective knowledge base in a format to be used by disaster risk 
management authorities, such as civil protection and policy-makers. DRMKC is 
developing a holistic repository of risk information (Risk Data Hub) to link research 
results with policies, disaster loss data (past) with risk assessment (future), and 
governance at European with local level as well as supporting the development and 
monitoring of disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies.  
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This report is the result of the collaborative effort of the Disaster Risk Management 
Knowledge Centre team and 9 Joint Research Centre expert groups from 5 different units 
(E1, E2, E4, E7, G10) to cover drought, earthquakes, floods, terrorist attacks, biological 
disasters, critical infrastructures, chemical accidents, nuclear accidents, and Natech 
accidents risks. Expert groups provide structured advice for risk assessment in a single-
hazard framework. In forthcoming versions (this is Version 0) the focus will be shifted to 
the assets to be protected. Potential impacts on specific assets arising from different 
hazards will be compared, calling for stronger collaboration among different expert 
groups. The aim is to find common risk metrics and making multihazard risk assessment 
feasible. Next version will expand in a number of disaster risk scientific communities 
involved to introduce risks herein not mentioned, such as forest fires risk, extreme 
weather risk, cyber security risk or hybrid threat, that are also identified among the 
most frequent disaster risks among Member States (MS) according to the last EU risk 
overview (Commission Staff Working Paper, 2017). 
Quick guide 
This report attempts to answer the question of why and how to do a risk assessment, 
how to use the results of risk assessment within the NRA context and how science can 
help. First, we discuss what the NRA is, the role of risk assessment processes therein, 
and how to tackle the whole process at the national level. Then we introduce the risk 
concept and risk metrics to establish the common understanding of risk and identify the 
most important scientific inputs for the disaster risk management planning. Afterwards, 
we describe the common steps in risk assessment process based on ISO 31010 (2018) to 
improve the coherence and consistency among the risk assessments and eventually 
assure that different risk assessment processes fit into NRA and as such, NRA could 
provide a useful output for decision makers in the process of disaster risk management 
planning. Then we summarize the challenges of different expert groups. Finally, the 
contributions of 9 expert groups explain the process of disaster risk assessment related 
to certain hazard or certain assets in the following order: drought, earthquakes, floods, 
terrorist attacks, biological disasters, critical infrastructures, chemical accidents, nuclear 
accidents and Natech accidents. 
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1 Introduction 
Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism2 (UCPM) calls 
participating states3 to develop risk assessments periodically (by 22 December 2015 
and every three years afterwards) and make the summary of their National Risk 
Assessment (NRA) available to the European Commission every three years. NRAs 
identify and assess the disaster risk of the natural and man-made hazards, which would 
require a response at a national or supra-national level. The aim of the periodic reporting 
is to promote an effective and coherent approach to prevention of and preparedness for 
disasters by sharing non-sensitive risk information and best practices within the Union 
Mechanism. 
In 2011 the Council4 asked the Commission to develop an overview of natural and 
man-made disaster risks in the EU based on national risk assessments. Based on the 
documents shared by Member States in 2013 (first exercise), the European Commission 
produced the first overview of the risks that EU may face (Commission Staff Working 
Paper, 2014) and based on the documents shared by Member States in 2015 (second 
exercise), the European Commission produced already the second overview (Commission 
Staff Working Paper, 2017). NRAs are, therefore, the most important disaster risk 
evidence for identifying the landscape of disaster risks across Europe which is an 
essential input to reinforce the collective ability to prepare and respond to disasters in 
Europe. Most importantly, NRAs also ensure a common understanding, with all relevant 
stakeholders, of the risks faced in a country and their relative priorities. The evidence 
extracted from the exercises serve as base for an integrated approach to disaster risk 
management, linking prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, 
restoration and adaptation actions. 
In order to facilitate Member States' actions in these areas, the Commission developed 
the guidelines "EU Risk Assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster risk 
management" (Commission Staff Working Paper, 2010) in a concerted action with 
Member States to ensure better comparability between methods and results. 
The last NRA reporting revealed how challenging it was for Member States (MSs) to do 
National Risk Assessment despite the guidelines due to the diversity in disaster risk 
management (DRM) governances that are in place around Europe, and, most 
importantly, due to the different level of available risk information (hazard, exposure, 
vulnerability, coping capacity, disaster losses) and experiences from the past risk 
assessment efforts in each country. Especially the latter can benefit a lot from the 
scientific input. So enhanced disaster risk understanding would make the follow-up 
decision making more evidence based. The more complete and advanced the NRAs are 
the more effective the exercise is in both, at the National and the European level. MSs 
have already expressed through different meetings the need for an updated and more 
detailed version of the guidelines that date back to 2010.  
The first in a series of periodic reports "Science for disaster risk management 2017: 
knowing better and losing less" [Poljanšek et al., 2017] started the continuous process of 
summarizing knowledge globally across the disciplines and made it available to the 
DRM community. In the light of this report the process of risk assessment calls for a 
more collaborative approach across sectors, a multihazard risk assessment, and more 
tools for prioritizing and for risk mapping to help policymakers to develop evidence base 
regional and global disaster risk reduction (DRR) frameworks. All of these require extra 
                                           
2 The European Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) was established to promote swift and effective 
operational cooperation between national civil protection services. It has two main objectives. Firstly, it 
aims to strengthen the cooperation between the Union and the UCPM’s Participating States (Member States 
plus six non-EU countries). Secondly, it aims to facilitate coordination in the field of civil protection in order 
to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing, preparing for and responding to disasters (EN, 
2016).   
3 In this report Member States (MSs) will refer to participating states of UCPM 
4 Council conclusions on a Community framework on disaster prevention within the EU, 2979th Justice and 
Home Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 30.11.2009. 
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resources and expertise to take up new challenges such as data, standards and 
guidelines, risk assessment methodologies and risk metrics, for better understanding of 
limitations and uncertainty. Therefore, it is important to take necessary action not only to 
improve knowledge base on disaster risks but, above all, facilitate the sharing of 
knowledge, the results of scientific research, best practices and information which is 
already identified as the main prevention priority of the UCPM as well as of the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015).  
Many of these challenges have been tackled by the Disaster Risk Management 
Knowledge Centre (DRMKC), an initiative of the European Commission launched in 
2016. The DRMKC provides a networked approach to the science-policy interface in 
disaster risk management fostering partnership, collective knowledge and innovative 
solutions. The DRMKC brings together different European Commission's services, 
European countries and different communities, experts, practitioners and policymakers, 
within and beyond the EU dealing with disasters to manage disaster risk in a more 
coordinated way, linking prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, 
restoration and adaptation actions. The DRMKC aims to integrate and consolidate existing 
scientific multi-disciplinary knowledge to provide solutions for existing needs as well as to 
identify gaps to guide new research programs. The DRMKC also addresses cross-cutting 
topics to allow an enhanced coordination across policies to increase their effectiveness.  
The DRMKC fosters partnership, co-develop collective knowledge and support 
innovative solutions through a variety of activities which can in many ways benefit the 
NRA process. DRMKC is providing a database of DRM research projects and results 
(Project Explorer5), is running a process of publishing periodic Science reports (Science 
for DRM6) to create a collective knowledge base in a format to be used by disaster risk 
management authorities, such as civil protection and policy-makers, and is developing 
holistic repository of risk information (Risk Data Hub7) to link research results with 
policies, disaster loss data (past) with risk assessment (future), and governance at 
European level with local level as well as supporting the development and monitoring of 
DRR strategies.  
 
 The purpose, scope and the focus of the report   1.1
The purpose of this report is to provide scientific support to UCPM participant 
countries and national authorities in charge of the preparation of the NRA process as well 
as to as well as to link the NRA exercise to the whole disaster risk management planning.  
The scope of the report is to collect scientific contributions to the potential update of 
the guidelines "EU Risk Assessment and mapping guidelines for disaster risk 
management". The main goal of the guidelines is to improve coherence and consistency 
among the risk assessments undertaken in the Member States at national level and to 
make these risk assessments more comparable between the Member States. In view of 
this, the objectives of existent guidelines are still relevant and can be used as an input 
for this report, especially if brought up to date:  
● improve the use of good practices and international standards across the EU and 
help to gradually develop coherent and consistent risk assessment methodology 
and terminology; 
● enhance coherence across the different disciplines dealing with disaster risk 
assessment; 
● provide a risk management instrument for disaster management authorities, and 
also other policy-makers, public interest groups, civil society organisations and 
                                           
5 https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/knowledge/Projects-Explorer#project-explorer/631/projects/map 
6 https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/knowledge/Challenges-Sharing 
7 https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/risk-data-hub 
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other public or private stakeholders involved or interested in the management and 
reduction of disaster risks; 
● inform the debate in international fora (Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction, Sustainable Development Goals, UNFCC Paris Agreement); 
● contribute to the development of knowledge-based disaster prevention policies at 
different levels of government and among different policy competencies, as 
national risk assessments involve the integration of risk information from multiple 
sources; 
● inform decisions on how to prioritise and allocate investments in prevention, 
preparedness and reconstruction measures; 
● contribute to the raising of public awareness on disaster prevention measures; 
 contribute to a risk assessment and mapping process across the EU which can 
serve as a basis for the overview of the major risks the EU may face in the future. 
 contribute to the information required to establish an assets database for 
emergency assistance. 
The focus of the report narrows down into recommendations in terms of instructions 
for robust and usable approaches for the risk assessment process in the context 
of NRA to inform disaster risk management planning.  
Our aim is to make NRA relevant, robust, sound and technically accurate (Abt et al, 
2010). Based on the review of NRAs given by countries at 2015 (Commission Staff 
Working Paper, 2017), it was concluded that: 
● The dynamic nature of risk is not well covered, not considering how the risk 
factors change, and how those support DRM planning and finally action. 
● Emerging risks are not always identified. 
● The scope of the exercise in time is too short to facilitate prevention and cross-
sectorial/trigger events. 
● Quantitative approaches should be boosted in order to replicate and compare 
results at EU level. 
Potential users of the documents are principally civil protection authorities, ministries and 
agencies, and research groups at European countries engaged in the NRA process. The 
aim is to maximize the national capacity in achieving the objectives above with the 
current knowledge, best available data, and already existing risk information in the 
country. 
 
 The structure of the report 1.2
The report answers the question of (1) why and how to do a risk assessment, (2) how to 
use the results of risk assessment within the NRA context and (3) how science can help. 
The report is the result of the collaborative effort of the Disaster Risk Management 
Knowledge Centre team and nine Joint Research Centre expert groups who provided their 
insight on tools and methods for specific risk assessment related to certain hazards and 
assets. 
The first chapter provides the introduction, the second chapter discusses what the NRA 
is, the role of risk assessment processes within, and how to tackle the whole process at 
the national level. The third chapter introduces the risk concept, the importance of the 
risk metrics in order to establish a common understanding of risk and identifies the most 
important scientific input for the disaster risk management planning. The fourth chapter 
describes the common steps in risk assessment process based on ISO 31010 (2018) to 
improve the coherence and consistency among the risk assessments and eventually 
assure that different risk assessment processes fit into NRA. The fifth chapter 
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summarizes the challenges put forward by different expert groups. Finally, their 
contributions on specific risk assessment related to certain hazards or certain assets are 
introduced in the chapters 8-16 in the following order: drought, earthquakes, floods, 
terrorist attacks, biological disasters, critical infrastructures, chemical accidents, nuclear 
accidents and Natech accidents8. 
  
                                           
8 Natech accidents are natural-hazard triggered technological accidents 
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2 National Risk Assessment  
In order to reach a common understanding among stakeholders of the risks faced in 
a country, NRAs identify and assess natural and man-made disaster risks that require a 
response at national or supra-national level. NRAs should enable to understand:  
● the relative importance of different risks for a given country,  
● how underlying disaster risk drivers relate (Chapter 3) to components of risk to 
address a range of measures to reduce risk.  
Only then, the design of DRM policies, regulations and measures can be prioritised to 
optimally arrive to societally acceptable levels of risk and the resources to manage 
disaster risk are efficiently allocated. 
Risk is treated particularly to the hazard that materializes and impacts the assets, if 
possible, and at the level of asset, considering the characteristics of it when facing a 
hazard.  
The related actions would encompass considering the asset and the hazard that emerge 
in the different phases of DRM (prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery). 
Figure 1. UCPM strategy for disaster risk management planning: National Risk Assessment (point 
1) and Risk Management Capability Assessment (point 1, 2, 3)  
 
Source: Authors 
 
National risk assessment is a process much wider than the process of 
assessment of one risk (In order to reach a common understanding among 
stakeholders of the risks faced in a country, NRAs identify and assess natural and man-
made disaster risks that require a response at national or supra-national level. NRAs 
should enable to understand:  
● the relative importance of different risks for a given country,  
● how underlying disaster risk drivers relate (Chapter 3) to components of risk to 
address a range of measures to reduce risk.  
Only then, the design of DRM policies, regulations and measures can be prioritised to 
optimally arrive to societally acceptable levels of risk and the resources to manage 
disaster risk are efficiently allocated. 
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Risk is treated particularly to the hazard that materializes and impacts the assets, if 
possible, and at the level of asset, considering the characteristics of it when facing a 
hazard.  
The related actions would encompass considering the asset and the hazard that emerge 
in the different phases of DRM (prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery). 
Figure 1). National Risk Assessment is a compound of many processes of risk 
assessment. Different hazards as well as different assets require very different analysis 
of their risk. To ensure the successful aggregation of the results of different risk 
assessment and useful outputs, NRA should at the beginning of the process 
accommodate:  
● the governance model (Chapter 2.1),  
● the context for each and every risk assessment process (Chapter 2.2),  
● the protocol for the aggregation process of the risk assessment results (Chapter 
2.3) and  
● the format of the outputs for communication with authorities and stakeholders 
(Chapter 2.4).  
Furthermore, NRA is part of Risk Management Capability Assessment [Commission Staff 
Working Paper, 2010] where NRA (In order to reach a common understanding among 
stakeholders of the risks faced in a country, NRAs identify and assess natural and man-
made disaster risks that require a response at national or supra-national level. NRAs 
should enable to understand:  
● the relative importance of different risks for a given country,  
● how underlying disaster risk drivers relate (Chapter 3) to components of risk to 
address a range of measures to reduce risk.  
Only then, the design of DRM policies, regulations and measures can be prioritised to 
optimally arrive to societally acceptable levels of risk and the resources to manage 
disaster risk are efficiently allocated. 
Risk is treated particularly to the hazard that materializes and impacts the assets, if 
possible, and at the level of asset, considering the characteristics of it when facing a 
hazard.  
The related actions would encompass considering the asset and the hazard that emerge 
in the different phases of DRM (prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery). 
Figure 1) is integrated into the whole disaster risk management cycle: risk assessment, 
risk management planning, and the implementation of risk prevention and preparedness 
measures. 
Disaster risk management planning sets out the specific objectives for reducing 
disaster risk with related actions to accomplish these objectives. It should consider the 
future improvements as well as how they can be coordinated within relevant 
development strategies, resources allocation and programme activities. Furthermore, 
linkages to sustainable development and climate change adaptation plans should be 
made where possible. 
Implementing risk prevention and preparedness measures includes the allocation 
of responsibilities and resources, the monitoring duties (such as loss and damage 
collection after the disaster happens) as well as an evaluation and lessons learned 
process.  
 
17 
 Governance of National Risk Assessment 2.1
The multi-disciplinary nature of the disaster risk assessment requires information and 
knowledge of many parties from different communities to conduct the comprehensive 
process of NRA. A robust and flexible governance model of NRA in which one 
authority has the mandate to coordinate all parties involved is essential. The goal of 
the governance model of NRA is to enhance coherence across portfolios and to create a 
working environment based on the same set of evidences.  
The governance model of NRA should consist of a number of working groups for 
different types of natural and man-made hazards as well as for different assets consisting 
of scientific experts, practitioners and representatives from all relevant sectors and 
governments departments or agencies responsible for DRM planning. The goal is to have 
at the same table data providers, end-users, and all technical support. The National 
Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction as promoted by the UNISDR (2017a), are an 
example of a national mechanism for coordination and policy guidance on disaster risk 
reduction that is multi-sectoral and inter-disciplinary in nature, with public, private and 
civil society participation involving all concerned entities within a country. It is often the 
case that national platforms are also the best suited to link the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction with other strategies, such as the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG, 2015), the UNFCC Paris Agreement (UN, 2015), and the Covenant of Mayors 
(2008).   
Top down coordination is important to establish priorities but bottom up 
approaches should not be neglected either. Each process of risk assessment is 
performed by a technical team that should not work in isolation. Each process of risk 
assessment should be conducted collaboratively with stakeholders and interested parties, 
including central and regional levels of government and specialised departments and 
drawn on the knowledge and views of all involved. Only then the risk assessment 
processes can be carried in the context of NRA. It is a matter of: 
 getting relevant, appropriate and up-to-date information and input data for the 
analysis;  
 identifying risk and applying proper risk metrics and be aware of risk criteria 
(acceptable risk) which is largely a political decision; 
 understanding which are the assets to be protected and which are the potential 
impacts that are of main concern; 
 supporting the design of realistic risk scenarios and  
 providing useful and usable results.  
In an ideal case they should be fully embedded in national sustainable development 
strategies, they should address all relevant issues and EU directives/policies and they 
should enjoy the support of all stakeholders/sectors from the beginning of the risk 
assessment process. Relevant EU policies, among others, are (Marin Ferrer et. al, 2018): 
● The EU Flood directive (Directive 2007/60/EC), 
● The Seveso III directive (Directive 2012/18/EU), 
● The European programme for Critical Infrastructure (Council Directive 
2008/114/EC), 
● EU Solidarity Fund (Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002), 
● EU strategy on adaptation to climate change (COM(2013)216), 
● Directive on serious cross-border threats to health (Decision No 1082/2013/EU). 
 
 Context of National Risk Assessment 2.2
The NRA governance identifies the context with the support of all involved stakeholders. 
The context defines the commonalities of all risk assessment processes related to all 
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stages (Chapter 4) and assures the consistency and comparability of results, essential for 
the risk aggregation. All parties involved should at the start of the process agree on: 
● What needs to be protected in the country – the list of assets that should be 
considered in the risk assessment processes, such as population, buildings, 
infrastructure, environment, etc., that are broken down to a level of detail 
meaningful for making decisions and allowing to assign vulnerabilities.  
● Which are the hazards that the country is exposed to – the set of scenario 
for different hazards and different probabilities (likelihood) of occurrence (discrete 
values). Consideration should be given to both, extensive, frequent, low-impact 
and intensive, occasional, high impact events. 
● Which are the risks to be considered, that is, the potential impacts, direct 
and indirect, and what are the risk metrics to measure them: human impact, 
economic impact, environmental impact and political/social impact. The criteria for 
selection are based on the assets to be protected and the values they present. 
● What is the time window for the potential impacts to be considered – the 
temporal horizon of risks to be assessed is decided. The process should consider 
risks that may occur in the immediate future (1-5 years) and in the long term 
(25-35 years) to accommodate the prioritisation of high probability/low impact 
events and low probability/high impact events, respectively. Long term periods 
are also considered to identify emerging risk, such as climate change, also cyber 
security, volatility of geopolitical landscape, etc.9. With enlarging the time window 
for the scenarios also more distant direct and indirect impacts should be covered, 
and with considering more than one time window, information can be included to 
propose prevention and recovery measures. 
● Classification of impact and likelihood levels should be defined (Chapter 2.4). 
The choice of the criteria for classes is largely a political decision. The selection of 
criteria is related to the risk tolerance in the country. For example, one country 
might define "insignificant" a human impact of 10 fatalities while the other no 
fatalities. The number of classes depends on the expected uncertainties 
introduced mainly through different risk assessment approaches: higher the 
uncertainties, smaller the number of classes introduced. The impact classes are 
defined for each type of impact and are derived from impact criteria. In case of 
likelihood levels it is recommended to carefully select a likelihood scale that can 
effectively cover the risks of intensive as well as extensive disasters. 
● Quality criteria in terms of acceptable levels of uncertainty arising from the 
input data and models used in different stages of risk assessment (Chapter 4): 
from the identification of events and scenarios to analyse to the evaluation of risk 
(Zio and Aven, 2013). Uncertainty, though, can provide interesting information for 
the exercise and for future actions to implement the management of risk. Some 
frameworks can be found in the literature to guide scientists and other 
stakeholders to deal with it (Refsgaard et al., 2007; van der Sluij, 2005; Walker et 
al, 2003). 
● Design of a protocol for the use of expert opinion and for the design of a 
procedure to document the whole process of the risk assessment process to 
assure transparency and consistency. 
● Risk criteria need to be agreed on in order to be used in the risk evaluation 
stage (Chapter 4.4) as a term of reference against which the significance of a risk 
is evaluated and determine whether the risk assessed is acceptable or not . 
However, partial knowledge of risk criteria should be known in advance as they 
dictate the risk metrics (Chapter 3) and level of detail (resolution). 
                                           
9 Insurance and reinsurance  companies monitors  the evolution of the risk landscape on a continuous basis 
(Swiss Re SONAR: New emerging risk insights) protect their clients and themselves against undue 
uncertainties, but many of identified future risks unveiled could be also of national concern  
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With periodic reporting (every three years) the context should be updated. Risk is 
dynamic and it should be treated as such. The start of the new NRA process is also the 
opportunity for improvements:  
 to introduce experiences gained from previous NRAs,  
 further development in the datasets and risk assessment methodologies,  
 changing hazard landscape due to climate change and emerging risks as well as 
 considering increased DRM capacities due to implemented risk prevention and 
preparedness measures.  
 
Box 1. UNISDR Definitions (UNISDR, 2018): extensive disaster risk, intensive disaster risk 
Extensive disaster risk 
The risk of low-severity, high-frequency hazardous events and disasters, mainly but not 
exclusively associated with highly localized hazards.  
Annotation: Extensive disaster risk is usually high where communities are exposed to, 
and vulnerable to, recurring localized floods, landslides, storms or drought. Extensive 
disaster risk is often exacerbated by poverty, urbanization and environmental 
degradation. 
Intensive disaster risk  
The risk of high-severity, mid- to low-frequency disasters, mainly associated with major 
hazards.  
Annotation: Intensive disaster risk is mainly a characteristic of large cities or densely 
populated areas that are not only exposed to intense hazards such as strong 
earthquakes, active volcanoes, heavy floods, tsunamis or major storms but also have 
high levels of vulnerability to these hazards. 
 
 The aggregation process of National Risk Assessment 2.3
National Risk Assessment is a compound of many processes of risk assessment. The 
process of risk assessment is an approach to estimate the potential impacts, their 
levels and probabilities of occurrence. The results of risk assessments covering different 
types of hazards and different asset types are often presented with a different risk 
metrics. To derive to the potential impacts at the national level for different hazard types 
and different probability of occurrence, the results of different risk assessments are 
subjected to high level of aggregation (Figure 2).  
Even more, the risks related to the same scenario may be the results of different risk 
analysis methodologies, qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative. For that reason it 
is suggested in European guidelines (European Commission, 2010) to use risk matrices 
(Chapter 2.4) to illustrate comparative risks derived from different risk analysis 
methodologies in a complementary way. For that purpose, the results of a fully 
probabilistic approach are downgraded. For example, it is assumed that the probability of 
impacts equals the probability of the event. 
The scale (granularity) and the scope (coverage) of risk assessments are dictated 
by the NRA context and guide the choice of the RA methodologies. The scale is defined 
with a level of detail which allows estimating the relative importance of the impacts, 
while the scope is national or appropriate sub-national. Furthermore, the risk assessment 
methodologies vary depending on available data on hazard, assets and vulnerability, the 
impact to be assessed and the further use of the results, as well as available resources 
and time. However, RAs should be always considered in the context of NRAs to enable 
the aggregation process leading to results which are usable, useful and used by those 
who are responsible for DRM. 
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The result of the aggregation process (Figure 2) are the points in the risk matrix 
(Chapter 2.4), correlating the aggregated potential impact to the likelihood and hazard of 
the scenario. Each risk assessment process focuses on one type of asset exposed to one 
scenario and assesses one type of the potential impact. Finally, the assessment should 
be made for the potential impacts of all the assets on the list of what each country needs 
to protect when exposed to one scenario for a specific hazard type and probability of 
occurrence. Then the potential impacts (the deterministic value or the expected values, 
depending on the analysis) of all the assets are summed. This is the value which is then 
categorized according to the impact classification, presented in the risk matrix where it is 
correlated to the likelihood levels of the hazardous event and the hazard type. 
Scenario is characterized by hazard type and probability of occurrence (likelihood). The 
number of scenarios for a specific hazard and its likelihood of occurrence depends on the 
size of the Member State and the level of advancement (ability of propagating the 
uncertainties through the process) of the risk assessment process (Chapter 4.3). 
However, for each hazard a set of multiple scenarios with various likelihoods of 
occurrence will provide a more complete picture of risk. Scenarios should cover all 
significant hazards of varying likelihood of occurrence.  
List of assets should be the same for all scenarios to ensure comparability in terms of 
assets included. If the aggregation process becomes too complicated because of the 
diversity of risks addressed, more sub-lists of assets can be prepared. Each sub-list joins 
the assets (e.g., only population or only residential buildings) which can be analysed with 
the same methodologies that can yield comparable results in terms of risk metrics. In 
such case each sub-list would have its own risk matrix. 
Potential impacts should be identified within the context of NRA. Risk metrics should 
coincide with loss indicators used in the national disaster loss databases. National 
disaster loss databases are a set of systematically collected records about disaster 
occurrence, damages, losses and impacts. If the country doesn't have a multihazard 
disaster loss database, the reference point should be loss indicators developed to 
measure global progress in the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UN, 2016).  Furthermore, direct and indirect impacts should be 
considered. Indirect impacts (e.g., flow for the production of goods and services) often 
result from direct impact (e.g., physical damage to property) and are even more difficult 
to assess (De Groeve et. al, 2013).  
For the sake of aggregation direct and indirect impacts should be converted to 
monetary value, most often used as a common denominator, which entails the need of 
economic models. Certain direct or indirect impacts cannot be converted into monetary 
value simply because the lost item cannot be bought or repaired for money (killed, 
injured, cultural heritage, extinction of species). Impacts related to population can be 
measured in number of persons. Other non-market impacts are difficult to measure and 
are called intangible damages. Furthermore, intangible damage is a catch-all term for 
even more undefined effects, that are impossible to quantify or are even difficult to 
identify, like loss of memorabilia, human suffering, impact on national security and many 
other similar factors related to well-being and quality of life (De Groeve et. al, 2013). 
Following the guidelines (Commission Staff Working Paper, 2010) they are referred to as 
political/social impact and can be measured in a qualitative scale of five classes (e.g. 1- 
insignificant, 2 – minor, 3 – moderate, 4 – significant, 5 - catastrophic). In that case 
each common denominator requires its own aggregation process and risk matrix. 
Figure 2: Example of aggregation processes of risk assessment results within NRA for one 
scenario. 
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Source: Authors 
 
This report (Chapters 8-16) provides concrete instructions/guidance at the level of single 
risk assessment processes focusing on one type of asset exposed to one scenario and 
assesses one type of potential impact with defined risk metrics (red arrows in Figure 2).  
 The outcomes of National Risk Assessment 2.4
National risk assessment provides evidences for Disaster Risk Management 
planning. This is the answer to why doing the National risk assessment in the first place. 
But how is this accomplished? The results of NRA should be quantified and presented in a 
way that is useful to the stakeholders. So, it matters a lot how the results of NRA are 
formulated to properly combine information on the level and probability of potential 
impacts. Once these metrics are in hand, disaster risk management strategies can be 
assessed. 
The format of NRA's results varies and depends on the risk analysis models applied and 
their ability to propagate the uncertainties arising in different stages of risk assessment 
to the end results. Furthermore, for the purpose of DRM planning it would be great to 
compare the potential impacts among spatial (subnational) entities among different 
hazards, among different time windows and depending on risk drives and capacities in 
place. Considering these, there are different tools for presenting the results that can be 
used: 
● risk mapping, with emphasis on spatial component of risk;  
● risk matrix, which allows comparison of risks arising from different hazards; 
● risk curves with temporal component of risk; 
● risk indices to present the links between risk drives and capacities with risk 
components: hazard, exposure and vulnerabilities. 
Risk mapping is in the form of maps showing the levels and natures of risk, different for 
each return period (or annual probability or likelihood) and hazard type (e.g., a GIS map 
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of the potential impacts). Risk mapping is therefore a process of establishing the spatial 
extent of risk.   
Risk matrices are a commonly used form for qualitative presentation of risk. It is 
employed to compare risks from different hazards of specific likelihood. The risk matrix 
(Figure 3) is a table where one dimension represents the likelihood of the event while 
the other dimension categorizes the hazard's potential impact. Classification of impact 
and likelihood levels is essential. Sorting the potential impact and the event's likelihood 
into classes introduces ranges of estimated values to compensate the uncertainties that 
have not been introduced during the analysis. They facilitate the communication the 
results of a semi-quantitative analysis (Chapter 4.3) and the output of fully probabilistic 
analysis. In such complementary way a risk matrix can illustrate comparative risks 
derived from different risk analysis methodologies. As such risk matrix is an essential 
input for DRM planning (Chapter 4.4). 
Figure 3: Risk matrix template. The classification of impact (e.g., from low to high impact: 
insignificant, minor, significant, disastrous) and likelihood levels (e.g., from low to high likelihood: 
very unlikely, unlikely, likely, very likely), conversions from quantitative values as well as risk 
criteria should be provided within NRA context.  
 
Source: Adapted by TorqAid, 2019 
 
In case of availability of quantitative data for the presentation of risk, a risk curve can 
be constructed. The risk curve relates the level of impact that will be surpassed in a 
given time period with the actual probability. It is also called the exceedance probability 
curve and it is the usual output of the full probabilistic approach. It is specific for each 
hazard type. From the risk curve two useful risk metrics can be derived. The first is the 
average annual loss (AAL), which is the expected loss per year, averaged over many 
years and equals the area under the risk curve. The advantage of AAL is that it accounts 
the cumulative damage of small impact and frequent events next to rare and big impact 
events. It also provides a useful, normalized metric for comparing the risks of two or 
more hazard types, despite the fact that hazards are quantified using different metrics. 
The second risk metrics is the probable maximum loss (PML) that describes the 
maximum loss that could be expected in a given time period. It is a subjective risk metric 
as it is associated with a given probability of exceedance chosen by the user that 
specifies the acceptable risk level. In case of earthquakes, the most commonly used 
probability of exceedance is 10 percent, and the most commonly used time period is 50 
years which corresponds to return period of 475 years. Therefore, PML limits are often 
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framed in terms of return period10. As such, PML is relevant to define the size of reserves 
that insurance companies or government should have available to manage losses.  
Then, there are risk indices, which provide the opportunity to explain how underlying 
risk drivers and capacities affect disaster risk components and final risk. Risk indices 
present the relative importance of the risk (e.g., in terms of ranking) arising from 
different hazards, different drivers and coping capacities within different spatial (also 
subnational) units. Therefore, risk indices can be used as a risk assessment tool that 
unfolds the range of activities to reduce risk. An example of such risk index is INFORM 
Global Risk Index (Figure 4) and its version of INFORM Subnational Risk Index11.   
Figure 4: INFORM GRI Conceptual Framework  
 
Source: Poljansek et. al, 2018 
 
Furthermore, with each process of risk assessments there should be also an opportunity 
to share and explain information on components of risk (hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability) and underlying risk drivers, risk metrics as well as risk itself, related levels 
and probabilities.  
Finally, the outcomes of the NRA should be useful for effective decision making by the 
authorities responsible for DRM. Therefore, it is highly recommended that they are 
involved as a part of the governance body of the NRA from the very beginning when 
agreeing on a set of methodologies for analysing risk from various hazards, so as to help 
shaping the outcomes in a common format according to their needs for evaluation, 
comparing risks and communicating results. Above all, authorities should understand 
what has been lost in the aggregation process while still being aware of the wealth of risk 
information generated. However, this is also the opportunity to see the gaps and 
challenges which hinder the calculation or increase the uncertainty of the desired results. 
Only then the actions to resolve them (e.g., the need of disaster loss database) can be 
taken as part of integrated DRM planning, so that the future NRA processes can be 
brought to the next level.  
                                           
10 Statistically, the loss which has a 10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years also has approximately 
0.2 percent probability of exceedance in 1 year, and an effective return period of 475 years. By definition, 
the return period is the inverse of the probability that the event will be exceeded in any one year. For 
example, the 100-year hazardous event a 1/100 = 0.01 or 1% chance of being exceeded in any one year.  
11 http://www.inform-index.org/ 
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3 Risk Concept and Risk Metrics 
Scientific community can help civil protection authorities and ministries preparing NRA 
that will effectively provide scientific evidences for disaster risk management 
planning, and as such reach the objectives of EU guidelines (Chapter 1). This series of 
report is an opportunity for scientific community to: 
 provide the guidance in common understanding of risk, risk concept and risk 
metrics (Chapter 3);  
 explain step by step the process of disaster risk assessment (Chapter 4); 
 provide approaches to assess the potential impact and their probabilities 
(Chapters 8-16); 
 and provide information on underlying disaster risk drivers and capacities 
(Chapters 8-16).  
This chapter introduces basis for a common understanding of risk in terms of a concept 
to be followed from the very beginning and in terms of the results and appropriate risk 
metrics to be used in NRA.  
Box 2. UNISDR Definitions (UNISDR, 2018): disaster risk assessment, disaster risk, hazard, 
exposure, vulnerability 
 
Disaster risk assessment 
A qualitative or quantitative approach to determine the nature and extent of disaster risk 
by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of exposure and 
vulnerability that together could harm people, property, services, livelihoods and the 
environment on which they depend. 
Disaster risk  
The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a 
system, society or a community in a specific period of time, determined probabilistically 
as a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity. 
Hazard 
A process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other 
health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental 
degradation. Hazards may be single, sequential or combined in their origin and effects. 
Each hazard is characterized by its location, intensity or magnitude, frequency and 
probability.  Hazards include, as mentioned in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015-2030 (UNISDR, 2105) biological, environmental, geological, hydro- 
meteorological and technological processes and phenomena. 
Exposure 
The situation of people, infrastructure, housing, production capacities and other tangible 
human assets located in hazard-prone areas. 
Vulnerability 
The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or 
processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or 
systems to the impacts of hazards. 
 
Regarding the terminology (Box 2) we follow the UNISDR (2018), but to connect all 
definitions into one story, we need to know the risk concept: 
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 What is risk? Risk is a potential loss/impact12 (Figure 5). The notion of 
potential loss requires information of the level of potential loss to be accompanied 
with the probability of its occurrence. 
 What is disaster risk assessment? Disaster risk assessment is an approach for 
assessing potential losses. Disaster risk assessment combines the results of 
hazard, exposure and vulnerability models. (Figure 6). 
 How to measure risk? A risk metric is the attribute of risk being measured. In 
terms of the unit used it coincides with loss indicators. Impacts/losses are the 
output of risk assessment models. Therefore, the disaster loss databases can be 
used to validate the results of disaster risk assessments. Risk metrics should also 
allow conveying the probability of occurrence related to each level of impact. 
When following the probabilistic approach, these can be summarized through 
annual average loss (expected loss per year) and probable maximum loss 
(maximum loss that could be expected corresponding to a chosen likelihood) both 
derived from the exceedance probability curve (also known as risk curve). 
Figure 5. What is risk?  
 
Source: Authors 
 
Figure 6. What is disaster risk assessment? 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Ideally, risk metrics are related to the asset and not to the hazard. However, different 
approaches differ substantially according to the hazard or asset in question. Collaboration 
among experts from different fields should be encouraged not only to transfer the 
                                           
12 Losses are subset of impacts. Impacts are negative and positive consequences of hazardous event, while 
losses are only negative one. (De Groeve et. al, 2013) 
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existing methods and models that work in one field and might be applicable in others, 
but also to find common risk metrics. Such harmonisation is needed:  
● to find a way to more coherent and consistent RA methodologies to make risks 
arising from different hazards comparable and to make risks arising from the 
same hazard in different regions comparable (cross-border and regional risk);  
● to understand the relative importance of different risks for a given region;  
 to assist decision makers in DRM in their prioritising of DRM planning and 
actions.  
Furthermore, common risk metrics offer even more possibilities of application (Figure 7) 
and all contribute to more effective and transparent disaster risk management planning 
as long as the users are familiar with the limitations and uncertainties related to the 
methodologies for assessing the potential impacts. 
Figure 7. The advantages of common risk metrics. 
 
Source: Authors 
 
The process of disaster risk assessment in general is more in detail explained in Chapter 
4 while Chapters 8-16 tackle the hazard or asset specific risk assessment. However, we 
would like to draw special attention to the two results of the risk assessment process: 
potential impacts with related probabilities of occurrences, and information on underlying 
risk drivers and required capacities which presents the most valuable scientific input for 
the disaster risk management planning (Box 3). 
 
Box 3. Scientific input for disaster risk management 
— Potential impacts (=risk) are the scientific input for disaster risk management 
planning. 
— The understanding of underlying risk drivers and required capacities are the scientific 
input for disaster risk management planning. 
 
Risk assessment models are the scientific tool to assess the potential impacts 
and their probability of occurrence. Only when we know what the potential impacts 
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are we can do disaster risk management planning. Prioritizing is possible only when 
potential impacts (=risk) arising from different hazards are comparable. 
Understanding underlying disaster risk drivers and capacities. Risk assessment 
provides the opportunity (Figure 8) to better understand the underlying causes of risk 
(i.e., disaster risk drivers). Sometimes the phenomena/pattern behind each component 
of risk is known but is not yet being modelled. Nevertheless, explaining the correlations, 
phenomena and patterns between risk drivers and capacities with the components of 
disaster risk are one of the most important parts of the risk assessment. Such 
information may be used to inform DRM on the root causes of risk that can be addressed 
and acted upon to target the various components of risk to reduce disaster risk. 
Figure 8. Risk assessment provides an opportunity to better understanding of the underlying 
disaster risk drivers and informs disaster risk management measures (H: Hazard, E: Exposure, 
V:Vulnerability, R: Risk). 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
Box 4. UNISDR Definitions (UNISDR, 2018): Underlying disaster risk drivers, Capacity, Coping 
capacity 
Underlying disaster risk drivers 
Processes or conditions, often development-related, that influence the level of disaster 
risk by increasing levels of exposure and vulnerability or reducing capacity.  
Annotation: Underlying disaster risk drivers — also referred to as underlying disaster risk 
factors — include poverty and inequality, climate change and variability, unplanned and 
rapid urbanization and the lack of disaster risk considerations in land management and 
environmental and natural resource management, as well as compounding factors such 
as demographic change, non disaster risk-informed policies, the lack of regulations and 
incentives for private disaster risk reduction investment, complex supply chains, the 
limited availability of technology, unsustainable uses of natural resources, declining 
ecosystems, pandemics and epidemics. 
Capacity 
The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within an 
organization, community or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and strengthen 
resilience. 
Coping capacity 
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Coping capacity is the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available skills 
and resources, to manage adverse conditions, risk or disasters. The capacity to cope 
requires continuing awareness, resources and good management, both in normal times 
as well as during disasters or adverse conditions. Coping capacities contribute to the 
reduction of disaster risks. 
 
Coping capacity is one of the underlying risk drivers that can be influenced the most 
with DRM actions and can significantly change the outcome of disaster as well as improve 
the resilience of the society. Coping capacity is so important that it is sometimes 
considered as one of the risk components, next to hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability (UNISDR, 2015). It refers to the ability of a country to cope with disasters in 
terms of formal, organized activities and the effort of the responsible authorities as well 
as of the existing infrastructure. All together coping capacity covers all the phases of 
DRM cycle; prevention, preparedness (early warning systems) as well as emergency 
response and recovery. Among the components of risk (Figure 8), coping capacity has 
the strongest influence on the vulnerability.  
SDG (Sustainable Development Goals) indicators capture many underlying disaster 
risk drivers and capacities affecting the vulnerability component of risk, especially the 
hazard independent aspect of it. Using the methodology of composite indicators to assess 
risk (Chapter 4.3), the SDG indicators can be used to design the vulnerability index 
which is widely used approach in the socioeconomic filed.  
Partial results of the risk assessment can be useful. Sometimes the uncertainties 
are too high to effectively apply the whole risk assessment approach to arrive to the risk. 
Disaster risk assessment is combination of three models: hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability models. Each of these models provides the linkages with the underlying 
factors (drivers and capacities) which can already be useful for DRM actions planning.  
29 
4 Risk Assessment process 
 
The process of risk assessment is an approach to estimate the potential impacts, their 
levels and probabilities of occurrence. Each risk assessment process within the NRA 
context focuses on one type of asset exposed to one scenario and assesses one type of 
the potential impact. The purpose of a NRA is to define appropriate measures to control 
and reduce risks in a determined space and time when used in many areas and sectors.  
In order to guide the process and having in mind that the outcomes of the exercise 
should support the decision-makers in treating (or not) risk, it is necessary to know the 
context (Chapter 2.2) of national risk assessment and the expected outcomes of each 
risk assessment for the aggregation process (Chapter 2.3). 
 
 Following the format of ISO 31010  4.1
ISO 31030 (ISO, 2018) provides a common and very general approach to managing any 
type of risk. It is not hazard or asset specific. It divides the risk assessment process 
(Figure 9) into three stages: risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. 
There are several advantages when risk assessment processes follow the same format 
within the NRA context: 
● helping target readers/users to find themselves around (where to start, what to 
expect) in topics perceived as complex and tackled with a variety of different 
approaches.  
● helping experts to fit their expertise into predefined modules, thus transforming 
the complex phenomena into complicated process, that is into a set of feasible 
tasks, that are normally executed by different actors to reach the desired results. 
● Facilitating the usage of the same terminology. 
● supporting the documentation of the whole process to assure transparency and 
consistency. 
 
Figure 9: Stages of risk assessment process according to ISO 31010.  
 
Source: Authors 
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 Risk Identification 4.2
According to ISO 31030 (ISO, 2018) the purpose of risk identification is to find, recognize 
and describe risks that a country would like to reduce using existing risk information 
The main task here is to collect relevant, appropriate and up-to-date risk information 
from national and international sources. For example (and more in detail in Chapter 
4.2.1): 
● information on past losses (national disaster loss database, European platform of 
risk data Risk Data Hub13 or online database with global coverage EMDAT14), 
● map of relevant research projects(Project Explorer15), 
● past efforts of risk assessments within the country(past NRA exercises 2013 and 
2015), 
● international efforts related to national risk profiling (INFORM16).  
For each of the risks to be studied, it is necessary to gather the available information 
on the risk components relevant to the NRA context (Chapter 2.2) to prepare:  
● hazard models,  
● exposure models,  
● vulnerability models and  
● relevant selection of risk drivers and capacities.  
It is necessary to study which are the causal mechanisms of risk (Powel et al, 
2016): characterize the activities and conditions that trigger the hazard; the factors that 
drive the assets' exposure and vulnerability; and which are the capacities (at the level of 
asset but also beyond it) in place for: 
— preventing the event,  
— mitigating its effects,  
— prepare for and respond to the hazard once it materialises, and 
— recover from it. 
There is no one-approach-fit-all-the-risk. For each hazard or asset related risk there 
are different solutions efficient in different phases of the DRM cycle. If the risk appears to 
be non-acceptable for the standards established by the decision-makers, the actions 
planned in order to manage disaster risk will tackle some or all the risk factors 
mentioned. 
It is also important to identify also the risks (e.g., emerging risks, cross-border risks) 
which sources are not under control and that can result in a variety of tangible and 
intangible consequences. This is also an opportunity to address issues such as lack of 
data, limitation of knowledge, reliability of information and corresponding uncertainties.  
All the information produced in the stage of risk identification is actually the formulation 
of a problem, which will help risk analysts to design a model or methodology to obtain 
the outcomes of the potential impacts with their probability of occurrence on the assets 
at risk. 
4.2.1 Tools to support risk identification 
The elements listed below can be used to guide the team in charge of characterizing 
risks: 
                                           
13 https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/risk-data-hub 
14 https://www.cred.be/projects/EM-DAT 
15 https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/knowledge/Projects-Explorer#project-explorer/631/projects/list 
16 http://www.inform-index.org/Countries/Country-Profile-Map 
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1. Loss and damage databases, which usually informs about the occurrence, 
magnitude and, sometimes, losses suffered. The data recorded after an event not 
only indicates the level of exposure of a society but also helps identifying the key 
drivers of losses (De Groeve et al, 2014).  
2. Hazard identification techniques, which are quite common in the industrial sector, 
such as HAZOP studies, fault trees, checklists, etc. (Mannan, 2012). Some 
methods can serve to describe the causes and conditions that favour hazard to 
happen. 
3. The risk identification stage is directly linked with the formulation of (a) problem, 
and as pointed out by Powell et al. (2016), the use of soft Operations Research 
methods can be useful to structure and formulate complex problems, where 
different stakeholders have different interests and require different expertise to 
describe these problems.  
4. Accident investigations or post-disaster reports, including documents containing 
lessons learned. These documents and the experience of the those engaged in 
responding and recovering from past disasters can support teh understanding of 
the underlying causes leading to consequences. These reports usually serve in 
taking corrective actions and improving protocols, and in displaying changes in 
risk factors. For example, some industries, such as aviation and chemical 
processing, commonly record near-miss events, which are a valuable source of 
learning from the past (Phimister et al, 2003). 
5. Scientific projects and loss projections. Besides learning from the past, and 
considering the effect that climate change will have on disaster risk, it is 
necessary to consider the potential future losses due to changes in assets' 
exposure, vulnerability and the nature of the hazard. 
6. Monitoring and Early Warning Systems in place. These are constantly collecting 
and analysing data of precursors of risk. Detecting trends and changes in the data 
collected can facilitate the team engaged in the RA to picture how risk is or is 
changing. Besides the traditional and operational warning systems for protecting 
people's lives and properties, the team can also exploit foresight approaches, 
citizen sciences and media monitoring (DG ENV, 2016). 
 
4.2.2 Scenario Building  
The scenarios have become a form of communication model and help bridge the 
theoretical models and the needs to solve practical problems (Alexander, 2000).  
At the first place scenarios are a replacement for describing future disaster events in 
terms of their magnitude and probabilities which can be based solely on known science. 
Instead the information about what can happen in the future disaster can be better 
described with sets of scenarios. These scenarios comprise the triggering events 
together with the description of possible consequences from cascading events to the 
impacts on societal systems while considering the capacities in place. Therefore, the 
scenario building process requires input from scientists, practitioners, policymakers and 
different parts of communities that complements with community's experience of past 
events and knowledge of social, cultural, economic and political context.  
This co-development process (Davies et al., 2015) is beneficial not just because such 
engagement allows mutual learning, the sharing of existing knowledge and the co-
production of new knowledge, but also because the knowledge that emerges is much 
more likely to have societal and scientific consents, because it will be perceived as 
relevant by all involved (Mercer, 2012; Wistow et al. 2015)  
Scenarios can be used for modelling all phases of the disaster risk management cycle. 
For the purpose of emergency preparedness, recovery and reconstruction planning the 
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"maximum credible" or "plausible worst case" scenarios are of interest. For the purpose 
of the risk assessment process their aim is to analyse the potential impacts and their 
likelihood. Therefore, it is recommended to have multiple scenarios with various 
likelihoods of occurrence to obtain a more complete picture of risk (UNISDR, 2017b). 
A scenario presents just a possible future, but should be internally consistent and 
plausible (Börjeson et al, 2006), covering all possible events and related effects so as to 
reach the desired information of risk impact. Shoemaker (1995) proposes three tests to 
ensure internal consistency and plausibility: compatibility of trends, outcome 
combinations and reactions of major stakeholders. There would always be events and 
their characteristics that will remain unknown unknowns, but we reduce this by having 
relevant stakeholders on board (Aven, 2015). Assumptions are an inherent part of the 
scenario building, as such should be examined and reported. 
 
 Risk Analysis 4.3
Risk analysis is the process of combining the risk components of hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability to determine the level of risk. For every risk and risk scenario identified in 
the risk identification stage, risk analysis determines the potential impacts and the 
probability of occurrence. Risk analysis approaches vary in various degrees of detail 
depending on the purpose of the analysis and data available as well as on how they 
address uncertainties arising in different stages of the RA process. Each risk analysis 
approache has different limitations as well as advantages. They differ among 
qualitative, semi-quantitative (risk matrix and indicator based) and quantitative 
(deterministic and probabilistic) methods. The most suitable methodology should be 
chosen based on:  
● purpose of the analysis (prioritization, planning, analysing the effect of 
changes,etc.);  
● the agreed level of detail;  
● the time spam of the assessment;  
● the agreed level of uncertainty;  
● the availability and reliability of information;  
● the existing models to produce these results;  
● the resources at hand (in terms of time, money, expertise, etc.) for the exercise.  
Here it is worth mentioning that the knowledge base of risk, as inherently uncertain 
(Covello and Merkhofer, 1994), can be limited. It is often the case that the knowledge 
base is decisive in deciding the approach for the analysis. Ideally, quantitative 
approaches would be favoured in front of qualitative ones and probabilistic models 
instead of deterministic analysis, to ensure that the outcomes of the analysis are 
objective and replicable.  
Qualitative risk analyses are risk narratives based on expert judgment. They are 
commonly used for screening risks to determine whether they merit further investigation. 
Sometimes it is the only option when almost all components of risk are not quantifiable 
or have a very large degree of uncertainty. It may be the case that a qualitative 
assessment provides the risk manager or policy-maker with all the information they 
require. For example, if there are obvious sources of risk that can be eliminated, one 
does not need to wait for the results of a full quantitative risk assessment to implement 
risk management actions. An important criticism for qualitative approaches is its 
subjectivity, which affects its reliability. In order to facilitate its replicability, the 
processes need to be clear and structured, so different experts can repeat the analysis. 
Semi-quantitative risk analysis seeks to categorize risks by comparative scores (e.g., 
tolerable, intermediate, intolerable). They permit to classify risks based on expert 
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knowledge with limited quantitative data (Haimes, 2008; Jaboyedoff et al., 2014). They 
can be a useful stepping stone towards a full quantitative approach, particularly where 
detailed data are lacking and can be used as a means to capture subjective opinion which 
makes it a good basis for discussing risk reduction measures (Simmons et al., 2017).  
Risk matrix is a mean to communicate the results of a semi-quantitative analysis. The 
risk matrix is made of classes of frequency of the hazardous events on one axis, and the 
consequences (or expected losses) on the other axis.  
Following the limitations of risk scoring systems (Cox et al., 2005), if some data is 
available, even rough, it is recommended to use quantitative methods in order to 
recognize uncertainty and the correlations existing between the components of risk 
(hazard, exposure and impact). In the case of high uncertainties, by trying to quantify 
them and identifying their contributors, it is possible to not only increase the knowledge 
base, but also to better allocate funds and resources for future research developments 
(Apostolakis, 2004). Nonetheless, expert judgement could be necessary when the 
underlying mechanisms are not well understood (Abrahamsson, 2018).  
Another semi-quantitative approach to measure risk is based on the methodology of 
composite indicators. Such indicator-based approach is useful when there is not 
enough data to quantify all the components of risk over large areas to carry out a 
quantitative analysis, but also as a follow-up of a quantitative analysis, as it allows taking 
into account other aspects than just physical damage. As a matter of fact, the indicator-
based approach is the only method that allows carrying out a holistic risk assessment, 
including social, economic and environmental vulnerability and capacity. Indicator-based 
approaches allow incorporating the risk concept where each risk component (hazard, 
exposure, vulnerability and capacity) is composed by risk drivers defining it and 
presented by indicators. Data for each of these indicators are collected at a particular 
spatial level, for instance by administrative units. These indicators are then standardized 
(e.g. by reclassifying them between 0 and 10), weighted internally and composed with 
arithmetic or geometric average. Although the individual indicators normally consist of 
quantitative data (e.g. population statistics), the resulting hazard, exposure, 
vulnerability, and risk results are scaled between 0 and 10. These relative data allows 
comparing the indicators and indices (i.e., composite indicator) for the various 
administrative units. These methods can be carried out at different levels, even at 
communities (e.g. INFORM subnational risk index17). The resulting risk is relative and 
doesn’t provide information on the level and probability of the potential losses. 
Quantitative risk assessment can assess potential impacts in two ways: 
deterministically or probabilistically.  
Deterministic risk assessment estimates impacts from a single hypothetical scenario 
or combination of scenarios but do not necessarily consider neither the probability of the 
events in quantitative terms nor guarantee that all possible events are captured within a 
deterministic scenario set. Even though the probability of the events is not considered, 
risk analysis can still quantify the uncertainties that permeate the different steps of the 
computations. It can take into account uncertainties from the input parameters and 
models related to exposure and vulnerabilities to get the ranges of risk estimates for 
each scenario. The distribution of these risk estimates can be queried with statistical 
procedures to arrive at quantitative probabilities that can be assigned to the risk levels. 
Therefore, the probability of impacts differs from the probability of an event.  
Probabilistic risk assessment attempts to associate probability distributions to 
frequency and severity of hazards and then run many thousands of simulated events in 
order to assess the likelihood of impacts at different levels.  
Probabilistic approaches face their particular challenges. Some decision-makers may be 
reluctant to change approach if the education of probability is not widespread enough, 
especially among those making the final decision (Lund, 2008). It is necessary to 
                                           
17 http://www.inform-index.org/Subnational 
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communicate these model results in a specific, judicious and unambiguous way with 
sufficient scientific evidence and uncertainty (Jansen et al, 2017). Lund (2008) also 
indicates that the costs of probabilistic risk analysis may be higher than other methods, 
and is recommended in situations where large expenditures need to be studied or when 
the impacts of disaster would have very large consequences. 
The outcomes of the risk analysis are the potential impacts over an agreed period of 
time. This result is linked to a particular uncertainty level that ideally has been 
aggregated from different sources of uncertainty. A sensitivity analysis provides 
information about the parameters of the model or other assumptions taken, determining 
their weight in the final outcomes obtained, facilitating to identify pitfalls while helping to 
verify and validate the model (Frey and Patil, 2002). 
 
 Risk Evaluation 4.4
According to ISO (2018) risk evaluation is the process of comparing the results of risk 
analysis with risk criteria to determine whether further action is required.  
Passing the results, passing the responsibility. Experts involved in risk assessment 
process should have a control also over the "evaluating risk" stage (In order to reach a 
common understanding among stakeholders of the risks faced in a country, NRAs 
identify and assess natural and man-made disaster risks that require a response at 
national or supra-national level. NRAs should enable to understand:  
● the relative importance of different risks for a given country,  
● how underlying disaster risk drivers relate (Chapter 3) to components of risk to 
address a range of measures to reduce risk.  
Only then, the design of DRM policies, regulations and measures can be prioritised to 
optimally arrive to societally acceptable levels of risk and the resources to manage 
disaster risk are efficiently allocated. 
Risk is treated particularly to the hazard that materializes and impacts the assets, if 
possible, and at the level of asset, considering the characteristics of it when facing a 
hazard.  
The related actions would encompass considering the asset and the hazard that emerge 
in the different phases of DRM (prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery). 
Figure 1), in spite of not being the experts those who advocate the risk criteria. 
However, partial knowledge of risk criteria should be known in advance as it dictates the 
risk metrics and the level of detail (resolution). This is the stage when the outputs of risk 
analysis are prepared for communication outside the expert group. This is a very delicate 
step because the experts are not only passing the results but also the responsibilities to 
the users of the results. Therefore the results should be accompanied with the instruction 
for use. The results should be understood correctly among all DRM responsible parties, 
only then the comparison and prioritization is possible as well as the risk criteria 
established. For example, the scale (resolution) of input data dictate also the scope of 
the results and their suitability for the decision making process at national, subnational 
or local levels. Or for example, the information on the time window considered can be 
important to determine whether climate change effects can be reflected in the results.  
The outcomes provided must be accompanied also with the overall uncertainty, that 
should have been aggregated from the different phases and limitations of the methods 
used: due to the context, input data, models structure and outcomes, and the model 
parameters (Walker et al, 2003). The uncertainties can be again represented in various 
ways depending on the approach. Quantify uncertainty as much as possible, in order to 
avoid linguistic ambiguity. A particular quantification of uncertainty can be provided 
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together with a description of the non-quantified uncertainties. Expert judgment may be 
used if necessary, but it must be openly reported.  
Preparing outcomes of risk assessment process for DRM responsible is crucial.  
The evaluation stage requires input from those who owns the results and those who are 
responsible for DRM (In order to reach a common understanding among 
stakeholders of the risks faced in a country, NRAs identify and assess natural and man-
made disaster risks that require a response at national or supra-national level. NRAs 
should enable to understand:  
● the relative importance of different risks for a given country,  
● how underlying disaster risk drivers relate (Chapter 3) to components of risk to 
address a range of measures to reduce risk.  
Only then, the design of DRM policies, regulations and measures can be prioritised to 
optimally arrive to societally acceptable levels of risk and the resources to manage 
disaster risk are efficiently allocated. 
Risk is treated particularly to the hazard that materializes and impacts the assets, if 
possible, and at the level of asset, considering the characteristics of it when facing a 
hazard.  
The related actions would encompass considering the asset and the hazard that emerge 
in the different phases of DRM (prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery). 
Figure 1). The outcomes should be presented considering that the mentioned audience 
may not have a technical background, so risk should be represented in different and 
suitable ways: percentages, "natural frequencies", bar charts, pie charts, among others 
(Riesch, 2013). The tools, such as maps, matrices, indices and curves, showing risk and 
the components of risk, as well as different aspects of it, are explained in Chapter 2.4.  
Risk metrics is the common point. It is an essential tool for decision making and for 
engaging other stakeholders in DRM. The challenge is to assure the comparability of the 
risks obtained from different RA process. The outcomes of each risk assessment should 
fit in the aggregation process where the outputs from various analyses are merged into a 
common format for evaluating and comparing risk and communicating results. 
The outcomes of the analysis are then presented to decision-makers, to compare and 
confront them to a set of criteria to reduce risk to an acceptable or tolerable level18.  
In the context of NRA, the risk criteria reckon with the socio-economic and political 
context of the country, such as: 
— Costs, in monetary terms of the potential impacts, versus the benefits gained from 
taking the risk. 
— Legislation in place, codes or standards of practice. 
— Reversibility of impact – the possibility to reverse the negative consequences. 
— Immediate effects on critical services. 
— Controllability of consequences. 
— Societal Perception, as "people respond to the hazard they perceive" (Slovic et al 
1982). This information can be extracted from social surveys, attitude surveys and 
behavioural intentions and psychometric scaling techniques (Gough, 1990). Some of 
the dimensions underlying perceived riskiness listed by Vlek (1966) can actually be 
used as evaluation criteria, such as social distribution of risks and benefits or the 
voluntariness of exposure. 
                                           
18 Tolerable risk is defined as the level of risk that society is ready wot live with as long as the risk is managed 
to reduce it, while acceptable risk represents the level to which society is prepared to accept without any 
risk management option put in place (Bell et al, 2005) 
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The results obtained from risk evaluation are a response, a decision. The results should 
display the expected (direct and indirect) losses for each risk, indicating which should be 
tackled first. Rather than going back to the characteristics of the risk, it is easier to 
detect which actions are more suitable. In this case a new round of risk analysis should 
be carried out; this time with the alternatives of which actions, to choose which actions 
would reduce the overall risk considering resources at hand.  
Explicitly stating the uncertainty and limitations of the outcomes of risk analyses helps 
decision-makers to agree in additional actions regarding the exercise (such as investing 
more time and money to collect new data or revise the model, if results are not good 
enough for decision makers) while boosting future research in the areas that should be 
further developed. 
In some sectors such as industrial manufacturing and energy production it may be easier 
to detect the need to treat the risk, and the possible options to do so. Klinke and Renn 
(2002) state to propose options beyond the typical risk-based management: the 
precaution-based management (for highly uncertain probabilities and related impacts or 
scarce knowledge on the causality of the agent to the possible assets and impacts) and 
the discourse-based management (when the impacts are known but ignored – because 
they materialize time after the event happens – or for such cases that scientifically have 
proved to be not an important threat, but are socially rejected, population feel frightened 
or unwelcome).   
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5 Overview of the experts contributions 
The process of disaster risk assessment in general has been in detail explained in 
Chapter 4. Authors of Chapters 8-16 tackled the hazard or asset specific risk assessment 
in the following order:  
● drought,  
● earthquakes,  
● floods,  
● terrorist attacks,  
● biological disasters,  
● critical infrastructures,  
● chemical accidents,  
● nuclear accidents,  
● Natech accidents.   
Authors were asked to structure the contributions in a harmonized way, as much as 
appropriate, and to follow ISO 31030 (ISO, 2018) for the stages of the risk assessment 
process and to follow the UNISDR terminology regarding the risk concept. Chapters 
addressing the risk assessments by hazard communities are put first as they have to 
address issues relevant for scenario building which are important input for the rest of the 
chapters focusing on risk assessment from the asset perspective. 
Different hazards as well as different assets require very different analysis of their risk. 
Scientist shall explain disaster risk assessment step by step. Experts contributing 
to the report will provide guidance for using existing risk assessment methodologies, 
terminology used for their understanding, data, knowledge and software needed for the 
analysis and what results can be expected/feasible for each of the methodologies.  
In order to assist decision makers in their prioritising of mitigation actions, we have to 
understand the relative importance of different hazards and risks for a given region. This 
requires that risks arising from different hazards to be comparable with each other. 
Different hazards differ in their nature, return periods, intensity and impacts which 
dictates different metrics to measure them. This doesn’t only hamper the comparability 
among the risks arising by different hazards but it also makes difficult to aggregate the 
impacts from a single hazard in a meaningful way to assess the total risks coming from 
all hazards in a region. All this issues should be treated in the context of a 
multilayer single-risk framework.  
Knowing the differences among risk assessment approaches related to different 
hazards/assets will eventually help us to find the framework covering all of them in terms 
of terminology, set of methodologies, risk metrics, data needed and results required for 
further treatment of risk. Hopefully, it will also pave the way to multihazard or even 
multirisk assessment approaches (Figure 10). Therefore, harmonising and standardising 
the assessment processes as well as risk metrics among different hazards risk is the first 
step towards a full multirisk assessment that covers the interactions on the hazard 
(cascading effects) and vulnerability level.  
Not to raise expectations too high the following level of sophistications (Figure 10) will 
be covered:   
 risk in a single-hazard framework (in the majority of hazard specific topics)  
 risk in a multilayer single-hazard framework when focusing on specific asset (e.g., 
critical infrastructure) 
 risk in multihazard framework (e.g. Natech accidents) 
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Figure 10. From single-risk to multi-risk assessment: terminology. 
 
Source: Zshcau, 2017 
Where do we stand? At this stage not all the topics could be addressed with the same 
level of attention in each of the hazard fields. Most probably because: 
 the risk related available knowledge and current research focus vary among 
hazards fields 
 risk assessments  for different hazards/assets have to tackle different challenges 
 disaster risk management is hazard and asset related, e.g., for each hazard 
related risk there are different solutions efficient in different phases of the DRM 
cycle 
The methodologies and processes to carry out disaster risk assessment have 
advanced in the last decade, as highlighted by many of the contributions in Chapters 
8-16. National risk assessments should consider the requirements of EU legislation. EU 
legislation (see Table 1) and research projects seem to boost disaster risk assessment 
exercises. These two elements have served to encourage the scientific community to 
work for specific outputs, having particular and common objectives to reach, and to work 
in the validation and credibility of methods, as many stakeholders are usually engaged in 
RA exercises and the outcomes of it must help governmental officials to make decisions. 
Furthermore, as said in Chapter 3, the information produced about the disaster risk 
drivers point out which actions could be taken in order to reduce future disaster risk. 
Table 1. Summary of the legal framework and standards in place for assessing the risk of different 
hazard at the EU, and the need to report about it to EU institutions. 
Hazard EU legislation/Standards Reporting 
Earthquakes 
Eurocode 8: Design of structures for 
earthquake resistance (CEN, 2005)19 
 
                                           
19 Eurocode 8 is introduced in the legal framework of some EU/EFTA MS as obligatory, but in other MS it is 
voluntary. The situation with the obligatory use of the Eurocode 8 Parts in the different countries is 
presented by Dimova et. al (2015).  
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Earthquakes 
Commission Recommendation 2003/887/EC 
on the implementation and use of Eurocodes 
for construction works and structural 
construction products 
20 
Floods 
The Flood directive: Directive 2007/60/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the assessment and management of flood 
risks. 
 
Threats of biological, 
chemical, 
environmental and 
unknown origin 
Decision 1082/2013/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on serious 
cross-border threats to health 
Commission Implementing Decision 
implementing Decision No 1082/2013/EU 
 
Zoonoses and zoonotic 
agents 
Directive 2003/99/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the 
monitoring of zoonoses and zoonotic agents 
 
Critical Infrastructure 
The European programme for Critical 
Infrastructure: Council Directive 
2008/114/EC on the identification and 
designation of European critical 
infrastructures and the assessment of the 
need to improve their protection 
 
Chemical accidents 
 
The Seveso III directive : Directive 
2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous 
substances 
 
Nuclear accidents 
Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom laying 
down basic safety standards for protection 
against the dangers arising from exposure to 
ionising radiation 
Council Directive 2014/87/EURATOM 
amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom 
establishing a Community framework for the 
nuclear safety of nuclear installations 
 
Natech accidents 21 
The Seveso III directive : Directive 
2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous 
substances 
 
 
                                           
20 There is a non-binding piece of EU legislation (Commission Recommendation 2003/887/EC) which 
recommends to the EU and EFTA MSs to notify the European Commission on the Nationally Determined 
Parameters chosen for their territory. 
21 The term Natech accidents covers technological disasters triggered by natural hazards. In case of the 
chemical facilities the regulations are provided by the Seveso III directive, while for the other facilities, 
such as off-shore structures and pipelines the standards by industry are applied.  
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Establishing a framework facilitates different communities to work together, and 
networks to grow and mature in their understanding of risk. As shown by the teams 
dealing with technological accidents, lessons learned are a valuable source for 
improving risk identification and analysis. 
One of the main challenges highlighted by the majority of groups is data quality and 
availability. Data is many times recorded by different institutions for their own 
purposes, not necessarily matching the ones of single-hazard assessments. European-
wide databases are proposed by the authors although local one is preferred in the 
guidelines (Commission Staff Working Paper, 2010). However, the objective of DRMKC 
Risk Data Hub is to improve the access and share EU-wide curated risk data either 
through hosting relevant datasets or through linking to national platforms for fostering 
Disaster Risk Management (DRM).  
There seems to be room for improvement regarding scenario building. Scenarios 
should consider different triggers of a hazard together with the conditions that lead to 
these to happen, while the socio-political and economic context and possible future 
trends are included. The advantage of the scenario approach is to include also the 
capacities in place to prevent/mitigate, recovery actions after the disaster as well as 
cascading events. Furthermore, to assure the comparability among the scenarios the list 
of assets considered should be kept the same. If technological facilities are on the list 
then Natech accidents should be part of all scenarios. 
Reach the impact. The different hazard communities have developed methodologies to 
calculate the potential losses on assets commonly affected by the materialization of the 
hazard of their expertise. The dynamic nature of the hazard together with the difficulties 
to characterize the different dimensions of vulnerability and integrate these in the 
methods, sometimes lead to general and highly uncertain outputs. Some teams struggle 
to calculate the most direct (in time and space) impact suffered by an asset, considering 
the resources and time that decision-makers would require to act in time on the assets 
they would like to protect. Socio-economic implications of an event are a challenge for all 
the risk assessment contributions. Nonetheless, characterizing the risk and using 
comprehensive and balanced approaches, even if simplified ones, is supported by the 
authors to plan measures to reduce risk.  
Methodologies diversification and sophistication can be fruitful, but it might be a double-
edged sword. As shown by the authors, assumptions are inevitably introduced. As 
recommended, these should be reported together with the limitation of the methods. It is 
responsibility of scientific teams to clearly state the advantages and disadvantages 
of the steps followed and how these affect the results presented. Actually the preferred 
method to be used would consider many criteria (data availability, transparency, 
consistency of the method, reliability of estimates, the possibility to assess uncertainty, 
etc.). This way, scientific teams secure providing all information at hand for decision-
makers to carry out their duties.  
 
41 
6 Way Forward 
 
NRA is a demanding process and presents a challenge for each and every Member 
State in terms of resources, time and complexity. The complexity is introduced through 
the multi-disciplinary nature of the disaster risk assessment per se that requires the 
involvement of many affected sectors and parties from different communities. This is 
necessary to fully consider their perspective, information, experiences and knowledge. 
The most important objective of NRA is to find a common understanding with all 
relevant stakeholders of the risks faced and their relative priority in a transparent way. 
This will serve to make DRM planning efficient and finally to increase the country's 
resilience in a steady but timely manner.   
The Version 0 of this report has started the process of involving the scientific community 
to help overcome obstacles that national authorities in charge of the preparation of NRA 
process are confronting. The whole NRA process is split into smaller feasible tasks 
executed by different groups and the gaps which hinder each group to provide the results 
that would fit together into the bigger picture are revealed. National Risk Assessment 
is a compound of many processes of risk assessment each engaging different set of 
sectors but have the context of NRA in common.  
From a scientific point of view, the main challenges we are facing are mainly true: 
1. consistent disaster risk assessment processes that would allow the comparability 
and aggregation of risks arising from different hazards as well as different assets,  
2. the better understanding of how underlying risk drivers and required capacities 
define the level of risk.  
The first challenge would support decision makers to prioritize risks, while the second, is 
required for an effective reduction of disaster risk. Both together are essential part of 
integrated approach in DRM, linking prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, 
recovery, restoration and adaptation phases.   
Different hazards as well as different assets require specific methods to analyse their 
risk. Therefore, this report collects the contributions from several JRC expert groups 
that provide guidance for disaster risk assessment processes related to their scientific 
field, hazard or asset specific. Knowing the differences among risk assessment 
approaches related to different hazards/assets will eventually help us to find the 
framework covering all in terms of terminology, set of methodologies, risk metrics, data 
needed and results required for further treatment of risk. In majority of cases the science 
can, at the moment, provide advice for risk in a single-hazard framework. Rare are the 
cases with more advanced level of risk assessment considering more than one hazard, 
hazard interactions or even vulnerability interactions. They are usually driven by the 
strong presence of industry where the asset is the virtue, such as critical infrastructure, 
chemical and Natech accidents. These latter examples become the model for the way 
forward. 
Risk comparability should be treated in the context of risks in a multilayer 
single-hazard framework. Harmonising and standardising the assessment as well as 
the risk metrics among different hazards is the first step towards a multi hazard 
assessment. One of the key messages of "Science for disaster risk management 2017: 
knowing better and losing less" [Poljanšek et al., 2017] is asking for multihazard risk 
assessment. This will be the challenge of the following versions of this report. To find the 
common risk metrics, the focus will be shifted to the assets to be protected and 
potential impacts of the specific asset arising from different hazards will be compared. 
To improve the understanding of underlying risk drivers and needed capacities 
can be dealt with the better knowledge base of risk, availability of data to describe 
hazard, exposure and vulnerability as well as development of the risk analysis 
methodologies that enables to model links between underlying risk drivers and 
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capacities, risk components and risk levels. The disaster loss databases are of major 
importance. For example, using past even losses it is possible to identify and quantify a 
wide range of socio-politic-economic drivers associated with the vulnerability. 
With the next version it is planned to expand also in a number of disaster risk scientific 
communities involved to introduce risks not mentioned herein, such as forest fires risk, 
extreme weather risk or cyber security risk, that are also identified as the most 
frequent disaster risks among MS according to the last EU risk overview (Commission 
Staff Working Paper, 2017). 
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8 Drought 
ALFRED DE JAGER, GUSTAVO NAUMANN, JUERGEN V. VOGT 
 
 Context of drought risk assessment 8.1
The Member States of the European Union report every three years on the national risk 
assessment for various disasters that occur on their respective territories. In order to 
assess priorities at European level an initiative was started aiming to make the reporting 
between the various Member States comparable.  
In this section, recommendations for the development of national drought risk 
assessments and for reporting on drought disasters are presented.  The 
recommendations are mainly based on the methodologies presented in a recently 
published JRC Technical Report on drought risk assessment and management (Vogt et al. 
2018) and the guidelines developed by the Global Water Partnership for Central and 
Eastern Europe in 2015 (GWP-CEE, 2015). Also some recommendations from the 
reporting obligations under the Water Framework Directive and from scientific literature 
are presented. 
This first version of recommendations aims to help the various existing assessments to 
converge over time, allowing the Member States to learn from experiences in 
neighbouring countries with similar issues and problems. 
Drought is for many countries one of the most expensive weather and climate related 
disasters. This affirmation is true for both, the world and particularly for Europe. 
Estimations of the losses due to drought in the US are in the order of 232.5 billion US$ in 
the period 1980 to 2017 (NOAA, 2017) and in Europe the annual losses were estimated 
around 3.2 billion € (Water Scarcity and Droughts in Europe, 2017). This situation is 
highlighted by the following statement of Swiss Re, one of the main reinsurance 
companies worldwide: “The big drying – growing water stress: While the U.S. Southwest 
is in an on-going water crisis, similar situations can be found today and in the future 
around the world – from Southern Europe and the Mediterranean to Africa, parts of Asia 
and Latin America. The risks range from wildfires, competition for water among the 
energy and agricultural sectors to mass migration and wider conflict potentials.” (Egloff 
et al. 2017). 
 
 Risk identification  8.2
According to the main characteristics of the water deficit and the related impacts, 
droughts are often divided in four main types: Meteorological Drought, which is 
related to a lack of precipitation and/or high evaporative demand, lasting from  weeks to 
months  or even years, Agricultural Drought, which is a period with reduced soil 
moisture resulting in a deficit in plant water supply with related impacts on agricultural 
crops and/or natural vegetation, and Hydrological Drought, which is characterised by 
reduced river and groundwater flows. Hydrological drought can provoke a reduction of 
the accessibility of waterways and access to cooling water for industrial and energy 
generating processes. 
Finally, a socioeconomic drought is a condition in which important services such as 
energy and drinking water supply are reduced. 
The effect of a drought disaster can be exacerbated if it coincides with a heatwave. 
Warmer conditions increase evapotranspiration, depleting surface and soil water 
resources quicker. Moreover, a heat wave constitutes a disaster in itself in which access 
to clean water becomes essential both for humans as well as (wild) animals.  
Since droughts are a recurring feature of all climates and can occur almost everywhere 
(excluding deserts and very cold regions) every Member State should have a drought 
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management plan to cope with possible impacts. However, in Europe there are areas 
more prone to recurrent droughts such as the Mediterranean or parts of central Europe, 
in which Member States are more susceptible to suffer the negative effects of severe 
droughts.  
Unlike other natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, or wind storms that result in 
immediately noticeable and structural damage, droughts develop slowly and can last for 
long periods of time from some months up to several years. Frequently, drought 
conditions remain unnoticed until water shortages become severe and adverse impacts 
on environment and society become evident. Drought impacts may be influenced by 
adaptive buffers (e.g. water storage, purchase of livestock feed) or can continue long 
after precipitation has returned to normal conditions.  
The slowly developing nature and long duration of droughts, together with a large variety 
of impacts beyond commonly noticed agricultural losses, typically makes the task of 
quantifying drought impacts difficult.  
Impacts of droughts can be classified as direct or indirect. Vogt et al., (2018) present a 
detailed characterization of the many different sectors that might be adversely affected 
by droughts. Examples of direct impacts are a reduction of water levels, reduced crop 
and forest productivity, increased wild fire occurrence, increased livestock mortality, and 
damage to ecosystems, and tourism among many others. 
Similarly, many economic sectors and livelihoods are indirectly affected by droughts as 
they rely in different ways on water availability. These indirect effects can propagate or 
cascade quickly through the economic system, affecting also regions far from where the 
drought originates. Indirect impacts relate to secondary consequences on natural and 
economic resources. They may affect ecosystems and biodiversity, human health, 
commercial shipping and forestry. In extreme cases drought may result in temporary or 
permanent unemployment or even business interruption, increased prices of food, and 
can lead to malnutrition and disease in more vulnerable countries (Vogt et al. 2018). 
The main sectors potentially affected by droughts might be identified by consultation with 
the main stakeholders as a first step of the risk assessment. Once the main sectors are 
recognised the assessment should be tailored to these specific needs and several 
complementary risk layers could be drafted for the different users. For instance, the 
information relevant for a farmer is not necessarily relevant for a water manager working 
in an inter-basin water transfer system and vice versa. 
 
 Drought risk analysis and characterization 8.3
There are several ways to approach drought risk, however, the most commonly applied 
are the so-called outcome and contextual approach (Van Lanen et al. 2017). The 
outcome or impact approach is based on the interactions between stressor and 
response. In this case, the endpoint of the analysis is the vulnerability (the more damage 
a society suffers, the more vulnerable it is). This approach relies on the use of 
quantitative measures of historical impacts as proxies for the vulnerability estimation. 
However, relying on historical impacts has several limitations, mainly because impact 
data are often unavailable or not directly comparable between different regions.  
The contextual approach is based on intrinsic social or economic factors that define the 
vulnerability. Here the vulnerability is the starting point, allowing understanding why the 
exposed population or assets are susceptible to the damaging effects of a drought. It is 
more suitable for setting targets for disaster risk reduction. This approach generally relies 
on combined indicators, which are mathematical combinations of risk determinants that 
have no common unit of measurement. 
Agriculture (crop and livestock production) is often the first sector affected by droughts. 
Globally, almost 86 percent of agricultural damages and losses were caused by drought 
events. A reduction in water availability and increases in solar radiation and temperature 
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during a drought event can be directly translated into a significant reduction of crop 
productivity.  
End users, water managers and policy makers rely on drought risk assessments that 
usually are developed with emphasis on agricultural and primary sector impacts. The 
conceptual framework presented here as an example of drought risk assessment was 
applied in an operational global risk assessment22. This system is mainly oriented to 
agriculture and other primary sectors. However, the described methodology can be 
applied at different scales (regional to local) and to different sectors.  
According to this framework, drought risk can be conceptualized as a combination of the 
natural hazard, the exposed assets and their inherent vulnerability (susceptibility to 
drought and adaptive capacity). Following this definition, the risk to be subject to 
damages and economic losses from a drought event depends on the combination of the 
severity and probability of occurrence of a certain event, the exposed assets (crops, 
livestock, critical infrastructure) and/or people, and their intrinsic vulnerability 
(susceptibility and adaptive capacity) to cope with a disaster (Carrão et al. 2016).  
 
8.3.1 Hazard characterization 
Droughts affect different economic sectors and sector-specific risk assessments need to 
be developed. The characterization of the drought hazard should identify the most 
suitable drought indicator to represent the water resources necessary to meet the 
specific needs and uses of each sector. For instance, precipitation and/or soil moisture 
anomalies are key for rainfed agriculture, while river low flows, groundwater and 
reservoir storage are important for water supply systems. 
 
8.3.2 Exposure identification 
Drought exposure is linked to the location of assets and persons that could potentially be 
affected by droughts. This information has to be represented through spatially explicit 
geographic variables. For instance, Carrão et al. 2016, proposed an approach taking into 
account different proxy indicators characterizing agriculture and primary sectors, namely 
crop areas and livestock distribution (agricultural drought), industrial domestic water 
stress (hydrological drought) and human population (socioeconomic drought).     
 
8.3.3 Vulnerability identification 
Drought vulnerability is a key risk component as it allows identifying the policy relevant 
variables to be targeted (Naumann et al. 2018). Since it is not possible to reduce drought 
frequency and severity, interventions to reduce drought impacts have to focus on 
reducing vulnerability of human and natural systems. 
As illustrated in Carrão et al., 2016, a multidimensional model composed by social, 
economic and infrastructural dimensions can represent vulnerability. Social vulnerability 
is linked to the level of well-being of individuals, communities and society; economic 
vulnerability is highly dependent upon the economic status of individuals, communities 
and nations; and infrastructural vulnerability comprises the basic infrastructures needed 
to support the production of goods and sustainability of livelihoods.  
According to this approach, each dimension is represented by generic proxies that reflect 
the level of development of different constituents of civil society and its economy. In that 
                                           
22 Global Drought Observatory (GDO): www.edo.jrc.ec.europa.eu/gdo/ 
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sense, individuals and populations require a range of independent factors or capacities to 
achieve positive resilience to drought impacts while no single factor on its own is 
sufficient to yield the varied livelihood outcomes that a society needs in order to cope 
with droughts.  
Some variables that could be included into the vulnerability assessments are listed below 
as an example: 
● Dependency on agriculture for livelihoods,  
● Energy use,  
● Farmers with crop/livestock insurance, 
● Market fragility, 
● Adult literacy rate,  
● Availability of functioning drought early warning systems, 
● Volume of water storage in a safe reservoir,  
● Population without access to improved water, 
● Institutional capacity and government effectiveness,  
● Fertiliser consumption,   
● Availability of water infrastructure, like reservoirs and irrigation systems. 
 
Figure 11: Drought hazard, exposure, vulnerability and risk for agricultural production in Europe 
according to the conceptual approach (after Carrao et al. 2016 and Vogt et al. 2018).  
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As an example, Figure 11 shows the three determining factors of drought risk (hazard, 
exposure and vulnerability) as well as their combination that results into the drought risk 
map for agricultural production in Europe. In this case, the scores for each component 
are not an absolute measure, but a relative statistic that provides a regional ranking of 
hotspots where to target and prioritise actions to reinforce adaptation plans and 
mitigation activities. This kind of analysis could be refined at higher resolution to obtain 
meaningful results at different scales of analysis. These can range from the farm level to 
the continent allowing an assessment of the spatial distribution of the drought risk within 
a given area of interest (e.g. farm, province, river basin or country). As this framework is 
data driven, to obtain reliable estimates the main limitation is the availability of data at 
the different levels. 
 
 Risk treatment (actions to prevent drought impacts) 8.4
To reduce the drought risk Member States need to present an inventory of the legal and 
institutional tools available in the country to perform the actions (Iglesias et al. 2009) 
briefly presented in the following chapters. After this short introduction for every action, 
a quantification method will be proposed, allowing comparing the readiness between the 
Member States. 
The preparation of Drought Management Plans should be linked to an agreed conceptual 
framework for drought management and based on clear drought definitions (Vogt et al. 
2018). A good example can be found in the National Drought Management Policy 
Guidelines published by the Integrated Drought Management Programme (IDMP) (WMO 
and GWP 2014) and adapted to regional circumstances by the Global Water Partnership 
for Central and Eastern Europe (GWP-CEE 2015).  
As presented in EC (2007) two basic approaches for drought risk management are 
currently applied. Their related legal and institutional tools can be divided into reactive 
and proactive actions. The proactive approach is linked with plans to prevent or 
minimize drought impacts in advance; these are mainly long-term actions, aimed to 
make the territory and the economy more robust to cope with droughts. The reactive 
approach includes actions after a drought event has started and is linked to short-term 
actions that can be executed during an emergency. 
8.4.1 Organizational issues 
It is recommended that the Member State establish a Drought Scientific and Advisory 
Committee. This Committee consists of scientific and practical experts in Land and Water 
Management and must be able to advice the various government bodies freely and 
openly. Care must be taken that the Committee is not representing so-called 
stakeholders. Stakeholders should be represented using the normal political decision 
process.  
The Committee should set out rules on when to gather during an emerging catastrophe 
and have the power to advice the government on declaring the state of emergency. The 
committee can also set out the relevance of the various actions mentioned in this 
document considering the local climatological, geographical and economical context of 
the Member State. 
In Member States with differing climates or federalization, more than one of these 
committees can co-exist. 
8.4.2 Short Term Actions, during and immediately after the emergency 
In order to mitigate the effects of an emerging drought disaster the Member State needs 
to be able and have legislation in place, to perform the following actions. 
Water Demand Reduction: 
 Information campaigns for water saving 
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 Restrictions (e.g. car washing, gardening etc.) 
 Irrigation restrictions 
 Mandatory Rationing 
Water Supply Increase: 
 Temporary use of additional sources (river, seawater)  
 Temporary exploitation of groundwater reserves 
Impact minimization: 
 Temporary reallocation of water resources 
 Public aids to compensate income losses 
 Tax reduction or delay of payment deadlines 
 Public aids for crop insurance 
8.4.3 Long term actions, National Strategy 
In order to make the territory and the economy less prone to drought disasters the 
Member State can develop a policy using a Drought Management Plan. Such a plan can 
focus on the following long-term actions: 
Water Demand Reduction: 
 Economic incentives for water saving 
 Pricing policy 
 Agronomic techniques for reducing water consumption 
 Drought resistant crops replacing of irrigated crops 
 Dual distribution network for urban use 
 Water recycling in industries 
Water Supply Increase: 
 Reuse of treated waste water 
 Leak detection programs 
 Inter-basin and within-basin water transfers 
 Reservoir construction or amplification of existing reservoirs 
 Construction of farm ponds 
 Desalinization 
 Control of seepage and evaporation losses 
 Keeping water longer in the ecosystem by naturalization of channelled rivers and 
creation of ponds 
 Counter actions on cementation (surface sealing), increasing soil water storage 
capacity 
 (Re)Forestation policy 
Impact minimization: 
 Education / awareness campaigns 
 Reallocation of water resources based on water quality requirements 
 Development/improvement of early warning systems 
 Implementation of Drought Management Plan 
 Programs for areas with soils subjective to additional hazards during droughts 
o Peatlands, leaking – drainage problems 
o Clayey soils, cracking – construction problems 
o Sandy soils, lack of moisture holding capacity– quick dryness of soils 
o Percolation of salty sea water in groundwater resources in coastal areas 
 Insurance programs 
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8.4.4 Quantification of the actions 
The following table gives a short overview of the actions previously presented and 
accompanied by a quantification method allowing them to be comparable between the 
Member States.  
The list is not exhaustive, and some measures are not relevant in very wet climates 
and/or in areas with a low population density.  
Besides the quantification, it is recommended to notice the source on which the 
quantification is based as well as a judgement on the quality of the quantification (poor, 
good, excellent). 
 
Table 2: Overview of the actions accompanied by a quantification method allowing them to be 
comparable between the Member States 
 
Action Impact Quantification Remark 
Information/Education 
Campaigns 
Change of behaviour 
in quantity of water 
use 
€ / per citizen / per 
year 
Measure effect, 
divide state and 
private sector 
campaigns 
Restrictions in water use Prioritizing the 
available resource 
Effort in enforcing the 
law in € 
Description of the 
law 
Restrictions in irrigation Prioritizing the 
available resource 
Loss of crops in € in 
year 
Description of the 
law 
Mandatory rationing Prioritizing the 
available resource 
Effort in enforcing the 
law in € 
Description of the 
law 
Temporary use of 
additional water sources 
Increasing resource, 
of lower quality 
Realization price of 
the effort 
m3 potential 
available 
Temporary use of 
groundwater 
Increasing resource m3 potential available, 
in emergency 
Description of 
installations 
Temporary reallocation of 
water resources 
Prioritizing the 
available resource 
m3 potential available, 
in emergency 
Description of 
installations 
Public aids to compensate 
income losses 
Preservation of the 
economic structure 
of the food 
production sector 
In €, total available 
funds, total used fund 
in year 
Reference to the 
law 
Tax reduction or delay of 
payment deadlines 
 
Preservation of the 
economic structure 
of the food 
production sector 
In € and time for year Reference to the 
law 
Public aids for crop 
insurance 
Preservation of the 
economic structure 
of the food 
production sector 
In € and for year Reference to the 
law 
Economic incentives for Gradually spilling In € per year Potential of water 
saving should be 
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Action Impact Quantification Remark 
water saving less water quantified 
Agronomic techniques for 
reducing water 
consumption 
 
Gradually spilling 
less water 
# of researchers 
working on the topic 
Peer reviewed 
articles on the 
subject produced by 
researchers of the 
Member State 
Dry crops in place of 
irrigated crops 
 
Reducing 
vulnerability 
Percent decrease in 
irrigated area per year 
Mark if official 
policy objectives 
Dual distribution network 
for urban use 
 
Optimizing use of 
resource 
€ invested per citizen 
per year, # of citizens 
connected to a dual 
system 
Mark if official 
policy objective 
Water recycling in 
industries 
 
Optimizing resource, 
avoiding pollution 
€ invested per year, 
m3 water extracted 
per year, per major 
river 
Reference to River 
basin plan of the 
WFD 
Reuse of treated waste 
water 
Increasing quantity 
of resource 
m3 water reused per 
year 
 
Leak detection programs 
 
Avoiding loss, also 
economic 
Length of water piping 
system, m3 water loss 
through leaks, K€ 
investment per year. 
Maintenance 
investment per year in 
national water pipe 
and sewage system. 
 
Inter-basin and within-
basin water transfers 
 
Flexibility increase Description of the 
possibilities in m3 
water per basin (from 
to) 
Reference to River 
basin plan of the 
WFD 
Reservoir construction or 
amplification of existing 
reservoirs 
Flexibility increase Storage capacity in 
the existing reservoirs 
(m3), m3 storage 
capacity in planned 
reservoirs. K€ planned 
investment for next 3 
years 
 
Construction of farm ponds 
 
Increasing coping 
capacity 
# of existing ponds, # 
of planned ponds for 
next 3 years 
Reference to River 
Basin Management 
Plan of the WFD 
Desalination Straight increase of 
availability resource 
Capacity in m3 and 
percentage reliance 
on renewable energy 
of Desalinization. 
Provide planning for 
the next 3 years 
both public and 
private (guess) 
Control of seepage and Improving 
agricultural 
Investment in K€ per  
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Action Impact Quantification Remark 
evaporation losses 
 
practices year 
Keeping water longer in 
the ecosystem, 
naturalization of 
channelled rivers and 
creation of ponds 
Adaptation of the 
hydro geographical 
system, correction 
of past errors 
Investment in K€ and 
capacity potential 
 
Counter actions on 
cementation, enhancing 
Soil Water Storage 
capacity increase 
Increasing the 
storage capacity of 
water in the 
landscape 
Investment in K€ in 
projects regarding the 
subject 
 
Reallocation of water 
resources based on water 
quality requirements 
Enhancing flexibility 
during hazard 
m3 of potential water 
resources 
 
Stimulation of silvo-
pasture and agroforestry 
Connecting 
vegetation with 
groundwater 
Km2 increase of area 
under silvo-pasture or 
agroforestry 
Provide government 
measurements to 
enhance change 
Development/improvement 
of early warning systems 
 
Timely information 
flow 
Qualitative description Reference to the 
systems, relation to 
setting state of 
emergency 
Implementation of a 
Drought Management Plan 
 
Coordination 
between various 
agents 
Qualitative description Relation to 
upstream and 
downstream plans 
in neighbouring 
countries 
Programs for areas with 
soils subjective to 
additional hazards during 
droughts 
Minimize impact Mapping of the areas 
with sensitive soils for 
example with cracking 
Description of the 
programs, soils with 
changing properties 
if drought lasts 
long. 
Insurance programs Enabling restart 
after the hazard 
M€ of harvest insured 
against drought 
Also M€ claimed 
and reimbursed to 
be marked. 
Drought Scientific Advisory 
Board 
Counteracting focus 
on short term 
interests 
Members of the Board 
and their affiliations 
Did the board 
create an advice in 
the last 3 years? 
 
 Gaps and challenges 8.5
Assessing the risk for drought-related impacts to society and environment is a complex 
task, complicated by the very nature of the phenomenon, its often large spatial extent 
and temporal duration, leading to cascading impacts that may affect areas far distant 
from the actual drought and may last long after the actual drought has ceased. Lack of 
standardized data on historical impacts (both damage and loss) are a further 
complication.  
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The interlinkages with other hazards such as wildfires, heatwaves and even floods and 
the combined risks arising from different hazards need to be explored. These risk 
assessments need to be sector specific, requiring an adequate set of environmental and 
socio-economic data related to the respective sectors. 
However, together with more efforts in the collection and standardisation of impact data, 
the use of conceptual models that rely on policy relevant variables or proxies of socio-
economic vulnerability can help stakeholders and policy makers to spot the most 
vulnerable sectors and the goals to be achieved in the high risk areas.   
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9 Earthquakes 
MARIA LUÍSA SOUSA, GEORGIOS TSIONIS 
 Introduction 9.1
Earthquake is the fourth most common hazard assessed in the recent national risk 
assessments prepared by the countries participating in the Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism23. Indeed, 19 countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain and Sweden) performed risk assessment for earthquake phenomena and 
in some cases considered cross-border and cascading effects, such as tsunami, 
landslides, disruption of infrastructure and industrial accidents. 
The effects of earthquakes can vary from localised events to dramatic impacts on 
communities, infrastructure, the economy and the environment, across large regions. 
Occurrence of a major seismic event in an urban area can have a particularly severe 
impact, resulting in the complete disruption of economic and social functions in the 
community. Table 3 shows that important earthquakes that occurred in Europe during 
the last 15 years affected whole regions and caused significant damage that reached 
billions of euros. 
Table 3. Earthquakes in Europe since 2002, for which the EU Solidarity Fund intervened 
Occurrence Country Category Damage (million €) 
October 2002, Molise Italy Regional 1558 
April 2009, Abruzzo Italy Regional 10212 
May 2011, Lorca Spain Regional 843 
May 2012, Emilia Romagna Italy Regional 13274 
January 2014, Kefalonia Greece Regional 147 
November 2015, Lefkada Greece Regional 66 
August 2016 – January 2017, Central Italy Italy Major 21879 
June 2017, Lesbos Greece Regional 54 
July 2017, Kos Greece Regional 101 
Source: EU Solidarity Fund, 2018 (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index.cfm/en/funding/solidarity-fund). 
Seismic risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the magnitude of the 
consequences of an earthquake and the likelihood of these consequences to occur. It is 
normally obtained considering the seismic hazard of the site or region, the exposed 
assets that may be impacted by an earthquake and the vulnerability of those elements at 
risk, for instance, the vulnerability of different types of buildings or constructions. 
This Chapter presents the main components of seismic risk assessment, i.e. hazard, 
exposure and vulnerability assessment, and the available methodologies for impact 
assessment at a regional scale. Other specific models and methodologies apply for the 
seismic risk assessment of individual assets. It provides references to state-of-the-art 
models, as well as a list of software for seismic risk assessment and of relevant European 
                                           
23 Commission Staff Working Document, Overview of natural and man-made disaster risks the European Union 
may face, SWD(2017) 176 final 
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research projects on this issue. The practical use of models and tools is illustrated 
through three risk assessments that were recently performed in European countries. 
 Hazard assessment 9.2
Many countries in the South-Eastern part of Europe are particularly exposed to 
earthquakes, which is consistent with the main fault lines in Europe located where the 
Eurasian plate meets the African plate and runs through the Mediterranean Sea. Active 
zones of seismicity in countries’ border regions may result in cross-border impacts of 
earthquake events. 
Earthquake hazard may be assessed with deterministic or probabilistic methods. Scenario 
studies, e.g. Coburn and Spence (2002), frequently refer to a maximum probable or 
maximum credible earthquake based on a deterministic seismic hazard assessment (see 
Chapter 9.4.2). Probabilistic methods for seismic hazard analysis have evolved 
significantly in the last decades and are widely used nowadays. Depending on the 
available data, they make use of historical and instrumental seismic records, seismogenic 
models, geological and geodetic data, time-dependent trends in earthquake recurrence, 
and ground motion prediction equations. Uncertainties in seismic hazard assessment 
originate from the models for the seismogenic source and ground motion, from the 
parameters used in those models and from the random nature of seismic events (Silva et 
al., 2017). 
The European Plate Observing System (EPOS)24, facilitates integrated use of data, data 
products, and facilities from distributed research infrastructures for solid Earth science in 
Europe. EPOS comprises thematic core services that are relevant to seismic hazard 
assessment, namely on seismology (waveform data, earthquake parametric data and 
hazard data), near fault observatories, geological data and modelling. 
The results of seismic hazard analysis are obtained in terms of an intensity measure, 
such as peak ground acceleration, peak ground displacement, spectral acceleration and 
spectral displacement for the fundamental period of the structure, spectrum intensity, 
etc. 
Figure 12. Peak ground acceleration from the SHARE project (Giardini et al., 2013) for 475 years 
return period (left) and peak ground acceleration from the National Annexes to Eurocode 8 for 475 
years return period, except for 100 years in Romania and 2500 years in UK (right) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Palermo et al, 2018. 
In probabilistic seismic hazard assessment methods, the reference values of intensity 
measures are calculated for a prescribed return period (e.g. 475 years) or for probability 
                                           
24 www.epos-ip.org 
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of exceedance of an intensity level in a period of time (e.g. 10 % in 50 years). A hazard 
curve provides a continuous relationship between intensity and probability of 
exceedance. A harmonised Seismic Hazard Model for Europe (Woessner et al., 2015) was 
produced within the SHARE25 project (Figure 12) and is currently being updated and 
extended in the framework of the SERA26 project. 
Hazard studies serve also to produce maps of seismic zones that are included in design 
codes, such as Eurocode 8 (CEN, 2004). Within the suite of Eurocodes27, Eurocode 8 
applies to the design and construction of buildings and civil engineering works in seismic 
regions. For this purpose, national territories are subdivided into seismic zones, 
depending on the local hazard. By definition, the hazard within each zone is assumed to 
be constant and is most often expressed in values of peak ground acceleration. It is 
noted that the seismic zone maps and peak ground acceleration levels given in the 
National Annexes to Eurocode 8 (Figure 12) were produced in different times and with 
different hazard models and data. 
 Exposure and vulnerability assessment 9.3
Assets that may be impacted by earthquakes include buildings, people, business and 
economic activities, basic services (health facilities, emergency services, educational 
facilities, etc.), infrastructures (transportation, water, sewage, gas, communication, 
etc.), cultural heritage and the environment. 
Exposure data for buildings have been collected for a few cities around Europe, often at a 
high level of geographic disaggregation. Another significant source of information on the 
building stock, albeit not fully harmonised across countries, are the cadastres and 
national housing censuses that may furnish an exhaustive picture of the housing stock in 
a region. In the framework of the Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for 
Response (PAGER) system, a global building inventory has been compiled based on 
harmonised data from various sources (Jaiswal et al., 2010). It provides fractions of 
building types present in urban and rural regions of each country by their functional use. 
The quality of data in the PAGER database for most of the high-seismicity countries in 
Europe is judged medium or high. The NERA project followed a similar procedure with 
focus on European countries (Crowley et al., 2012). The Global Exposure Database 
developed by the Global Earthquake Model (GEM) Foundation (Gamba, 2014) is 
structured at country, region, local and building level, and distinguishes between urban 
or rural areas, and residential or non-residential buildings. The Global Human 
Settlement28 (GHS) framework produces global spatial information about the human 
presence on the planet, in the form of built up maps, population density maps and 
settlement maps. 
The vulnerability of physical assets at risk is described by means of fragility functions 
that describe the probability that, for a given value of the earthquake intensity, 
structures of a certain typology will exceed different damage levels. Empirical fragility 
functions are based on observed damage data from past earthquakes, while numerical 
ones are produced from the results of numerical simulations of varying degrees of 
sophistication. Uncertainties in probabilities of damage originate from the variability of 
the seismic action, geometric and material parameters of the studied structures, type of 
structural model and analysis, resistance models, definition of damage states, etc. A 
collection of fragility curves for buildings, bridges, highway and railway infrastructure, 
harbour elements, health care facilities, electric power stations, gas and oil distribution 
networks, water and waste-water systems, may be found in Pitilakis et al. (2014) and 
Yepes-Estrada et al. (2016). 
The majority of buildings in the European stock are vulnerable to earthquakes, as they 
have been designed without earthquake resistance or with moderate-level seismic codes 
                                           
25 www.share-eu.org 
26 www.sera-eu.org 
27 http://eurocodes.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
28 https://ghsl.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
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(Figure 13). This is particularly relevant for the countries of moderate and high 
seismicity in south and east Europe (Figure 12). 
Figure 13. Seismic vulnerability of buildings in Europe. 
 
Source: Palermo et al, 2018. 
 Impact assessment 9.4
9.4.1 General 
Ground shaking is the most damaging effect of earthquakes. It results from the passage 
of seismic waves through the ground, affecting built and natural environments. Ground 
shaking triggers other hazards, like liquefaction and subsidence, which can disrupt 
lifelines, harbours and originate bridge and building foundation failures. Examples of 
earthquake-induced environmental effects are rock falls and landslides. Those were 
observed to cause significant soil erosion or to block river streams creating quake lakes 
of major concern to neighbouring urban regions. Severe shallow earthquakes causing 
vertical displacements on the ocean floor may generate tsunami waves able to produce 
destruction over large areas. Surface faulting and ground failure can cause the disruption 
of tunnels, railroads, powerlines, water supply networks and other lifelines. Fires 
following earthquakes, linked for instance to the rupture of gas mains, are important 
secondary effect of earthquakes, eventually aggravated by the disruption of water supply 
systems. Potential disastrous secondary damage caused by earthquakes, can also result 
in Natech accidents, i.e., Natural Hazard Triggering Technological Disasters, such as the 
release of hazardous materials and the destruction of vital transport and technical 
infrastructure, industrial buildings and facilities. Other examples of earthquake secondary 
effects are air pollution due to burning of chemicals, demolition of damaged buildings and 
traffic congestion after a major earthquake (Gotoh et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2008). In the 
reconstruction phase, the increased demand for construction materials in a very short 
time may lead to shortage of natural building materials and subsequently to 
environmental impacts like coastal erosion, saline intrusion and illegal mining (Khazai et 
al., 2006). 
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Earthquake ground shaking intensity may be calculated for a deterministic scenario or in 
a probabilistic way. Models of ground shaking, fragility or vulnerability functions and the 
distribution of exposed assets in a region are used to estimate damage and losses. Loss 
estimation methods with reference to a region are fundamental for assessing seismic 
risk, and for government and insurance companies evaluating the economic 
consequences of earthquakes. For instance, they provide a useful first order estimate for 
planning and analysing funding requests in the aftermath of a seismic event (De Martino 
et al., 2017). 
In practice, the models and methodologies for seismic risk assessment are able to 
estimate several Sendai Framework Indicators29, such as, number of deaths, injured 
people, people whose dwellings were damaged or destroyed, direct economic loss in 
relation to global gross domestic product, direct economic loss in the housing sector, 
damage to critical infrastructure, and disruptions to basic services. 
9.4.2 Methodologies for risk assessment 
Earthquake scenarios may be assessed using deterministic or probabilistic methods as 
referred in section 9.2. An example of an earthquake hazard scenario is the maximum 
probable or credible earthquake, i.e., the largest earthquake that is reasonable to expect 
in a region. It is often based on a deterministic seismic hazard assessment, like the 
estimation of the magnitude of the worst historical event reported in a region and its best 
guessed location derived from known geological faults, or seismic source zones. The 
evaluation of the effects of deterministic earthquake scenarios is a way to prepare 
emergency plans for civil protection, to model seismic losses for a region, or to obtain 
time histories and duration of ground motion to be used in seismic design and retrofitting 
(Sousa and Campos Costa, 2009). 
Probabilistic seismic risk assessment considers all possible earthquakes that may affect a 
site and a probabilistic estimation of damage and losses, including relevant uncertainties. 
Results are obtained in terms of risk metrics, such as, loss exceedance curves or 
averaged earthquake socio-economic losses. Thus, seismic risk may be described, among 
others, by (i) the probability that various levels of loss will be exceeded, (ii) by average 
annualized earthquake losses, (iii) or by average annualized earthquake loss ratio, AELR 
(FEMA, 2017). AELR is a useful metric to compare the relative risk across different 
regions, since it is normalized by the replacement value. 
Several open-source tools are available for the assessment of loss scenarios and the 
evaluation of the earthquake impact in a region (Chapter 9.8). 
9.4.3 Damage-to-loss models 
Generally, damage-to-loss models assess the total repair cost for a class of buildings, or 
building typology, correlating a given damage threshold to the repair cost, knowing the 
building replacement cost in the region (ATC, 1985, D’Ayala et al., 2015, De Martino et 
al., 2017, FEMA, 2018, Martins et al., 2016, Wehner and Edwards, 2013). There exist 
also empirical models to estimate debris resultant from building collapse (FEMA, 2018, 
Santarelli et al., 2018). Similar methodologies are used to estimate damage and losses in 
cultural heritage, taking into consideration the particularities of these structures. 
Empirical models, e.g. by Lehman et al. (2004) and Mackie and Stojadinović (2006) for 
bridges, relate the functionality of basic services and infrastructures to structural 
damage. The latter can be obtained, as function of earthquake ground shaking intensity, 
by means of numerical or empirical models (fragility functions). Empirical models are also 
available for business interruption (ATC, 1985, FEMA, 2018) as a function of structural 
damage. 
                                           
29 www.preventionweb.net/drr-framework/sendai-framework-monitor/indicators 
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 Estimation of casualties 9.5
Injuries and casualties during earthquakes are caused by structural and non-structural 
damage, accidents, heart attacks, etc. Coburn and Spence (2002) report that the 
majority (more than 75 %) of deaths in past events were due to building collapse and 
propose a 'lethality ratio', i.e. the ratio of people killed to the number of people present 
in a building, to estimate casualties for each building class. This ratio depends on the 
characteristics of the ground motion, the building type and function, collapse mechanism, 
occupancy, behaviour of occupants, and search and rescue effectiveness. The model 
provides, for each typology of collapsed building, the percentage of people that are 
lightly, moderately or seriously injured, or killed. A large number of casualty models with 
different degrees of sophistication have been developed (e.g. ATC, 1985, Balbi et al., 
2006, Cavalieri et al., 2012, Erdik et al., 2011, Jaiswal et al., 2009, Jaiswal and Wald, 
2012, Khazai et al., 2014, So and Pomonis, 2012, So and Spence, 2013, Spence et al., 
2011). 
9.5.1 Estimation of shelter needs 
Data from past earthquakes show that the number of displaced people is almost an order 
of magnitude higher than the number of collapsed and severely destroyed buildings. 
Multi-criteria models for estimating displaced households and short-term shelter needs 
consider the physical habitability of buildings together with the occupants' desirability to 
evacuate and to seek public shelter (Khazai et al., 2014, FEMA, 2018). The habitability of 
buildings is based on the physical damage, the loss of utilities (such as water and energy 
supply) and the weather conditions. The desirability to evacuate depends on a number of 
social factors, such as the household tenure and size, household type, age of occupants 
and perception of security in the area. Lastly, the desirability to seek public shelter is 
influenced by the fear of aftershocks, residents' income, employment and education 
level, as well as by the distance and ease of access to shelters. Data for these indicators 
are available through the national statistical institutes and Eurostat. 
 Software for seismic risk assessment 9.6
In the last decades several open-source tools with high degree of sophistication and 
capabilities have been developed for the assessment of loss scenarios, or for the 
evaluation of earthquake impact on critical infrastructures. Most of the software include 
libraries with pre-defined hazard and vulnerability models and also allow the user to input 
new ones. Examples include: 
 HAZUS30 is a standardised methodology for estimating potential losses from 
disasters that contains models for estimating potential losses from earthquakes, 
floods, and hurricanes. HAZUS uses GIS technology to estimate physical, 
economic, and social impacts of disasters. It is used for mitigation and recovery, 
as well as preparedness and response. 
 The CAPRA31 probabilistic risk assessment platform is an initiative that aims to 
strengthen the institutional capacity for assessing, understanding and 
communicating disaster risk, with the ultimate goal of integrating disaster risk 
information into development policies and programs. 
 AFAD – RED is the Turkish national operational tool for seismic risk assessment, 
prevention, preparedness and response. In its real-time operational configuration, 
the system combines seismic data with an extensive inventory of buildings, critical 
facilities and population to provide damage and fatality loss estimates. 
 The REAKT32 project produced the Earthquake Qualitative Impact Assessment 
(EQIA) tool that uses earthquake data (location and magnitude) and modelling 
                                           
30 www.fema.gov/hazus 
31 https://ecapra.org 
32 www.reaktproject.eu 
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(fault geometry, slip distribution, directivity effects, wave propagation, site 
effects, etc.) to produce real-time "heads-up" alerts for global earthquakes. 
 The SELENA33 open risk software is a tool to provide earthquake damage and loss 
estimates. It uses a logic tree approach and allows for deterministic analysis, 
probabilistic analysis and real-time ground motion data. 
 The OpenQuake34 engine is the Global Earthquake Model Foundation’s (GEM) 
state-of-the-art, free, open-source and accessible software collaboratively 
developed for earthquake hazard and risk modelling. 
 The RASOR35 project developed a platform to perform multi-hazard risk analysis 
to support the full cycle of disaster management, including targeted support to 
critical infrastructure monitoring and climate change impact assessment. 
 Rapid-N36 has been developed by the European Commission for the assessment of 
natural-hazard triggered technological (Natech) accidents risks at local and 
regional levels, and has currently been implemented for earthquakes. 
Andredakis et al. (2017) provide further details on these tools. Example applications with 
pre-loaded exposure data showed that these tools are able to produce an early impact 
assessment within 5-15 minutes. Comparison of predicted losses with data recorded after 
real earthquakes demonstrated that, in general, the order of magnitude of economic 
losses is accurately predicted, but casualties are overestimated. 
Near-real time loss assessment systems provide rapid estimates of ground motion, 
damage and losses following a seismic event, its magnitude, time of occurrence and 
location are known. PAGER37 is a well-known near-real time loss assessment system, 
which provides first order estimates of human and economic losses at a global scale. 
 Recent research 9.7
The European Union has provided within the Framework Programmes for research and 
innovation, significant funding for collaborative research projects dealing with the impact 
of earthquakes. The projects listed in Table 4 involved experts from across Europe. They 
produced state-of-the-art methodologies and models for hazard, vulnerability and risk 
assessment, developed tools that can be deployed in practice for preparedness, 
mitigation, planning and risk management activities. The methodologies, models and 
tools were used for a large number of illustrative case studies at local (city) or regional 
level. 
Table 4. European research projects related to seismic risk assessment. 
Project Title Duration Website 
LESSLOSS Risk mitigation for earthquakes 
and landslides 
2004-2007 https://cordis.europa.eu/pr
oject/rcn/74272_en.html 
NERIES Network of research 
infrastructures for European 
seismology 
2006-2010 https://cordis.europa.eu/pr
oject/rcn/79877_en.html 
SERIES Seismic engineering research 
infrastructures for European 
synergies 
2009-2013 www.series.upatras.gr 
                                           
33 www.norsar.no/r-d/safe-society/earthquake-hazard-risk/the-selena-open-risk-software 
34 www.globalquakemodel.org/oq-getting-started 
35 www.rasor-project.eu 
36 http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
37 https://earthquake.usgs.gov/data/pager 
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SHARE Seismic hazard harmonization 
in Europe 
2009-2012 www.share-eu.org 
SYNER-G Systemic seismic vulnerability 
and risk analysis for buildings, 
lifeline networks and 
infrastructures safety gain 
2009-2013 www.vce.at/SYNER-G 
NERA Network of European research 
infrastructures for earthquake 
risk assessment and mitigation 
2010-2014 https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa
.eu/knowledge/Projects-
Explorer#project-
explorer/631/projects/detail
/3922/nera/main-info 
REAKT Strategies and tools for real 
time earthquake risk reduction 
2011-2014 www.reaktproject.eu 
STREST Harmonized approach to stress 
tests for critical infrastructures 
against natural hazards 
2013-2016 www.strest-eu.org 
INDUSE-2-
SAFETY 
Component fragility analysis 
and seismic safety assessment 
of special risk petrochemical 
plants under design basis and 
beyond design basis accidents 
2014-2017 www.induse2safety.unitn.it 
SERA Seismology and earthquake 
engineering research 
infrastructure alliance for 
Europe 
2017-2020 www.sera-eu.org 
 
Furthermore, the Global Earthquake Model (GEM)38 is engaging with a very diverse 
community to i) share data, models, and knowledge through the OpenQuake platform, ii) 
apply GEM tools and software to inform decision-making for risk mitigation and 
management, and iii) expand the science and understanding of earthquakes. 
 Examples of seismic risk assessment studies 9.8
A probabilistic method was adopted for the assessment of seismic risk in 40 cities in 
metropolitan France (AFPS, 2014). The study employed hazard curves for cities in 
different seismic zones, fragility functions for buildings belonging to four vulnerability 
classes, and models that relate structural damage to the number of victims and to 
economic losses. The results are given in terms of probability of collapse of buildings, 
expected annual losses and probability of casualties. 
A scenario-based approach was followed for the seismic risk assessment in Spain 
(DGPCE, 2015). This study used the national seismic hazard maps, census and cadastral 
data respectively for population and buildings, vulnerability classes according to the 
period of construction of buildings, and empirical models for impact on people. The 
analysis yielded the number of buildings at different damage states, the number of 
casualties and injuries and the number of homeless people in the event of earthquakes 
with return period equal to 500 and 1000 years. 
                                           
38 www.globalquakemodel.org 
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The Portuguese National Authority for Civil Protection with the collaboration of several 
research institutions coordinated two projects for assessing the seismic risk in the 
metropolitan region of Lisbon and in Algarve, the two regions in mainland Portugal which 
historically have most suffered the impact of earthquakes (ANPC, 2010, Campos Costa et 
al., 2010, Costa et al., 2012, Sousa et al., 2010). The projects aimed at providing 
scientific foundations to support decision-making concerning seismic disaster 
preparedness and management for the regions. The projects included studies on 
seismotectonics, seismic catalogues updating, ground motion at the bedrock and 
considering site effects, vulnerability to landslides, exposure and vulnerability of 
buildings, critical infrastructures, lifelines and population. A near-real time loss 
assessment GIS system was developed to evaluate damages and losses considering 
strong motion seismic scenarios similar to historical earthquakes that affected both 
regions. Particularly in Algarve region, tsunami hazard and vulnerability of the littoral coast 
to tsunami incursion was evaluated. 
 Seismic risk mitigation 9.9
Preventive measures such as seismic retrofitting of buildings and infrastructure and the 
wide application of building codes that ensure low damage can considerably reduce the 
severity of human, structural and economic impacts of earthquakes. The provisions of 
Eurocode 8 contribute to reducing the vulnerability of buildings by ensuring that, in the 
event of earthquakes, lives are protected, damage is limited and civil protection 
structures remain operational. This has been demonstrated in all major earthquakes that 
occurred worldwide, e.g. the 1995 Kobe, Japan, earthquake (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 
2014) and the 2009 earthquake in L’Aquila, Italy (Dolce and Manfredi, 2015), where the 
large majority of damaged buildings were built with no or low-level provisions for 
earthquake resistance. The lesson learnt is that building codes have proven to be a 
valuable mechanism to implement effective mitigation measures and significantly reduce 
the high costs of post-disaster reconstruction in many countries. Moreover, post-disaster 
reconstruction offers an opportunity for introducing or reforming regulatory processes, 
aiming to “Build Back Better”, i.e., to improve the quality and safety of the built 
environment, to strength the resilience of communities to earthquakes and to capitalise 
long-term earthquake risk reduction efforts. 
Besides building codes, state incentives are a useful instrument to upgrade the building 
stock. For example, Italy introduced a tax reduction equal to up to 85% of the cost for 
structural interventions that improve the seismic vulnerability of existing buildings39. 
Another way to save lives is by implementing advanced early warning systems in urban 
regions. Early warning systems rely on the difference of arrival time between warning 
messages and destructive shaking waves. The former are transmitted almost 
instantaneously when triggered by an earthquake, whereas the latter may take seconds 
to minutes to arrive to a location. People and automated systems may use this short time 
delay to activate measures to protect life and property. Japan and Mexico are examples 
of countries where early warning systems are functioning (Cuéllar, 2014, Fujinawa and 
Noda, 2013). 
 Limitations and gaps in seismic risk analysis 9.10
The research community is continuously refining seismic hazard, vulnerability and 
damage-to-loss models that will be included in upgraded versions of the software for 
seismic risk analysis. While most software tools are user-friendly, their high degree of 
sophistication requires they should be operated by trained expert staff. In addition, for 
specific risk assessment studies, the software tools may require user-supplied data that 
is costly and time-consuming to obtain. 
It is worth pointing out the high uncertainty on the estimation of casualties, resulting 
from the wide variability of the number of earthquake victims subject to a similar ground 
                                           
39 Legge 27 dicembre 2017, n. 205. Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l'anno finanziario 2018 e bilancio 
pluriennale per il triennio 2018-2020. 
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motion, and from the poor reliability and large gaps in post-earthquake statistics for 
casualties. 
The major gap in seismic risk analysis is the absence of inventories of georeferenced 
exposure data, designed specifically for assessing the vulnerability of the built 
environment at a local scale. Exposure data is mainly available for residential buildings 
and aggregated at large regions. Inventories should preferably include as many as 
possible assets (e.g. industrial, commercial and other buildings, networks, critical 
infrastructures, etc.) in order to provide a more accurate and detailed risk assessment. 
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10 Floods 
F. DOTTORI, P. SALAMON 
A flood can be defined as the temporary covering by water of land not normally covered 
by water (EU, 2007). While floods are natural phenomena that may occur everywhere, 
human activities (such as encroaching in floodplains and land use changes) and climate 
modifications may increase the likelihood and adverse impacts of flood events, creating a 
risk for people and assets. Specifically, “flood risk” means the combination of the 
probability of a flood event and of the potential adverse consequences for human health, 
the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity associated with a flood event 
(EU, 2007). 
Every year floods cause enormous losses to economies and societies worldwide. In 
Europe, direct economic losses from floods (e.g. economic losses due by physical 
damage) are estimated to be ≈EUR 6 billion per year, and 250 000 people per year are 
estimated to be exposed (Alfieri et al., 2016). These figures are comparable to recent 
estimates based on observed impacts (EEA 2010). 
 Legal framework of flood risk assessment in the European 10.1
Union 
Flood risk assessment in the European Union is regulated by the Floods Directive of the 
2007 [EU 2007; FD in the following text], which is now integrated in the national 
legislation of EU countries. The Directive describes the steps that each Member State 
should take to implement flood risk assessment: 
1. Preliminary Flood Risk Assessment: based on available information on past 
studies, evaluate impacts on human health and life, the environment, cultural 
heritage and economic activity. 
2. Risk Assessment: identify the areas at significant risk to produce flood hazard and 
risk maps, including detail on the flood extent, depth and velocity for three risk 
scenarios (high, medium and low probability). 
3. Flood Risk Management Plans to indicate to policy makers, developers, and the 
public the nature of the risk and the measures proposed to manage these risks 
Moreover, the Floods Directive foresees regular updates and review of each part of risk 
assessment. The following Table 5 summarizes the relevant steps identified by the 
Floods Directive and the milestones for implementation and review (EU, 2016a). The first 
round of implementation of the Floods Directive has been finalized in 2016 and the 
results have been described in a number of reports (EU 2016a,b; WGF 2017).  
Table 5. List of steps identified by the Floods Directive and the milestones for implementation and 
review. WFD: Water Framework Directive 
Subject 
Main 
Article 
Other 
Articles 
Responsibility To 
Report 
Due date 
Frequency/ 
review 
Transposition 17  MS COM 26/11/2009  
Competent 
Authorities and 
Units 
of Management 
(if different from 
WFD) 
3.2 
(annex 
1 
WFD) 
 MS COM 26/05/2010 
3 months 
after any 
changes 
Preliminary  
Flood Risk 
Assessment 
4 
13.1(a) 
and 
13.1(b) 
MS COM 22/03/2012 
22/12/2018, 
every 6 years 
thereafter 
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Flood Hazard 
Maps and Flood 
Risk Maps 
6 13.2 MS COM 22/03/2014 
22/12/2019, 
every 6 years 
thereafter 
Flood Risk 
Management 
Plans 
7 13.3 MS COM 22/03/2016 
22/12/2021, 
every 6 years 
thereafter 
Progress by MS 
in 
implementation 
16  COM COM 22/12/2018 
Every 6 years 
thereafter 
Source: EC, 2000. 
Given its relevance, the description of methods for flood risk assessment in the following 
sections will mostly refer to the prescriptions of the Floods Directive, integrated with 
additional considerations based on the current state of the art (or good practices) in the 
field.  
 Risk Analysis 10.2
In the risk assessment framework outlined by the Directive, the first requirement is the 
identification of relevant flood processes than can produce significant consequences in 
the areas of interest. The identification of relevant processes is generally based on the 
analysis of past flood events in the area of interest, which had significant adverse 
impacts on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity. Such 
analysis should be complemented by preliminary simulations or investigations, to 
evaluate whether similar future events might occur and cause impacts.  
Several natural and man-made processes can give origin to flood events. In practical 
applications, flood events are classified according to the main drivers and the water 
bodies that cause the event itself. The following list is taken from Poljanšek et al. (2017). 
— Fluvial floods occur when river levels rise and burst or overflow their banks, 
inundating the surrounding land. This can occur in response to storms with higher 
than normal rainfall totals and/or intensities, to seasonal strong weather systems 
such as monsoons or winter storm tracks, or to sudden melting of snow in spring. 
— Flash floods can develop when heavy rainfall occurs suddenly, particularly in 
mountainous river catchments, although they can occur anywhere. Strong localised 
rainfall, rapid flood formation and high water velocities can be particularly threatening 
to the population at risk and are highly destructive.  
— Heavy rainfall may cause surface water flooding, also known as pluvial flooding, 
particularly in cities where the urban drainage systems become overwhelmed. 
— Floods can also be generated by infrastructure failure (e.g. dam breaks), obstructions 
caused by avalanches, landslides or debris, glacial/ lake outbursts and groundwater 
rising under prolonged very wet conditions, which cause waterlogging  
— Coastal flooding is caused by a combination of high tide, storm surge and wave 
conditions. Note that floods caused by tsunami events are generally considered as 
geophysical hazards, and therefore are analyzed with different techniques (Poljanšek 
et al., 2017). 
In many cases, flooding occurs as a result of more than one of the generating 
mechanisms occurring concurrently, making the prediction of flood hazards and impacts 
more challenging. 
Following the identification of relevant flood processes it is necessary to select adequate 
models and methodologies to evaluate risk components. These include flood hazard 
modelling tools and methods (to define probability, magnitude and extent of flood-prone 
areas), and flood impact models, relating hazard variables with consequences such as 
physical damage to buildings.  
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Parallel to model selection and setup, it is indispensable to identify and collect any 
relevant data related to risk components, such as topographic and geographical data, 
hydrological data related to water bodies in the area of interest, maps of population 
distribution and land use,  information on flood protection structures. Risk assessment 
tools must be chosen according to flood process(es) of interests  and data availability. 
As stated in the Flood Directive, risk assessment should aim at identifying people, 
economic activities and critical infrastructures potentially affected. In standard practice, 
risk evaluation can be undertaken with qualitative approaches (e.g. classifying the 
territory into risk classes) or quantitative methods (e.g. taking into account potential 
economic damage). It is important to note that the Floods Directive does not provide 
specific indications on the methodologies to be applied for evaluating flood hazard and 
flood risk, thus leaving to Member States the choice of the most suitable approach.  
10.2.1 Hazard 
Flood hazard is defined as the combination of probability and magnitude of relevant flood 
events that may affect the area of interest. In practical applications, flood hazard is 
quantified providing a spatial and temporal evaluation of the following variables, as 
mentioned in the Floods Directive (EU 2007): 
— probability of occurrence,  
— flood extent, 
— water depth,  
— flow velocity,  
— sediment load, 
— pollutant load. 
The probability of occurrence of a specific flood event is usually expressed as a return 
period. For instance, a 100-year flood event means that the event is expected to have 
1% probability of occurring every year.  Flood extent, water depth and flow velocity are 
usually characterized as spatial maps, as prescribed by the FD. Sediment load may be a 
crucial variable where floodwaters have a potential to transport relevant quantities of 
sediments at high velocity, as in the case of flash floods involving areas with steep 
slopes. Pollutants load is important in case of flood events affecting infrastructures such 
as chemical industries and wastewater treatment plants. 
Evaluating the probability of occurrence requires to calculate the frequency and 
distribution of extreme floods events in the area of interest, which can be done once the 
meteorological and hydrological regime of the area is known.  
In case of small areas with limited river network, the hydrological regime can be defined 
using empirical methods or hydrological models. In both cases, the aim is to estimate the 
runoff regime and hence extreme values based on available meteorological data (e.g. 
precipitation, temperature, humidity) and characteristics of the river hydrographic basins 
(e.g. geological, soil and land use maps). There is a wide range of existing commercial 
and research hydrological models that can be used (see for instance Beven 2011), as 
well as a large variety of empirical methods for more rapid runoff estimation, such as the 
Curve Number method, developed by the Soil Conservation Service of the United States 
[USDA, 1986]. 
In case of complex river networks, river hydraulics models are needed to simulate water 
flow in the river network, including man-made structures such as dams and retention 
basins. In this case, extreme flow values can also be directly estimated from water and 
flow level measurements in rivers. Alternatively, coupled hydrological-hydraulic models 
can be set up to derive river flow regime from observed meteorological data. Moreover, 
hydrological and hydraulic models can be coupled with meteorological forecasts to create 
a flood early warning system, which can provide real-time indication of expected flood 
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hazard. Data requirements include hydrological data for the water bodies in the area of 
interest, such as time series of water level and flow measured from gauge stations, as 
well as the characterization of the river reaches (cross section shape, bed slope, 
geometry and location of hydraulic structures, etc.).  
Finally, flood hazard maps can be derived by applying inundation models to simulate 
flooding processes. These models might be integrated with the hydraulic models used for 
simulating river network flow, or they can use results to derive flood scenarios (e.g. dike 
breaches, dike overtopping at specific locations). Simulations are often combined with 
Geographic Information System (GIS) techniques to improve the development of flood 
maps. Alternatively, methods based on topography and geomorphological indices can be 
applied to quickly evaluate flood prone areas, however these methods do not allow to 
estimate all the hazard variable requested for a complete risk evaluation.  
Besides results from hydraulic models, the application of inundation models requires a 
relevant amount of data. Digital terrain models (DTMs) are also needed to describe the 
morphology of the study are, together with information about past flood events, such as 
flood extent maps (nowadays often available as satellite-derived maps) and high water 
marks, to calibrate and validate model results. 
As for hydrological models, researchers and practitioners nowadays can count on wide 
variety of commercial and research models to model river flow and flooding processes 
(see for instance Teng et al., 2017). As an example, the HEC-RAS model, developed by 
USACE (http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/software/hec-ras) is a free software well known 
and used worldwide. 
10.2.2 Exposure 
In the definition of flood risk maps, the Floods Directive indicates how flood exposure 
should be characterized in order to map potential adverse consequences associated with 
flood scenarios. Specifically, the following elements of exposure have to be considered 
(EU 2007): 
(a) the indicative number of inhabitants potentially affected; 
(b) type of economic activity of the area potentially affected; 
(c) installations which might cause accidental pollution in case of flooding and potentially 
affected protected areas as by the Water Framework Directive (EU 2000). 
(d) areas subject to floods with a high content of transported sediments, or with 
significant sources of pollution. 
Other aspects of exposure that are mentioned by the FD are critical infrastructures (such 
as transport and energy networks, hospitals etc) and cultural heritage buildings. 
As such, the requirements of the FD make necessary to characterize the spatial exposure 
of population, relevant assets (e.g. industrial and commercial districts), critical 
infrastructures and protected natural areas. For population, the standard approach is to 
use population maps derived from national-scale census data. The exposure of economic 
activities and builtup areas is generally evaluated with land use maps, which describes 
the extent and location of built-up and natural areas with similar characteristics (e.g. 
residential areas, industrial districts, forests etc). These maps can be based on national-
scale census data or derived from satellite images. For instance, the Corine Land Cover 
map is a satellite-derived product available for all the EU Member states (Copernicus 
LMS, 2017). Finally the location and characterization of critical infrastructures, cultural 
heritage buildings and other points of exposure requires detailed information al local 
scale. Exposure maps are usually combined with hazard maps using Geographic 
Information System (GIS) techniques. 
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10.2.3 Vulnerability 
The evaluation of vulnerability is crucial to quantify flood impacts on population, 
economic activities and the environment, and thus to produce flood risk maps as 
requested by the FD. 
In standard practice, economic consequences of floods are usually evaluated 
distinguishing between direct and indirect damages. Direct damages are defined as 
physical, short term consequences such as physical damage to buildings and consequent 
repair costs. These impacts are usually evaluated using flood damage curves, which 
relate hazard variables (such as water depth and flood duration) with physical 
consequences to different types of buildings and their related content (e.g. residential 
buildings and furniture, industrial buildings and machinery).  Conversely, indirect losses 
identify impacts that are not directly caused by floods, such as consequences of 
electricity cut-offs, roads closures, or loss of revenue due to closing of commercial 
activities.  These impacts are evaluated using economic models that simulate the effect 
of floods on the economy of the affected areas. A detailed review of the existing methods 
is reported in Merz et al. (2010). Similar approaches can be used to evaluate impacts on 
critical infrastructures, although in this case specific models are requested.  
Consequences of floods on population are generally evaluated considering resident 
population in the flood prone areas and quantifying the number of people exposed to the 
flood events of interest. Even though flood risk for people include the risk of death and 
major injuries, they are not usually addressed as it is more complex to evaluate. When 
performing risk assessment at municipality or limited scales, personal safety risk models 
based on precise hydro-dynamic analysis may be applied (e.g. Arrighi et al. 2016), 
although with a relevant uncertainty. Conversely, in larger scale applications probabilistic 
risk methods (e.g. de Bruijn et al., 2014) and the use of mortality rates calculated from 
previous flood events (e.g. Jongman et al., 2015; Tanoue et al., 2016) are more feasible. 
For a correct evaluation of flood risk it is also important to take into account flood risk 
management plans, if available for the area of interest. Risk management plans are 
foreseen by the Floods Directive and should contain objectives for the reduction of the 
likelihood and potential adverse consequences of flooding for human health, the 
environment, cultural heritage and economic activity, including non-structural initiatives. 
In particular, these plans should consider all the prevention, protection and preparedness 
measures in place, such as protection measures, flood forecasts and early warning 
systems, emergency plans, interventions to improve water retention and flood 
attenuation. 
 Gaps and Challenges 10.3
The implementation of the Floods directive can be considered a success story in the field 
of natural hazards risk management. It allowed to establish a common ground in flood 
risk assessment in the European Union, introducing minimum requirements while leaving 
flexibility in its application. Despite this progress, there are a number of gaps and 
challenges that still need to be tackled in order to progress further.  
Regarding flood hazard maps, the surveys conducted among Member States highlighted 
a number of possible improvements. For instance, only 14 MS (out of 28) considered 
pluvial flooding among the possible drivers of flood hazard, even though pluvial flooding 
is a widespread problem. More in general, flash flood and pluvial floods are not always 
considered in flood risk management plans, as well as hazard deriving from multiple flood 
processes (e.g. combination of pluvial and river floods) or from multiple natural hazards 
(e.g. combination of landslides, debris flows and flash floods in mountain areas). 
Regarding flood Risk Maps, all MS included the number of people potentially affected, 
adverse consequences on economic activity and on the environment. However, in many 
cases risk evaluation is still based on qualitative approaches (e.g. classifying the territory 
into risk classes) rather than quantitative methods (e.g. taking into account potential 
economic damage). While quantifying all aspects of risk is crucial to carry out reliable 
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cost-benefit analyses as requested by the FD, the application of impact models is not 
straightforward and there are relevant limitations in both modelling tools and loss data 
for model setup and validation. First, comparing and quantifying different flood impacts 
can be complex (e.g. economic losses, human impacts and consequences on cultural and 
natural heritage). Furthermore, flood loss data collection is still at the beginning in most 
of the EU Member States. Official estimates are still affected by the absence of clear 
standards for loss assessment and reporting, although progresses have been made in the 
last years (Corbane et al., 2015; IRDR, 2015). Moreover loss reports are rarely complete 
and can strongly deviate from true extents and damages, thus complicating the 
validation and set up of impact models (Thieken et al. 2016). Finally, indirect losses due 
to floods are rarely quantified in flood risk assessment works, due to the complex 
application and verification of the related economic models. 
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11 Biological disasters 
ANNE SOPHIE LEQUARRE 
  Introduction 11.1
Biological disasters gather all the events linked to the uncontrolled spread of pathogens 
or pests affecting humans, animals or even plants. Well-known examples with huge 
economic costs are the food and mouth crisis in UK in 2001 with the culling of over 6 
million of cows and sheep or, right now, the wipe out of millions of ancient olive trees in 
Italy due to the infection by deadly bacteria with no cure 40. In human a number of 
epidemics (e.g. cholera or Spanish flu) have had previously devastating consequences on 
our populations but thanks to the development of vaccines or appropriate treatments 
health crisis are now fortunately scarce in most countries. However this stability can be 
shaking down as illustrated by the recent outbreak of measles after a decrease in vaccine 
coverage, especially in Ukraine41 or the threat of the Ebola virus leading to thousands of 
deaths in West Africa with a few imported cases reported in Europe in 2014.   
Outbreaks, the sudden rise in the incidence of a disease, occur when pathogen agents 
and target hosts are present in adequate numbers. It may result from an increase in the 
amount or in the virulence of the agent, but also a change in the susceptibility of the host 
and/or the introduction of the agent into a setting where it has not been before 
(emerging pathogen). International transportation, trade, urbanization, environmental 
change, agricultural practices could pave the way to new emerging epidemics in Europe 
or globally. Accidental release of an infectious agent from a laboratory or from the 
importation of goods has also to be taken into consideration. Potential malicious 
discharge should not to be discarded either.  
Anticipating and managing outbreaks is complicate. In contrast with other disasters, 
outbreaks have very different profiles and impact according to the responsible agent and 
targeted host. Drafting generic risk assessment is challenging as this exercise strongly 
depends on the pathogen accountable and its host(s).   
Epidemic (or outbreaks) refers to a sudden increase in the number of cases of a specific 
disease. Pandemic is an epidemic affecting a large number of people and spreading over 
several countries. Zoonosis is any disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from 
vertebrate animals to humans. 
 Risk identification and characterisation 11.2
As said the extent of an outbreak depends on pathogen's features (host range, 
transmission mode, virulence, pathogenicity, etc.), characteristics of the host (numbers, 
especially population density, natural or acquired resistance, possibility of asymptomatic 
carriers, vaccination status, etc.) and finally the availability of countermeasures (vaccine, 
treatment, isolation and quarantine, possibility of culling or cutting down in case of 
animals or trees).   
The first step in risk assessment for biological crisis is the identification and 
characterisation of all pathogens that could be responsible for outbreaks in our countries 
as well as the host populations that would be affected.   
11.2.1 Human epidemics 
The impact of an epidemic depends on the number of cases, the severity of the disease 
but also the burden on society (missed work, hospital capacity, and public services). 
Unlike disasters such as earthquakes or floods, basic physical infrastructures will remain 
                                           
40 https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosecurity/legislation/emergency_measures/xylella-
fastidiosa_en  
 
41 http://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/ukraine/news/news/2018/05/ukraine-restores-immunization-
coverage-in-momentous-effort-to-stop-measles-outbreak-that-has-affected-more-than-12-000-this-year  
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intact but the danger is a lack of personnel for public services. For example at the height 
of a pandemic flu up to 40% of employees could be out of work for a period of at least 
two weeks. Key measures to be taken include plans for maintaining a workable level of 
staff and ensure the continued health of necessary workers. In consequence national 
governments have to build scientific mechanisms to anticipate, identify, and address 
such threats. 
A. International Public Health policies 
After the SARS outbreak (severe acute respiratory syndrome due to a coronavirus) in 
2005 the new International Health Regulations (IHR)42 entered into force binding on 196 
countries across the globe. The IHR define the rights and obligations of countries to 
report all public health emergencies of international concern in order to help the 
international community to prevent and respond to acute health risks having the 
potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide. The diseases under concerns 
are all epidemic prone diseases, food borne diseases, accidental and deliberate 
outbreaks, toxic chemical accidents and radio nuclear accidents as well as environmental 
disasters. 
B. EU policies controlling human communicable diseases 
Decision 2119/98/EC43 established the network for epidemiological surveillance and 
control of communicable diseases, with implementing measures and a reference list of 
communicable diseases and case definitions. In 2013 it was replaced by Decision No 
1082/2013/EU44 on serious cross-border threats to health. This new Decision revived the 
network for the epidemiological surveillance of communicable diseases. It laid down rules 
on data and information that national competent authorities should communicate and 
provided for coordination of the network by the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC). The list of diseases and case definitions are regularly updated to 
reflect changes in disease incidence and prevalence, and in light of new scientific 
information, and evolving laboratory diagnostic criteria and practices.  
Apart from communicable diseases, a number of other sources of danger to health, in 
particular related to other biological or chemical agents or environmental events, which 
include hazards related to climate change, could by reason of their scale or severity, also 
endanger the health of citizens in the entire Union and are included in the regulation.  
Once a year, all EU MS & 3 EEA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) send data 
from their surveillance systems to ECDC. All data relate to occurrences of cases of 
communicable diseases and health issues under mandatory EU-wide surveillance. A 
number of conclusions drawn from these data are presented in the ECDC Annual 
Epidemiological Report.  
List of human priority diseases: To perform a ranking of human pathogens and zoonosis 
ECDC has developed a tool based on a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), with 
several steps to follow45 for prioritisation such as criteria to assess a disease (e.g. 
probability of exposure, vulnerability of the population, consequences) and the weighting 
of criteria according to their importance in the society.  
11.2.2 Animal diseases  
A distinction is made between epizootic – not transmittable to humans (e.g. foot-and 
mouth disease) and zoonotic – diseases transmittable from vertebrate animals to 
humans (e.g. avian influenza). Zoonosis are under higher concerns as they may 
represent a threat for human health however epizooties can impact heavily the economy 
                                           
42 https://www.who.int/topics/international_health_regulations/en/  
43 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31998D2119  
44 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/preparedness_response/docs/decision_serious_crossborder_t
hreats_22102013_en.pdf  
45 https://ecdc.europa.eu/sites/portal/files/documents/Tool-for-disease-priority-ranking_handbook_0_0.pdf  
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of a country deeply involved in livestock production.  The amount of animals concerned 
by a specific disease, their density, the contamination process and the breeding system 
used are all significant factors to be considered for assessing the risk of an outbreak.  
Similarly the measures to fight against a transmissible disease are based on the nature 
of the agent, its transmission route (direct contact or indirectly via contaminated 
equipment), geographical distribution, health impacts and evolution in the population.  
A. International Animal Health policies 
Diseases previously classified by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) within 
the list A represent fast spreading diseases of major economic importance. Such 
epidemics can result in substantial losses for governments, farmers and all stakeholders 
involved in the livestock production chain. In countries with a highly industrialised 
agricultural sector, vulnerability to the spread of such diseases is particularly high. Here 
is the list: 
 
 Foot and mouth disease 
 Swine vesicular disease 
 Peste des petits ruminants 
 Lumpy skin disease 
 Bluetongue 
 African horse sickness 
 Classical swine fever 
 Newcastle disease 
 Vesicular stomatitis 
 Rinderpest 
 Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia 
 Rift Valley fever 
 Sheep pox and goat pox 
 African swine fever 
 Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
The OIE lists A & B have now been replaced by one single list of notifiable terrestrial AND 
aquatic animal diseases (117 diseases in total)46 counting several severe zoonotic 
diseases such as anthrax, Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever, brucellosis, Rift Valley 
fever virus, Japanese encephalitis, Q fever, Tularemia and West Nile fever. OIE standards 
represent an international reference with no "legal" power of enforcement if not 
transcribed into the national legislation. OIE standards are only "binding" for Members 
which are Parties to the WTO (World Trade Organisation) SPS (Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures) Agreement.  
B. EU policies controlling animal diseases 
Under Directive 2003/994748 MS shall ensure that all data on zoonotic agents and 
antimicrobial resistance are collected, analysed and published. These data should allow 
the identification of hazards and assessment of exposures. Monitoring must take place at 
the food chain level. Each MS shall transmit to the EC every year a report on trends and 
sources of those hazards. The reports are analysed by the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) for the publication of annual summary Reports. 
Since 2016 one single, comprehensive EU animal health law49 (AHL: EU2016/429) 
supports the livestock sector with early detection and control of animal diseases, 
including emerging diseases linked to climate change.  The Regulation lays down general 
and specific rules for the prevention and control of transmissible animal diseases (with a 
risk based approach) and ensures a harmonised approach to animal health across the 
Union. Diseases targeted are:  
 Foot and mouth disease 
                                           
46 http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/oie-listed-diseases-2018/  
47 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32003L0099  
48 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32003L0099  
49 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0429  
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 Classical swine fever  
 African swine fever 
 Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
 African horse sickness 
As well as around forties of them listed in the Annex II.  
11.2.3 High-security level biological laboratories: 
The presence of laboratories manipulating pathogens, toxins or GMOs needs also to be 
taken into consideration for assessing biological risk. The consequences of laboratory 
acquired SARS infections in Asia (2004) raised concerns and triggered the improvement 
of national biosafety policies. WHO has published a laboratory biosafety manual50 (2004) 
and a biosecurity guidance51 (2006). Organisms targeted are pathogens and toxins but 
also biological materials such as reference strains, GMOs, vaccines or other 
pharmaceutical products for the sake of health and biodiversity.  
A. International conventions and agreements on biosecurity 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2003)52 aims to ensure the safe handling, transport 
and use of living modified organisms (LMOs). Under the Biological Weapons Convention 
(1972), States Parties have accepted to provide annual reports on specific activities53 
with data on research centres & laboratories, information on vaccine production facilities, 
information on national biological defence research, information on outbreaks of 
infectious diseases and occurrences caused by toxins, publication of results and contacts, 
information on legislation, regulations and other measures. 
B. EU policies on biosafety and biosecurity 
The EU Directive 2000/54/EC54 lays down minimum requirements for the health and 
safety of workers exposed to biological agents at work and the Directive 2009/41/EC55 
governs the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms. Reporting of 
incidents and/or accidents in laboratories is included in national regulations but there is 
no common European mechanism. Furthermore facilities and practices in containment 
level 3 laboratories throughout the EU are not of a comparable standard.  
 Risk Analysis and Risk Evaluation 11.3
Risk assessment terminology is well established for chemical hazards to health (OECD, 
2003)56, but the terms used in the areas of diseases differ somewhat as hazard 
characterisation and consequence assessment both deal with the effects of exposure.  
11.3.1 Human epidemics 
When an alert is notified (when a communicable disease from the reference list or 
another event which could endanger the health of citizens in the entire Union is 
reported), the Commission shall make promptly available to the national competent 
authorities a risk assessment of the potential severity of the threat to public health, 
including possible public health measures. The risk assessment shall be carried out by:  
(a) ECDC in accordance in the case of communicable diseases  
                                           
50 https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_2004_11/en/  
51 https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6.pdf  
52 https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf  
53 https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/DE1EE44AFE8B8CF9C1257E36005574E4/$file/cbm-
guide-2015.pdf  
54 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0054  
55 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32009L0041  
56 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ENV/JM/MONO(2003)15&docLang
uage=En  
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(b) European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in matters of food safety and animal 
health  
(c) Other relevant Union agencies.  
If the risk assessment needed is totally or partially outside the mandates of the agencies, 
and it is considered necessary for the coordination of the response at EU level, the 
Commission shall, upon request of the Health Security Committee (HSC) or its own 
initiative, provide an ad hoc risk assessment.  
The Commission shall make the risk assessment available to the national competent 
authorities promptly through the EWRS57 (Early warning and response system, 
centralized mechanism for the secure exchange of information in the occurrence of 
events with the potential to endanger public health in the EU). Where the risk 
assessment is to be made public, the national competent authorities shall receive it prior 
to its publication.  The risk assessment shall take into account, if available, information 
provided by other entities, in particular by the WHO in the case of a public health 
emergency (PHE) of international concern. A guide for RRA methodology of PHE was 
released in 2012 by WHO58. 
Risk Assessment methodology for human diseases 
ECDC technical report "Operational guidance on rapid risk assessment methodology" 
https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/operational-guidance-rapid-risk-
assessment-methodology  
The risk from a communicable disease is dependent on the likelihood of transmission in 
the population (probability) and the severity of disease (impact).  Risk may be influenced 
by the environment in which the threat occurs, including political, public, media interest 
and perception of risk. Probability and impact are based on both the nature of the 
infectious agent (i.e. incubation period, mode of transmission, available interventions, 
vectors/reservoir species) and details of the incident (e.g. characteristics of the 
population at-risk including immune status, prevention, treatment and control measures 
available, and potential for international spread).  
Rapid risk assessment, undertaken at the initial stages of an event of public health 
concern, is a core part of public health response, widely undertaken by public health 
professionals. However it is not often done in a formalised way but based on consensus 
opinion of experts. There are a limited number of examples of a more systematic and 
transparent approach to rapid risk assessment in the literature: 
 A qualitative method for assessing the risk from emerging infections in UK 
(Morgan et al. 2009) using algorithms to consider the probability of an infection 
occurring in the population, its potential impact, and identifying gaps in 
knowledge or data.  
 
 A prioritisation approach to rank emerging zoonoses posing the greatest threat in 
the Netherlands, based on 7 criteria (including probability of introduction, 
likelihood of transmission, economic damage, morbidity and mortality) to aid 
decision-making59.  
 
Rapid Risk Assessment methodology (when an outbreak is occurring, produced in a 
short time period with often limited information and circumstances possibly evolving 
quickly). 
1. Collecting event information: who has reported the incident, where, what is the 
agent, what are the symptoms, how many cases, what are the specimens taken 
                                           
57 https://ewrs.ecdc.europa.eu/ 
58 http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/HSE_GAR_ARO_2012_1/en/  
59 https://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/330214002.html  
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and tests performed, what is the potential exposure to the agent, what are the 
protection means, etc.?  
2. Performing structured literature search/systematically collecting information: 
Identify basic facts about the disease and aetiological agent from a reference text 
(ideally less than 5 years old). Basic disease information/determinants are: 
• Occurrence: time, place, person, endemic, routes of introduction, 
Seasonal/temporal trends. 
• Reservoir (if zoonotic, which species affected). 
• Susceptibility: are specific risk groups at increased risk of exposure/infection. 
• Infectiousness: Mode of transmission, Incubation period. 
• Clinical presentation: Disease severity (morbidity; mortality); Complications, 
specific risk groups.  
• Laboratory investigation and diagnosis. 
• Treatment and control measures. 
• Previous outbreaks/incidents. 
3. Extracting relevant evidence: Role of the experts: Identify and seek advice from 
key experts, including public health, microbiology, infectious disease and other 
disease-specific experts or specialists within country and internationally. 
4. Appraising evidence: The quality of evidence is the confidence in the truth of the 
information or data. Triangulation of evidence, including specialist expert 
knowledge, may be important to reach a consensus. Ensure a minimum of 2 to 3 
data sources and agreement between these.  
5. Estimating the risk: assess the risk posed by the threat using the risk assessment 
algorithms. Two approaches are presented, one combines probability and impact 
into a single algorithm resulting in a single overall risk level, the second assesses 
probability and impact separately. 
 
Option 1 (combined approach) includes consideration of the following (Figure 14). 
• Potential for transmission within the Member States: 
• Potential for transmission within the EU (routes of introduction/spread)  
• Threat unusual or unexpected, 
• Availability of interventions (alters the course, influence the outcome) 
• Severity of disease in this population/risk group 
 
Option 2 (separate algorithms for probability and impact) (Figure 15): 3 separate 
algorithms:  
1. Probability of infection in the MS (depends on likelihood of further exposure, 
infectiousness of the disease, susceptibility of the population). 
2. Probability of infection in the EU (depends on availability of routes of 
introduction/spread, exposure, population susceptibility, infectiousness). 
3. Impact: severity of disease in the population (morbidity, mortality, 
complications), infectiousness, mode of transmission, period of communicability, 
length of incubation and asymptomatic period, availability of treatment, 
prophylaxis and other control measures. 
These algorithms are gathered in the risk-ranking matrix to produce an overall risk level 
(Figure 16). 
 
 
 
 
82 
Figure 14. Single algorithm for the single overall risk level (option 1). 
 
Source: ECDC, 2011 
Figure 15. Algorithm for calculating probability and impact (option 2). 
At MS level: At EU level: 
 
 
Impact 
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Source: ECDC, 2011 
Figure 16. Matrix for risk-ranking (option 2). 
 
Source: ECDC, 2011 
11.3.2 Animal diseases 
As reported, in matters of food safety and animal health, risk assessment shall be carried 
out by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)60.  
EFSA also provides guidance to national authorities on how to carry out monitoring and 
reporting activities on zoonoses, food-borne outbreaks and antimicrobial resistance. MS 
collect data and transmit a yearly report to EFSA for analysis. EFSA identifies risk factors 
that contribute to the prevalence of zoonotic micro-organisms in animal populations and 
makes recommendations on prevention and reduction measures for these pathogens. 
Risk assessment for animal disease is a multi-analysis decision-support system, involving 
different type of experts. First, the responsible pathogen is identified with a range of 
adverse events it might cause (e.g. clinical disease, death, spread within the same 
species or to other species, maybe public health consequences if it is a zoonotic pathogen 
                                           
60 https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.2903/j.efsa.2007.550  
84 
or a pathogen carrying antibiotic resistance). A recent understanding of the problem 
should be made available (e.g. sources of pathogen, susceptible species, nutrition or 
space required by the species, import routes, exposure routes, import quantities etc.). 
Then the epidemiology of the infection should be described in time and space 
(modelling). The time component refers to the incidence over time, while space means 
the description of the geographical entities of interest with meaningful epidemiological or 
political boundaries. The latter often determine the disease control policy and options. 
Finally the potential management options must be described. They include measures 
which might control or eradicate the risks, current policy etc. The wider impact (e.g. 
economic, welfare) are also defined. Only realistic management measures merit 
consideration, it includes practicality (time and cost), and effectiveness with respect to 
infection, disease, animal welfare, and public health consequences. Risk assessment 
consequently is strongly dependent on the responsible pathogen; an illustration of such 
modelling exercise is given for an epidemic of classic swine fever (Gamado K et al. 
2017). For new/emerging pathogens risk assessment means the evaluation of the 
likelihood and the biological and economic consequences of entry, establishment and 
spread of a hazard within the territory of an importing country. A risk assessment 
framework for emerging vector-borne livestock disease is comprehensively explained in a 
report from Wageningen University (de Vos et Al.)61 
For zoonosis, the figure hereunder categorizes the evidence of zoonotic potential into 4 
levels (Figure 17) by considering three key stages in the transmission of zoonoses 
(Palmer et al, 2005). 
11.3.3 High-security level biological laboratories 
The outcome of a pathogen risk assessment is its risk group (see WHO biosafety manual 
2004)62, which helps determining the minimum physical containment requirements, 
operational practice requirements, and performance and verification testing requirements 
for the safe handling and storing of the pathogen.  
However international standards for biosafety and biosecurity are lacking which could 
lead to significant risk of accidental releases of infectious agents. National biosecurity risk 
management frameworks are often inconsistent. Several guidance documents are trying 
to integrate biosafety and biosecurity into a comprehensive biorisk management 
framework (Johnson B and Casagrande R. 2016).  
At EU level the CWA1579363 (CEN Workshop Agreement) was released in 2011, it sets 
the requirements necessary to control the risks associated with handling or storage and 
disposal of biological agents and toxins in laboratories and facilities. This standard is 
voluntary, without the force of regulation. It aims at improving biorisk management 
system with adequate resources (X. Abad 2014, with RA process) (Figure 18).  
For GMOs a network of inspectors, the European Enforcement Project (EEP) was founded 
in 1997 with the aim to exchange knowledge and experience from inspection of GMO 
contained use laboratories and of field (deliberate) releases of GMOs and resolve 
challenges and impasses and promote the harmonization of enforcement practice and 
strategies across the EU and beyond (de Wildt et al. 2015). 
Finally, according to the EU CBRN action plan (2014) each MS should establish:  
• a registry of facilities possessing any of the substances on the EU list of high risk 
biological agents and toxins.  
• a process to verify whether security arrangements of these facilities are adequate, 
including diagnostic laboratories.  
                                           
61https://www.wur.nl/upload_mm/5/f/8/d77e2ef6-cfe2-4b14-8cca-
70bce8d355c5_RiskAssesmentFrameworkEmergingVectorBorneLivestock.pdf  
62 https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_2004_11/en/  
63 ftp://ftp.cenorm.be/CEN/Sectors/TCandWorkshops/Workshops/CWA15793_September2011.pdf  
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• a mechanism within facilities storing those biological agents and toxins to regularly 
review the need of such biological agents and toxins while keeping a good record of 
stored materials.  
Figure 17. Categorization of zoonotic potential. 
 
Source: Palmer et al, 2005. 
 Risk Treatment 11.1
As said drafting a generic risk assessment for communicable diseases is challenging as it 
strongly depends on the pathogen accountable, its host(s) and the environmental 
conditions. Consequently it is highly important to support extensive surveillance systems 
for all hosts (human, animal and plant) in order to react quickly and to build national 
capacities for a proper response customised for each species and diseases.     
11.1.1 Human epidemics 
The decision on cross-border threats to health44 lays down rules on epidemiological 
surveillance, monitoring, and early warning of serious threats and includes preparedness 
and response planning, in order to coordinate and complement national policies. The MS 
shall, on the basis of the information from their monitoring systems, inform each other 
through the EWRS about developments of the threat. The EC collaborates with MS within 
the Health Security Committee (HSC), with relevant EU Agencies, in particular ECDC, and 
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international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), to organise 
preparedness planning, alerts and appropriate assessment of the risks for the EU, and to 
coordinate the response.  
Figure 18. Framework for decision-making in a facility. 
 
Source: Abad, 2014. 
MS shall provide every 3 years an update on the latest situation with regard to 
preparedness and response planning at national level64 with the following:  
— Status of the implementation of the core capacity standards for preparedness and 
response planning as determined at national level for the health sector, in accordance 
with IHR.  
— Measures for ensuring interoperability between the health sector and other sectors 
including the veterinary sector, identified as critical in the case of an emergency, in 
particular:  
● Coordination structures in place for cross-sectoral incidents;  
● Emergency operational centres (crisis centres);  
— Description of the business continuity plans, measures or arrangements aimed at 
ensuring the continuous delivery of critical services and products.  
11.1.2 Animal diseases 
The animal health law65 is laying down the rules for the prevention and control of animal 
diseases. These rules provide for surveillance, early detection, notification and reporting 
of diseases, as well as for disease awareness, preparedness and control. The competent 
authority in MS shall conduct appropriate surveillance to detect the presence of listed 
diseases and MS shall submit their surveillance programme to the Commission with 
regular reports on the results. MS shall immediately notify the Commission and other MS 
of any outbreaks of listed diseases. The competent authority should initiate the first 
investigations to confirm or rule out the outbreak, put in place preliminary disease 
control measures to prevent the spread of the disease, and should undertake an 
epidemiological enquiry.  
                                           
64 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0504&from=EN  
65 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0429  
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For preparedness MS shall draw up and keep up to date, contingency plans and detailed 
instruction manuals laying down the measures to be taken in the event of the occurrence 
of a listed disease or of an emerging disease, in order to ensure a high level of disease 
awareness and preparedness and the ability to launch a rapid response. The competent 
authority shall ensure that simulation exercises concerning the contingency plans are 
carried out regularly. 
As soon as a listed disease is confirmed, the competent authority should take the 
necessary disease control measures, if necessary including the establishment of 
restricted zones, to eradicate and prevent the further spread of that disease. The 
Commission should adopt immediately measures such as stocking, supply, storage, 
delivery of antigen, vaccine and diagnostic reagent banks, special rules on movements 
for animals, emergency measures, and the listing of third countries and territories for the 
purposes of entry into the Union. 
The measures taken are based on a risk assessment elaborated on the available scientific 
evidence and undertaken in an independent, objective and transparent manner. Due 
account should also be taken of the opinions of the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA). 
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12 Terrorist attacks 
VASILIS KARLOS, MARTIN LARCHER 
 Introduction 12.1
Terrorism over the last years has grown into one of the main concerns at EU level, as 
shown in the latest Standard Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 88, 2017). The 
threat of terrorism contains unique characteristics, as it is responsible for spreading 
irrational fear and terror in the population (Figure 19). It is interesting to note that 
while the number of fatalities in road traffic accidents in Europe is high (e.g. 26100 in 
2015, Eurostat), the number of victims due to terrorist attacks is relatively small (383 
between 2014-2017, on average 96 per year). This means that the probability of a 
citizen being killed as a result of a road accident is approximately 270 times higher than 
by a terrorist attack. Therefore, violent terrorism acts may be considered rare events, 
whose psychological, economic and political impact on society can be disproportionally 
high, as for example after the bombing attacks in Brussels and the vehicle-ramming 
attack in Nice in 2016. Even though terrorist events are of low frequency, a 
comprehensive understanding of the parameters that influence their likelihood is required 
for establishing a robust risk assessment and management framework.   
Figure 19. Terrorist risk. 
 
 
Terrorist events can be defined as intentional violent acts performed under the pretext 
of political, religious or nationalistic motives, whereas crime is usually driven by 
economic or retaliation intentions. The borderline between terrorism and military conflicts 
(encounters in which armed combat among military forces takes place either at 
international or national level) might be hard to be distinguished, since both rely on the 
extensive use of violence and could be guided by similar motives. Weapons (firearms, 
knives etc.), vehicles, CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) devices and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are either homemade or purchased in the black 
market are the preferred attack methods of terrorist groups, lone actors and extremists. 
However, it is important to consider that the modus operandi of the aggressors (in both 
terrorist acts and military conflicts) can rapidly transform, as has been demonstrated in 
the recent past. This transformation depends on a number of factors, such as the current 
political and religious status, the skills and capabilities of the perpetrators, the availability 
of financial and human resources, the instructions and guidance available in terrorist 
propaganda sites and magazines. A tendency has recently appeared to target 
unprotected public spaces of mass congregation (also known as soft targets) by using 
easily obtained weapons like knives, axes or vehicles. Such attacks may generate 
cascading effects on the societal level as the objectives of the terrorists include, but not 
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limited to, causing casualties, gaining media attention, spreading fear and inflicting a 
sense of insecurity upon the public.  
The risk of terrorism exists in both developed and developing countries and it still poses 
a major concern in certain regions that are mainly located in Africa, the Middle East and 
Asia. Nevertheless, the recent attacks in the Western world have clearly demonstrated 
that terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon, featuring complex direct (e.g. victims, 
injuries, loss of property) and indirect (e.g. psychological) consequences on the society. 
Unfortunately, the unique characteristics of terrorism risk are often neglected, resulting 
in a lack of dedicated guidance material for assessing and managing the relevant risk. 
Therefore the establishment of a national terrorism risk assessment plan is crucial for 
identifying critical zones and tactics and get the overall picture about the economic, 
social and political consequences in case of a successful attack.  
The varied, cross-border and cross-sectorial nature of terrorist attacks is addressed at 
the EU level in the European Agenda on Security (2015), which aims at assessing 
Member States in ensuring security through coordinated and effective response at the 
European level. As a result, several operational measures have been proposed to 
significantly reduce the number of inherent vulnerabilities that were exposed in previous 
terrorist attacks and enhance the overall security of potential targets.  
 Lessons learned from prior terrorist attacks 12.2
The majority of terrorist attacks are not random, but have been carefully planned (or at 
least to a certain degree) to maximize the number of casualties, increase the generated 
damage and draw the attention of the media. Targets are usually selected according to 
their vulnerability and past experience has shown that unprotected sites have higher 
chances of being attacked. Predicting locations of a potential attack is a challenging task, 
since there exist many different factors that affect the reaction of the aggressors. In this 
section, a selection of indicative cases of terrorism incidents, which resulted in a large 
number of victims and injuries, is presented, emphasizing on their common 
characteristics and underlining any lessons-learned that could serve as an asset for 
future risk assessments.  
 One of the most notorious terrorist acts resulting in a great death toll is the attack 
against the World Trade Centre in New York, USA on 11th September 2001, which 
took place in parallel to additional attacks in the US. The attack included 
sophisticated and detailed planning, aiming at structures of symbolic value, while 
guaranteeing a great number of victims and provoking panic and fear to the 
population. The use of asymmetric warfare techniques led to the realization that 
both public spaces and critical infrastructures could be potential targets of 
terrorist attacks and that different strategies need to be adopted for resisting the 
aggressors. The business and economic activities at the affected sites were 
disrupted for many weeks due to the widespread destruction causing severe 
consequences at the financial sector. The 19 terrorists who hijacked four 
airplanes, were members of the Al-Qaeda and four of them had received specific 
pilot training in the US without raising any suspicion to the secret services. 
 On 19th April 1995 in Oklahoma City, USA a vehicle borne explosive device was 
detonated in front of the A. P. Murrah building resulting in the collapse of 
approximately one third of the structure. The attack was performed by two US 
citizens that had undergone military training, though not belonging to a terrorist 
group. It was extensively planned targeting a structure that housed several state 
facilities, as the aggressors wanted to disapprove several governmental actions. 
Bomb ingredients were acquired from local stores and the bomb was placed in a 
rental truck that was later parked on the curb outside the nine-storey building. 
The remaining standing structure was demolished due to safety reasons and 
several years were required for a new facility to be constructed that would 
substitute the old one.  
90 
 On 13th November 2015, Paris experienced a series of coordinated terrorist 
attacks that resulted in a great number of victims and injuries. The aggressors 
used person-borne improvised explosive devices (suicide bombers) and assault 
rifles attacking a sport stadium, a music theatre and several restaurants and bars. 
The perpetrators belonged to the ISIL and claimed that the motives behind the 
attacks were the ideological objections to the western lifestyle. Clearly, the 
simultaneous attacks against multiple targets, reveal the existence of a 
sophisticated plan against places of mass congregation that would guarantee 
maximizing the number of victims and drawing the attention of the media.  
 One of the deadliest vehicle-ramming attacks took place at the city of Nice against 
the thousands of people gathered at the city’s waterfront during the Bastille Day 
celebrations. On 14th July 2016 a 20-ton rented cargo truck attacked the public 
by managing to attain a speed of 70-80km/h as the promenade leading to the 
pedestrian zone is an almost straight path. Because of its mass and speed, the 
truck managed to force its way through the existing light protection measures 
(crowd control portable barriers, lane dividers etc.) and covered a total distance of 
approximately 1.7km before being stopped by the police. In order to increase the 
number of victims, the terrorist, who had not been involved in major crimes 
before, was driving the truck in a zigzag fashion boarding the crowded sidewalks 
whenever possible. Analysis revealed that the aggressor had been planning the 
attack for over a year and that he had surveyed the attack site while driving the 
rented truck on numerous occasions before the assault date. He was born in 
Tunisia and had been living in France for more than 10 years, and had been 
previously involved in minor crimes and was radicalized, sharing the views of the 
Islamic State, shortly before the vehicle-ramming incident.    
The above-mentioned events are only a fraction of the number of terrorist attacks that 
have been performed over the last years (Figure 20), but constitute a typical sample 
(including the use of airplanes, explosives, weapons and vehicles as the preferred attack 
methodology) that shares a substantial number of characteristics. It is clear, that the 
majority of such incidents were carefully planned in advance, as the aggressors had 
examined the attack sites beforehand to mark their vulnerabilities. The targets were 
iconic structures and places of mass congregation that would cause mass casualties, gain 
media attention and spread terror and fear. The attack sites were characterized by the 
absence of (or the presence of insufficient) protective measures that would be able to 
deter or mitigate the consequences of the assaults. The results of the attacks may 
include substantial damages on the infrastructure, effects on the local economy and an 
important psychological impact on the society. Moreover, the majority of the aggressors 
were not considered a threat by the local intelligence agencies, as they had never been 
arrested before, even though that in many occasions their attack planning 
communications were unencrypted.  
A common feature among the majority of the attacks was the role of radicalisation 
(especially for Jihadist related attacks), as many of the aggressors had adopted violent 
extremism after being inspired from radicalised preachers. Tackling radicalization is a 
major challenge that requires the collaboration of different stakeholders at both national 
and local level. There are various reasons and different paths that push individuals to 
violent extremism but since most of them are part of the local community, detection and 
prevention activities need to mainly focus at the local level. The most effective 
prevention is to deter people from performing acts of terrorism in the first place, which 
shows the importance of the local authorities and community in the fight against 
extremism. The European Commission has set up the Radicalisation Awareness Network 
(Migration and Home Affairs-RAN, 2018) working on the fight against terrorism that has 
provided guidance material on assessing the relevant risk and suggested actions that 
guarantee resilience against violent radicalisation.  
It is has already been highlighted that aggressor tactics and targets may quickly change 
introducing attack techniques that were not considered before. For instance, Radiological 
Dispersion Devices (RDD’s, also known as “dirty bombs”) are feared to be of interest to 
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terrorist groups as they can be constructed by combining conventional explosives with 
radioactive material normally used in nuclear medicine and industrial applications. The 
aim of such an attack is generating a panic reaction in the public and inflicting high 
economic damage due to the required cleaning actions and the consequences from the 
disruption of affected services. As the immediate number of casualties from such attacks 
is small, a target may be selected not because of its high concentration of people, but 
depending on the favourable dispersion conditions for the radioactive particles.  
However, not all terrorist attacks are extensively planned and may be of opportunistic 
character resulting in smaller number of fatalities. The impact of an attack on the society 
is not only related to the number of fatalities and injuries, as even a failed attack can 
have significant psychological implications for the public. Depending on the information 
source, the worldwide number of terrorist attacks in the last years is approximately 
20,000 per year and the number of yearly casualties about 25,000. 
Figure 20. Fatalities per month from global terrorism database (year 1994 is missing in the 
recordings) 
 
 
 Risk identification and assessment 12.3
The most common approach for assessing the risk of a certain site can be divided in 
three distinct steps that can help decision-makers in prioritizing their security needs 
(Figure 21). In the first step, potential terrorist threats are identified and their likelihood 
of occurrence is estimated. In the second step, the exposed assets where the potential 
consequences would be the highest are evaluated and in the third the inherent 
vulnerabilities of potential targets are examined. The establishment of the risk profile of 
potential targets can considerably assist in the implementation of tailor-made protection 
measures that can effectively deter and/or mitigate terrorist attacks.  
12.3.1 Threat assessment 
The first step in the risk assessment process is the identification of potential terrorist 
threats that are relevant for the region and the target under consideration.  
Threat assessment focuses on pinpointing potential terrorist tactics and providing the 
framework for determining effective prevention and/or mitigation measures. For 
estimating the likelihood of occurrence of a terrorist attack and formulate possible attack 
scenarios, one has to resort to available statistical data from recent incidents and 
investigate information that is available from counterterrorism units, intelligence 
services, state and emergency agencies and the internet.  
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Figure 21. Risk assessment process. 
 
 
Attack scenarios should be rated according to their feasibility and probability. For 
example, the probability of vehicle ramming incidents is usually higher compared to 
attacks with the use of explosives due to the terrorists’ direct accessibility to a variety of 
vehicles, the minimal required expertise and the easy planning. In general, during 
assessing terrorist threats, decision makers and assessors tend to put more emphasis on 
past events failing to “think the unthinkable”. Additionally, new tactics may emerge that, 
even though they might be characterized by a smaller probability, could result in higher 
societal, economic or political impact. This transformation of actions and tactics depends 
on a number of factors, such as the current political and religious status, the skills and 
capabilities of the perpetrators, the availability of financial and human resources, the 
instructions and guidance available in terrorist propaganda sites and magazines.   
12.3.1.1 Threat assessment on country level 
The nature of extreme manmade events with malicious intent, such as terrorist attacks, 
makes them different from most usual risk types. Their intentional character means that 
they are rarer events, than for example small scale earthquakes, floods or droughts. 
Classical statistical approaches may provide an indication for calculating future risk, but 
detailed data from additional sources, such as intelligence agencies, could be required for 
a more rigorous analysis. Information included in propaganda sites and magazines can 
greatly contribute in assessing the probability of occurrence of attacks against specific 
targets. Nevertheless, information concerning potential terrorist threats is not always 
readily available due to its sensitive nature and access may be granted only to authorized 
individuals and not to private stakeholders. Moreover, the risk needs to be re-assessed in 
regular intervals to analyse any new security related information and relevant threats, 
especially since a major part of malicious events is politically motivated and can rapidly 
transform, as has been demonstrated in the recent past. 
For assessing the terrorism threat, one has to resort to statistical and other types of data 
from prior attacks. The likelihood of occurrence of an attack can be estimated by 
examining any observed criminal activity in the area of interest and possible recorded 
incidents or security breaches over a certain time period. Possible data sources are: 
 Global terrorism database (University of Maryland, 2018), which is freely available 
but updated on an annual basis, which means that latest data are not readily 
available 
 Commercial security risk providers like Jane’s (IHS Markit, 2018) or Control Risks 
(Control Risks Group Holdings Ltd, 2018) databases 
 European Media Monitor (European Commission-EMM, 2018) system that analyses 
information from both traditional and social media. The usability of the provided 
terrorism tool is apparently tested by the JRC 
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Since terrorist threats can completely change over time, special attention should be paid 
on very recent events, thus it is advised that higher statistical weighing factors are 
assigned to such events during the threat assessment process compared to older ones. 
Supporting information that can prove valuable during this threat assessment process 
may be located in organized crime databases, such as the number of firearms in 
circulation, the terrorism funds obtained via drug trafficking etc. For example, the pie 
charts presented in Figure 22 highlight the worldwide predominant assault types and 
targets over a four-year period (2014-2017). 
Figure 22. Worldwide terrorist attacks by a) utilized modus operandi and b) target. 
a)   b)  
 
Assessing the risk of terrorism on a country level, can prove useful in identifying critical 
countries, yet the results are usually too general for recommending and implementing 
specific actions. A breakdown of risk to smaller regions is also questionable, since the 
statistical significance of available data might not be adequate for performing a reliable 
assessment. The development of worldwide critical terrorism-affected zone maps (e.g. 
Niger, Afghanistan, Yemen) that demonstrate terrorist incidents, like the one presented 
in Figure 23, can assist in classifying hot spots and issuing travel advices, but are 
impractical if the introduction of specialized protective plans is of interest. 
Figure 23. Threat level from terrorist attacks in central Africa in 2015. Red: 10 or more fatalities, 
blue: between 1 and 10 fatalities, green: no fatalities 
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12.3.1.2 Threat assessment on local level 
Carrying out a threat assessment on a local level is a challenging process, as a definite 
“yes or no” answer concerning imminent attacks cannot be provided. Quantifying the 
probability of a terrorist attack against a specific target may seem futile, as by nature it 
contains many uncertainties. The introduction of a universally applicable method for 
calculating the likelihood of a specific attack type against a certain target is problematic 
due to the frequently opportunistic character of attack planning. Even though no concrete 
conclusions can be drawn from analysing the potential modus operandi of the aggressors, 
it still provides valuable information since places of people congregation could potentially 
prove attractive targets for terrorists and extremists. Examining statistical data from 
previous similar events at the region and target of interest using the databases that have 
been described in the previous section, can provide valuable indications concerning 
threat rating.  
The likelihood of an attack against a specific target, can be evaluated by responding to 
several questions that may arise during the risk assessment process including, but not 
limited to: 
 Are there any indications of an imminent terrorist attack? 
 Does the potential target represent a religious/ethno-nationalist ideology that is 
against the political or religious agendas of active terrorist groups?  
 Is the target of symbolic or historical value? 
 Which is the maximum attendance? 
 Are there any high profile events hosted that are attended by famous people and 
covered by the media? 
 Are there any trained security officials present? 
 How easily accessible are the target’s premises and by what means (vehicles, 
motorcycles, on foot etc.)? 
  
12.3.2 Exposed asset identification 
A crucial step in the risk assessment process is the identification of the assets that have 
to be considered in the analysis. Recent terrorist attacks have shown that there is a 
recurrent targeting of unprotected public spaces of mass congregation of various 
gathering purpose, as shown in Table 6.  
Table 6. Soft target categories. 
 
Target 
category 
Places of people congregation 
Recreational 
Stadiums, concert halls, entertainment venues, festivals, 
parks, markets, shopping malls, theatres, cinemas, clubs, 
restaurants, bars, cultural events, parades, pedestrian areas 
etc. 
Commercial Hotels, apartment buildings, office complexes, shops etc. 
Public Hospitals, medical centres, universities, schools, museums, 
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libraries, etc.  
Religious Churches, religious events, places of worship, etc. 
Transportation 
Train and subway stations, airports, bus and port terminals, 
transportations sites, etc. 
Governmental  
Town halls, ministries, official residences, monuments, 
landmarks governmental office complexes, etc. 
 
The majority of terrorist attacks are not random, but have been carefully planned (or at 
least to a certain degree) to maximize the number of victims and draw the attention of 
the public and the media. Unprotected public spaces pose an attractive target, but 
several other sectors may become exposed to terrorism resulting in great consequences, 
such as critical infrastructures, as has already been described in the relevant chapter in 
the current good practice document.  
The weighing factors for evaluating the criticality of each exposed target may be different 
among the different countries, but some common indicators (e.g. people attendance, site 
symbolism, facility size, importance of facility etc.) may be used for identifying the sites 
where potential consequences have the greatest impact. Such a process guarantees 
improved, custom-made security and mitigation actions, though differences may appear 
depending on the stakeholder responsible for performing the identification. For instance, 
the criticality of a certain target from the building/site owners’ perspective is usually 
related to its operation, whereas state organizations and policymakers may be more 
attentive to the public’s safety and needs. Consequently, during the design of an 
effective physical security strategy the harmonic collaboration of all relevant stakeholders 
is crucial for effectively tackling the interdependencies between the different assets.  
12.3.3 Vulnerability assessment 
Vulnerabilities are the inherent weaknesses of a potential target that may render it 
susceptible to the destructive consequences of a terrorist attack and are directly related 
to its risk level. These vulnerabilities can be exploited by perpetrators in their effort to 
strike, thus effective mitigation measures and identification of optimal strategies are 
required for minimizing exposure and enhancing resilience. A detailed examination of the 
site under consideration can disclose deficiencies and flaws that may encourage the 
formulation of an attack plan, as the lighter the security measures, the more attractive a 
target is deemed to the eyes of terrorists. An objectively assessment of the vulnerability 
degree of a public space or infrastructure is a challenging task, as there are many 
different factors that should be taken into account, such as the target’s accessibility, its 
significance, its location, its shape and the current protective measures (entry checks, 
video surveillance, security guards, perimeter protection etc.). DG HOME is in the process 
of developing a vulnerability assessment tool that can prove valuable in the assessment 
process of potential targets. An example of a vulnerability assessment categorization is 
shown accordingly, 
Low vulnerability: The examined infrastructure or public space is equipped with adequate 
security countermeasures (controlled access, safeguards, perimeter protection etc.) to 
drive away potential aggressors and is unattractive as a potential target. 
Moderate vulnerability: The examined infrastructure or public space may be equipped 
with some security countermeasures (no controlled access, some safeguards, partial 
perimeter protection etc.) and is well-known only at a local scale.  
High vulnerability: The examined infrastructure or public space is characterized by 
inadequate security countermeasures, while it is well-known at a national scale. 
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Very high vulnerability: The examined infrastructure or public space is characterized by 
inadequate security countermeasures, while it is well-known at a global scale. 
Site assessments from experienced professionals can recognise the main elements that 
should be considered as weaknesses and specify appropriate protective measures that 
can be applied to reduce these vulnerabilities. For assessing the vulnerability of the built 
infrastructure specialized engineers need to be engaged so that special attention is paid 
to security aspects of the engineering design, such as: 
 Resistance against progressive collapse. Robust infrastructures, similar to the 
ones designed for resisting the effects of severe earthquakes, demonstrate 
improved resistance to blast and progressive collapse incidents. 
 Resistance of glazing material. Glass, that is a main window element in nearly 
every building’s facade, fails instantly under blast loads, due to its extreme 
fragility. The created glazed fragments are responsible for a large fraction of the 
injuries and fatalities observed during explosive events. The use of laminated 
glass panels or anti-shatter films guarantees a higher resistance to blast loads and 
reduces the relevant risk. 
 Protection of soft targets/people. A combination of perimeter security measures in 
public spaces (fences, controlled access, security guards, video surveillance etc.) 
can effectively reduce the risk of a terrorist attack. Moreover, the introduction of 
stiff protective elements and barriers that are harmonically integrated into the 
surrounding urban environment can substantially reduce the risk of vehicle-
ramming events and provide cover in case of explosions or active shooter 
incidents. 
 Risk analysis 12.4
It is observed that in the last years the majority of attacks have been performed against 
the so-called soft targets (described in Table 6), meaning targets characterized with 
high concentration of people and absence of specific security measures. They are the 
opposite of “hard targets” that indicate grounds equipped with heightened protection and 
surveillance. Target attractiveness depends on many different factors that are associated 
with both the terrorist group and the characteristics of the target. For instance, 
aggressors may choose a target that is against their political, social or religious ideology, 
while the selection may be also influenced by the availability of funds and the number of 
terrorist members. This means that religious or cultural symbols that are considered to 
be promoting the western life style, capitalism and/or democracy may become the target 
of Jihadist terrorists. Iconic and recognizable locations have higher chances of being 
attacked, especially if they are mentioned in terrorist propaganda magazines. Popular 
tourist locations, open-air festivals, sport events, landmarks and areas that are typically 
characterized with high people presence and lack of security guards are also appealing to 
terrorist groups. 
There exists a lack of risk assessment methodologies for terrorist attacks as the majority 
of the required information is of restricted nature. Nevertheless, various approaches may 
be employed for addressing the complexity of the risk management process. For 
attaining a desired protection level, a holistic creative approach is needed, that favours 
the assessment of possible attack scenarios and their consequences if successfully 
executed. A scenario-based approach at potential targets is bound to simplify the 
complexity of the risk assessment process and assist in the evaluation of the different 
targets in terms of criticality (i.e. consequences severity). Some of the necessary data for 
the development of potential attack scenarios may be acquired through the sources that 
have already been described in the threat assessment section.  
The impact of an attack is directly linked to the type of target selected by the terrorists 
and its conditions at the time of the assault. For instance, an attack against a city square 
will have a completely different aftermath if it is performed during peak hours or during 
social events when the crowd attendance is at its highest. The consequences of past 
attacks, such as the effects on human life (injuries, fatalities etc.) and the economy 
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(repair cost, disruption of services etc.), can be used as input for assessing the 
repercussions of potential future events. Indirect consequences from a terrorist attack 
are more difficult to be assessed, as they include the social and economic costs, such as 
the effects on the population’s psychology and the impact on the tourism industry 
(Larcher, 2018). Cascading phenomena may also appear through the interconnections 
between infrastructure systems, such as for instance during a terrorist attack against a 
power plant which, apart from the immediate life losses, would also result in disruptions 
in many other companies and the public. Consequence assessments serve as a tool for 
estimating the outcome of different attack scenarios at various sites and categorize them 
in terms of severity.  
Since specialized quantitative approaches for measuring the consequences of an attack 
are still missing, qualitative methods and expert judgement may provide valuable insight 
at the dependencies among the different affected elements of public life. For example, 
part of the indicators included in the (Sendai Framework for Action on Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015-2030) may be used for analysing the consequences and eventually 
reducing disaster loss in terms of lives and other types of damage. For example, Global 
Target A aims at reducing disaster mortality (A-2 compound), while Global Target B 
highlights the number of people injured by a disaster (B-2 compound). Similarly, Global 
Target D mentions the damage to critical infrastructures (D-1 compound) and the 
disruption to basic services (D-5 compound). 
Using number of fatalities and injuries for developing an impact factor is a rather 
straightforward process, as they can be easily measured from prior attacks. The use of 
other parameters, such as the effect of assaults on public morale or the economic 
damage due to the disruption of services are hard to be measured since they do not 
constitute quantitative values. Nevertheless, the global targets set out by the Sendai 
Framework for the disaster risk management include indicators, some of which (e.g. 
economic loss, disruption of basic services etc.) may be employed during the assessment 
of a terrorist attack’s impact factor. Assessing the risk of a terrorist attack has certain 
disadvantages as a significant statistical sample is required for the prediction to be 
accurate. This can be the case in high terrorist risk countries where many events have 
occurred in the past, but in countries with hardly any attacks, as commonly observed in 
the western world, this approach leads to unreliable results.  
 Risk evaluation 12.5
Terrorist groups usually aim at exploiting the intrinsic vulnerabilities of their targets, such 
as public spaces, critical infrastructures, landmarks etc., in an effort to cause casualties, 
attract the media’s attention and spread fear to the public. The risk of terrorism needs to 
be properly evaluated either as an individual, separate risk or as part of an overall risk 
assessment national strategy. The consequences of a successful attack may span across 
different sectors (human lives, economy, tourism, psychological effects, critical 
infrastructures etc.) both at a local and at a regional/national level. Therefore, during the 
risk assessment process these interconnected, cascading consequences have to be 
considered for establishing a thorough quantification. 
As is the case in other risks that are described in the present document, the potential 
consequences of a terrorist attack depend heavily on the specific target. Moreover, the 
different stakeholders and decision bodies that are involved in the assessment process 
and its various uncertainties make the consequences evaluation a challenging task. As 
the probability of occurrence of an imminent terrorist attack is difficult to be calculated 
due to its usual opportunistic character and the religious or political motivations of the 
aggressors, a “judgement call” might be required from the decision makers when 
evaluating the relevant risk. One of the main concerns during these evaluation 
procedures, is the definition of an acceptable risk level, since providing protection against 
all possible terrorist threats is not feasible in both economic and practical terms.   
National risk assessment strategies should be updated on a regular basis, since threat 
types and terrorist tactics alter with time. When reviewing terrorism risks different 
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factors, such as the global and local political scene, religious tensions and the availability 
of potential weapons (explosives, vehicles, guns, biological agents etc.), should be 
considered. The various attack scenarios that may be examined during the risk 
evaluation process should be regularly reassessed and updated to be in line with the 
latest threat developments. Furthermore, the implementation of mitigation and 
protective measures need to follow, whenever possible, a security-by-design approach, 
so that the selected solutions may be harmonically integrated in the surrounding 
environment, reaching a proper balance between security and the protected asset’s 
characteristics. These measures should focus on increasing the redundancy of the 
potential target in order to be effective for a variety of different threats and be adequate 
for new emerging risks.  
 Key messages and challenges  12.6
Given the diverse targets and tactics selected by terrorists in their effort to cause victims 
and draw public attention, a multidimensional response is needed, one that includes 
innovative new approaches in the assessment of the relevant risk. A holistic and 
individualised risk evaluation approach is crucial for drawing together all terrorism-
related data and providing tailor-made suggestions for effectively reducing and/or 
mitigating the risk of a terrorist attack. Past incidents may provide valuable information 
concerning the vulnerability of various sites, the potential consequences should an attack 
materialize and common tactics used by the aggressors. Clearly, protection of all public 
spaces is impractical in both economic and technical terms, so a cost and benefit analysis 
needs to be followed for the zones that have to be protected in order to introduce an 
efficient protection plan with reduced installation and running costs.  
Since a universally accepted risk assessment methodology for terrorism is still missing, 
efforts should focus on identifying potential threats utilizing available terrorism 
databases, evaluating the impact of potential attacks and assessing the vulnerability of 
targets. Terrorism-affected zone maps are available at country level, but breaking down 
the information to smaller regions is questionable, as the samples usually lack the 
statistical significance for drawing concrete conclusions. However, they may provide hints 
regarding the preferred terrorist tactics and potential targets, which are essential inputs 
for the vulnerability and consequences assessment procedure.  
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13 Critical Infrastructures 
MARIANTHI THEOCHARIDOU, LUCA GALBUSERA, GEORGIOS GIANNOPOULOS 
 Introduction 13.1
In Council Directive 2008/114/EC, a Critical Infrastructure (CI) is defined as “an asset, 
system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance 
of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of 
people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a 
Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions”66. In time, various 
characterizations and categorizations have been proposed for CIs, especially to promote 
their protection and resilience67. 
When discussing risk assessment and related good practices in this context, we have to 
consider that both exogenous (e.g. natural, man-made) and endogenous (e.g. aging) 
factors may lead CIs to failure. Moreover, generally CIs play multiple roles during 
disasters and crises. In particular, 
 they may be directly affected by critical events; 
 the failure of a CI may provoke consequences and trigger emergencies; 
 a CI may mediate response and mitigation actions68. 
It is then interesting to evaluate how these three aspects are taken into account in 
current risk assessment practices. 
Based on the latest Commission Staff Working Document on National Risk Assessment 
(NRA) results69, CI-related risk scenarios assessed by the majority of Member States 
(MSs) focus predominantly on the first two aspects. In particular, such scenarios refer to 
either: (a) major accidents or energy shortages or (b) infrastructure failures induced by 
other kinds of hazards. Several NRAs also assess potential infrastructure-to-
infrastructure cascading effects, including cross-sectoral consequences. Besides, 
correlated hazards such as the loss of CIs or nuclear and industrial accidents have been 
linked to increased exposures to terrorism and cyber-risks. In this regard, a recent JRC 
report70 identified some gaps in the way CIs are addressed during risk assessment 
processes performed by MSs. These findings were based on the NRA report published in 
201571, but similar observations can be made for recent NRAs, as reported in 201772. 
Since CIs mediate the flow of goods and allow the provision of essential services to the 
society, bolstering their resilience against critical events requires a comprehensive 
analysis of the failure-recovery cycle. To this end, it is often inadequate to evaluate the 
coping capabilities of an infrastructure in isolation. Exposures, for instance, may emerge 
from the accumulation of those specific to each asset, or be inherent to the way systems 
are interconnected. Global supply chains are one of the clearest examples in this sense, 
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European Union may face, SWD(2017) 176 final, Brussels, 23.5.2017. 
100 
and they demonstrate how systemic vulnerabilities may enable cascading effects and 
amplify losses. 
Interdependencies and associated risks are often complex to assess, due to the 
articulated geospatial layouts of CIs, their many mutual interactions, the integration of 
technological sectors and many other factors. Traditional asset-based, hazard-specific 
risk assessment methodologies are sometimes ineffective in coping with this challenge. 
On the other side, new trends emerge in this area, such as the so-called service-based 
approaches. These, instead of focusing on damages to specific assets, capture 
interdependencies on the basis of exchange of services between infrastructures of the 
same or different sectors. 
In this sense, moving from the definition of risk proposed in standard ISO 31000:2009 
(“effect of uncertainty in objectives”), 73 discusses the concepts of systemic risk (“the risk 
of having not just statistically independent failures, but interdependent”) and hyper-risk 
(“implied by networks of networks”). The same reference also points out some key 
shortcomings of current risk-assessment methods. These include poor estimates of 
probability distributions and parameters for rare events, underestimation of likelihoods of 
coincidence of multiple rare events, scarce accounting for feedback loops in fault/event 
tree analysis, insufficient consideration for joint probabilistic analysis and complex 
dynamics analysis, human/social factors, lack of questioning about established ways of 
thinking, economic/political/personal incentives. 
Awareness about the aspect of interdependency and direct/indirect effects is also clear in 
standard ISO 31000:2018, which we will reference for our discussion on risk assessment 
phases74 and, throughout most of this document, for risk-related terminology. In the 
standard’s definitions, for instance, term “consequences” receives a comprehensive 
interpretation, which includes both direct and indirect effects. 
In the rest of this chapter, we will first overview some recent policy background relevant 
to CI risk, starting from the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, 
the European Union framework and some other significant experiences on a global scale. 
Secondly, we will introduce aspects of interest and good practices related to risk 
assessment for CIs, notably in risk identification, analysis and evaluation. Emerging 
trends interpret risk assessment as part of a broader, circular risk management process. 
We will, therefore, introduce techniques (frameworks, methodologies and tools) 
supporting this process in the case of CIs, also including the concept of resilience and the 
implementation of related strategies. Finally, we will discuss risk treatment and some 
important gaps and challenges that both policymakers and CI operators are facing today. 
 Policy background 13.2
The multi-dimensional aspect of disaster risk reduction in the case of CIs is taken into 
account with increasing emphasis in international policies and agreements. A notable 
example is found in the Sendai Framework for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-
2030, which promotes actions devoted to reducing disaster losses in various areas and 
expressed in terms of lives as well as material/non-material damages. As part of the 
framework, Global Target D proposes to “substantially reduce disaster damage to critical 
infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational 
facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030”. More in details, the 
target articulates the aspect of “damage to critical infrastructures attributed to disasters” 
(target D1-compound) and “number of disruptions to basic services attributed to 
disasters” (target D5-compound). Interestingly, the latter conceptualization equally 
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74 For further discussion on terminology, see also: 
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stresses the aspect of damage/disruption to assets and to services, which clearly binds 
with the discussion on interdependencies proposed above. 
Observe that CIs are also mentioned in other portions of the Sendai Framework, notably 
in Global Target C. There, within the general framework of economic losses reduction 
(“reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) 
by 2030”), target C5 refers to “direct economic loss resulting from damaged or destroyed 
CI attributed to disaster”. This is a case where consequences emerging from CI failing 
are taken into account, emphasizing once more the multiplicity of roles played by CIs in 
disaster scenarios. 
At the EU level, the designation of CIs is accompanied by the attention to their protection 
and ability to withstand and overcome crises. However, the landscape within the EU 
remains diverse75. Indeed, the MSs follow different approaches with respect to CI 
designation, with the notable exception of the Energy and Transport sectors76, which are 
commonly accepted due to Council Directive 2008/114/EC. This diversity is also reflected 
in the associated best practices, such as the Operator Security Plan for designated 
infrastructures. Risk assessment is the cornerstone for the design of such plans at the CI 
level or at a sectoral level, and can be performed either by the CI operator, the sector 
regulator, or in a collaboration involving local or national authorities. 
A relevant example in this context is the integrated approach for CI protection 
established in the Netherlands in May 2015 as part of the National Safety and Security 
Strategy developed by the Dutch Ministry for Security and Justice. This approach 
identifies what is considered as CI, based on criteria stemming from the National Risk 
Assessment process. The degree of criticality depends upon the identified consequences 
of a failure involving the considered critical sectors, and cascading effects are taken into 
account in the assessment. Then, the vulnerability assessment provides insight into the 
most relevant risks, threats, vulnerabilities and the degree of resilience of each 
infrastructure. According to the results of the assessment, particularly risks, threats and 
vulnerabilities, plans are formed to maintain or increase the resilience of the 
infrastructure. In addition, CIs can be incorporated into the national crisis management 
structures. 
Beyond the EU, USA’s ‘National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013: Partnering for 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience’77, includes a CI risk management approach 
which can be applied to all threats and hazards, including cyber incidents, natural 
disasters, manmade safety hazards, and acts of terrorism. It is designed in a way that 
complements and supports the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA) process conducted by regional, State, and urban area jurisdictions. Similarly, the 
Canadian government recognizes that the impacts of disruptions can cross sectors and 
jurisdictions, and provides practical guidance for implementing a coordinated, all-hazards 
approach to CI risk management78. 
As observed in 79, “complementing traditional risk management, security, and protection 
practices, resilience gains a prominent role as the ‘umbrella’ term to cover all stages of 
crisis management. This aspect is also prominent in emerging EU policy trends, wherein 
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Guide on Resilience (volume 2) Domains of Resilience for Complex Interconnected Systems in 
Transition, to appear, 2018. 
102 
CI resilience acquires increasing importance and links to a number of strategic priorities”. 
Selected key policy documents at the EU level related to the topic include: 
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
- Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism80; 
 Green Paper on a European programme for critical infrastructure protection81; 
 Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection82; 
 Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and 
designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to 
improve their protection (Text with EEA relevance)83; 
 Commission Staff Working Document on a new approach to the European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection: Making European Critical 
Infrastructures more secure84; 
 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and 
information systems across the Union85; 
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - 
An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change86; 
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - 
The European Agenda on Security87; 
 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - Joint 
Framework on countering hybrid threats a European Union response88; 
 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council - Increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid 
threats89; 
 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - Resilience, 
Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU90. 
Figure 24 illustrates the conceptual evolution of the emerging policies from the context 
of CI risk, security and protection to that of CI resilience. The EU-funded H2020 
IMPROVER project91 uses the following definition of CI resilience: “the ability of a CI 
system exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the 
effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, for the preservation and restoration 
of essential societal services.”92 However, through six interactive workshops with 
infrastructure operators organized by the IMPROVER project, what has become apparent 
is that the definition of resilience isn’t what matters; what does matter is the way 
resilience changes the outlook of operators93. Indeed, resilience is an optimistic approach 
                                           
80 COM/2004/0702 final 
81 COM/2005/0576 final 
82 COM/2006/0786 final 
83 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 
84 SWD(2013) 318 final 
85 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 
86 COM/2013/0216 final 
87 COM/2015/0185 final 
88 JOIN/2016/018 final 
89 JOIN/2018/16 final 
90 JOIN/2017/0450 final 
91 www.improverproject.eu 
92 The definition has been adapted from: 2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), Geneva, Switzerland, 
May 2009. 
93 Petersen L., Theocharidou M., Lange D., & Bossu R. (2018). Who cares what it means? Practical 
reasons for using the word resilience with critical infrastructure operators. The Third Northern 
European Conference on Emergency and Disaster Studies (NEEDS 2018). 
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when compared to current risk management practices, allowing operators to be actors in 
responding to crises, as opposed to simply being subjects exposed to risks. 
From the perspective of CI protection, there are main two schools of thought regarding 
the relationships between risk management and resilience management94. Some see 
resilience management as part of risk management; others interpret resilience 
management as a separate process. Regardless of the most correct interpretation, 
considering the relationships between these two concepts is unavoidable when discussing 
CI resilience. Indeed, in many respects both approaches find justification. Resilience 
management can be a separate process with respect to risk management, while it can 
also be performed in a way such that the two processes enrich and support each other. 
At the time of writing, a proposal for a new ISO resilience standard is been prepared 
under the ISO 31000 family of standards on risk management, exploring the potential 
benefits of a resilience-based approach. Moreover, many of the methods, frameworks 
and tools described below in this chapter implement risk approaches which comprise 
resilience elements as well. 
Figure 24. EU policy milestones towards the resilience of CIS. 
 
Source: Theocharidou et al, 201895. 
 Risk assessment 13.3
According to ISO 31000:2018, risk assessment is the overall process comprising risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. However, when applying such a standard 
to the case of CIs, there are some issues that pose challenges or require particular 
consideration. 
                                           
94 Theocharidou M., Lange D., Storesund K. (2018). Guideline on implementation of organisational, 
societal and technological resilience concepts to critical infrastructure, IMPROVER D5.2, 
September 2018. 
95 Theocharidou M., Galbusera L., Giannopoulos G. Resilience of critical infrastructure systems: 
Policy, research projects and tools. In Linkov I., Trump B., Florin M.V. (Eds.) IRGC Resource 
Guide on Resilience (volume 2) Domains of Resilience for Complex Interconnected Systems in 
Transition, to appear, 2018. 
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13.3.1 Defining the scope 
A risk assessment related to CIs can be performed at various levels: 
 at the level of specific infrastructures, typically conducted by the CI operator; 
 at the sector level, conducted by governmental authorities or the sector’s 
regulator with input by the CI operators; or 
 at local (e.g. for a city) or national (e.g. as part of the NRA) level, where the 
process should involve all relevant authorities and stakeholders. 
Goal definition 
In general, the goal of the assessment could be to identify those critical components 
where potential consequences would be highest and where security and resilience 
enhancement activities can be mainly focused. It is clear that, depending on the level of 
analysis, such goals are likely to vary across sectors, organizations, and policymakers. CI 
operators may view criticality or risk differently, as their goals relate to their operations, 
while a policymaker’s goals may relate more to public needs and priorities. 
Stakeholder identification 
In all cases, when focusing on infrastructures, the consequences to the society and the 
presence of interdependencies are parameters that highlight the importance of 
collaboration. An important step is, therefore, to identify and engage all stakeholders 
relevant to the assessment. 
CI identification 
Another key step is the identification of the CIs to be included in the analysis. As we 
briefly mentioned in the previous section, different countries have different 
interpretations about what is considered to be critical. Some practices in this domain 
include96: 
 adopting definitions of CI sectors and services from other countries;  
 introducing methodologies to identify CI sectors and services systematically; 
 performing (national and cross-border) dependency analysis. 
Data collection challenges 
One of the early questions to be faced, even in defining the scope of the assessment, is 
whether or not adequate data support can be provided. A number of actions have been 
completed or are ongoing in order to address the availability or data relevant to risk 
assessment, for instance through initiatives such as the OFDA/CRED International 
Disaster Database EM-DAT97 and JRC’s Risk Data Hub98. 
                                           
96 The GFCE-MERIDIAN Good Practice Guide on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection for 
governmental policy-makers, Luiijf E. (Ed.), 2017. Available at: 
https://www.thegfce.com/documents/reports/2017/10/22/the-gfce-meridian-good-practice-
guide-on-critical-information-infrastructure-protection-for-governmental-policy-makers. 
97 This resource  provides disaster information for an extensive and increasing number of disasters. 
In particular, “the main objective of the database is to serve the purposes of humanitarian 
action at national and international levels. The initiative aims to rationalise decision making for 
disaster preparedness, as well as provide an objective base for vulnerability assessment and 
priority setting”. URL: https://www.emdat.be/. 
98 This platform  “adopts the comprehensive framework of policies and guidelines, data sharing 
initiatives and spatial data infrastructure with the purpose of setting the bases for knowledge 
for DRM at local, national, regional and EU-wide level”. The platform also comes with a 
collection of good practices to the development of risk web-platforms and risk data. Data are 
available at different levels of aggregation, while country corners allow MS to manage their own 
risk assessment, covering both the prevention and preparedness assessment and the response 
and recovery assessment. URL: https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/risk-data-hub. 
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Risk analysis data requirements vary depending on the situation and the tasks to be 
completed, spanning from prevention measures to real-time status assessment and 
decision making just after a critical event has hit a region. Different information sources 
may complement each other in order to address the various situations more 
comprehensively (e.g. institutional information, crowd-sourced crisis information). 
Moreover, best practices in the area of risk data management are also developed in the 
private sector. Often, these also manifest a need for smoother interaction with regulatory 
bodies and partnering entities. Indeed, guidelines for the creation of sound infrastructure 
risk data and management methods can be found in the experience of CI operators. For 
example, four aspects are identified in 99 for achieving effective risk data infrastructures 
in the financial sector: 
 efficiency, which may be affected by siloed and incompatible data, while suffering 
from the more time is spent on data management than on risk treatment; 
 flexibility, needed in order to provide quick response with limited manual work, 
when non-standard scenario analysis and reports are needed, or when regulators 
request information; 
 quality, which can be compromised by incompatible definitions, inconsistency, 
incompleteness, and duplication; 
 ownership, which expresses the need for risk governance, accountability and 
commitment to quality, especially when data are collected by multiple 
stakeholders. 
Finally, observe that concerns have also been raised about the public availability of CI 
data, which in some cases might represent a threat in itself100. 
13.3.2 Risk Identification 
The purpose of this stage is to identify and describe the risks that may or are expected to 
affect a CI or a CI sector. Sources for the selection of scenarios of interest include: 
– events that may affect the functionality of the CI; 
– vulnerabilities of the CI (e.g. its age or location); 
– indicators of emerging risks; 
– intelligence information for man-made threats; 
– time-related factors, etc. 
An all-hazards approach to risk management does not mean that all hazards will be 
assessed, evaluated and treated, rather that all hazards will be considered. When 
analysts are developing scenarios to identify potential risks for an assessment, these 
should be selected in such a way as to cover the full scope of the assessment. 
It is important to observe that service loss for a CI can result from: 
– causes inherent to the infrastructure (e.g. technical failures, accidents, aging), 
– external causes (hazards, man-made threats), or 
– the service loss of another infrastructure. 
In some cases, relevant scenarios can be driven not only by service loss but also by 
increased demand for service provision, as in the case of an emergency. 
                                           
99 KPMG, Rebuilding and reinforcing risk data infrastructure. An extract from KPMG's Frontiers in 
Finance. April 2014. Available at: http://kpmg.com/frontiersinfinance. 
100 Abbas, R, The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and 
the Level of Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia, Bachelor of Information and 
Communication Technology (Honours), University of Wollongong, 2006,129p. 
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13.3.3 Risk Analysis 
At a minimum, risk analysis should determine: 
 the likelihood of the threat or hazard; and 
 the consequences of the threat or hazard, taking into account the disruption of 
critical services and products. 
For CIs, risk often includes the frequency of service loss and the resulting consequences 
for the concerned people101. Important factors to consider include complexity (CI 
interdependency), time-related factors and the effectiveness of existing controls. By 
definition, CIs provide essential services to the public, and their disruption is associated 
with significant consequences. The emphasis of an assessment is often placed more on 
the consequences when CIs fail to some degree, with a lack for precise definitions about 
the cause and the associated probabilities. Regardless of the initiating factor, CI 
operators often mostly focus, for their planning or training, on the consequences of 
service loss. This allows them to plan and exercise against disruptions of unknown 
probability and to focus more on the effects to the service provision. 
When assessing the consequences of CI loss or failure, one should not only consider 
economic aspects such as the reconstruction costs or the expenses for building or system 
recovery, but also the effects of service inoperability on the population or a country. For 
example, FP7 project Casceff considers various types of consequences from infrastructure 
failures102. In particular, 
 technical consequences encompass the damage and loss of technical components 
and physical assets, loss of production etc.; 
 organizational consequences relate to the organisations and institutions that 
manage the systems (CI owners or operators), encompassing impacts on 
organisational capacity, coordination, and information management, etc.; 
 social consequences encompass impacts on the community, such as political 
instability and civil unrest; 
 human consequences are about impacts on population such as health-issues, 
reduced well-being, casualties and injuries; 
 economic consequences encompass impacts in terms of direct costs; 
 environmental consequences relate to the effects on natural resources, flora and 
fauna. 
Secondly, as we mentioned above, CIs can be affected by a hazard. As an example of 
direct effects caused by a flood scenario, FP7 project CIPRNet considers and identifies the 
following possible disruptions103: 
 transport disruptions due to flood-related accidents (derailment, collision of road 
vehicles; 
 collision of maritime vehicles, structural elements collapse or overflow, e.g. 
tunnels, bridges, airports etc.; 
 transport disruptions due to large-scale evacuation of civilian causing traffic 
congestion; 
 disruptions of water supply or contamination of drinking water or other health 
hazards; 
                                           
101 E. Zio, Challenges in the vulnerability and risk analysis of critical infrastructures, Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 152 (2016) 137–150. 
102 http://casceff.eu/media2/2016/02/D2.1-Deliverable_Final_Ver2_PU.pdf. 
103 Y. Barbarin, M. Theocharidou, and E. Rome, “CIPRNet deliverable D6.2: Application scenario,” 
CEA, JRC, Fraunhofer IAIS, Tech. Rep., May 2014. [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.ciprnet.eu/. 
107 
 hazardous substances (CBRN) incidents due to structural damages/flooding on 
facilities; 
 hazardous substances (CBRN) incidents due to accidents to transporting vehicles; 
 collapse of sewage systems; 
 electrical power supply disruptions; 
 telecommunications disruptions; 
 medical care facilities disruptions, due to power shortage, flooding, increased 
number of patients or inability of the personnel or supplies to reach the location; 
 industrial or business disruptions, due to power or communication disruptions. 
Here observe that a flood can cause multiple damages to CIs of various sectors (e.g. 
transport, ICT, energy), beyond the direct consequences to the population. These may 
refer to damages to a specific building or infrastructure element, and they are calculated 
based on exposure of the element to the hazard and its vulnerability level. While the list 
is not exhaustive and these disruptions are unlikely to happen all simultaneously, they 
highlight the complexity of mapping the direct and indirect effects of a scenario to 
national CIs. An additional parameter to consider is whether the disruptions described 
above can hinder the emergency response capabilities. For example, the disruption of 
transportation nodes can delay assistance in reaching affected areas, and potentially 
amplify the consequences to the population. 
Calculating the overall societal impact of a scenario is a difficult process, especially in 
cases when parallel disruptions take place or double counting of losses is difficult to 
avoid, likely leading to poor quality impact estimations. The case of previous incidents 
may allow for more realistic assessments, but this is not always the case when examining 
unknown or rare events. 
As a third point, cascading effects between infrastructures need to be considered104. The 
impact of a disruption, or failure, may spread both geographically and across multiple 
sectors. The 2017 World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report105 observes that “greater 
interdependence among different infrastructure networks is increasing the scope for 
systemic failures – whether from cyberattacks, software glitches, natural disasters or 
other causes – to cascade across networks and affect society in unanticipated ways”. This 
observation highlights a key parameter with respect to CIs that should be considered 
when performing a NRA. 
Identifying dependencies is, therefore, an important task106. While various classifications 
of dependencies can be found in the literature107, such as physical, geographical, cyber, 
social, etc., a more recent empirical study108, shows that events can be classified as 
cascade-initiating (i.e., an event that causes an event in another CI), cascade-resulting 
(i.e., an event that results from an event in another CI), and independent (i.e., an event 
that is neither a cascade-initiating nor a cascade-resulting event). The empirical findings 
indicate that: 
                                           
104 L. Franchina, M. Carbonelli, L. Gratta, M. Crisci and D. Perucchini, An impact-based approach for 
the analysis of cascading effects in critical infrastructures, International Journal of Critical 
Infrastructures, vol. 7(1), pp. 73–90, 2011. 
105 https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2017 
106 Setola, R., Theocharidou, M. (2016). Modelling Dependencies Between Critical Infrastructures. 
In: R. Setola et al. (eds.), Managing the Complexity of Critical Infrastructures, Studies in 
Systems, Decision and Control 90, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-51043-9_2. 
107 Rinaldi SM, Peerenboom JP, Kelly TK (2001) Critical infrastructure interdependencies. IEEE 
Control Syst Mag, 11–25. 
De Porcellinis S, Panzieri S, Setola R (2009) Modelling critical infrastructure via a mixed holistic 
reductionistic approach. Int J Crit Infrastruct 5(1–2):86–99. 
108 Van Eeten M, Nieuwenhuijs A, Luiijf E, Klaver M, Cruz E (2011) The state and the threat of 
cascading failure across critical infrastructures: the implications of empirical evidence from 
media incident reports. Public Adm 89(2):381–400. 
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 cascade-resulting events are more frequent than generally believed, and that cascade 
initiators are about half as frequent; 
 dependencies are more focused and directional than often thought; 
 energy and telecommunications are very frequent cascading initiating sectors. 
A JRC report observed the lack of CI dependency modelling and analysis in most NRAs109. 
This is also highlighted by110, which includes “dependencies and interdependences 
identification and modelling” and “dynamic analysis (including cascading failures)” as two 
of the steps required in CI vulnerability and risk analysis (“hazards and threats 
identification” and “physical and logical structure identification” are also part of the 
approach). If MSs select to perform a risk assessment method that considers both 
dependencies among CIs and the direct or indirect consequences of hazards, then the 
method for analysing a risk scenario needs to include more steps and iterations, as 
illustrated in Figure 25. 
Figure 25. Risk Assessment for CI Loss. 
 
 Source: Theocharidou and Giannopoulos, 2015 111. 
Such an approach would allow to establish closer links between Disaster Management or 
Civil Protection and Critical Infrastructure Protection within a MS or across MSs, when 
examining hazards of cross-border scale. 
13.3.4 Risk Evaluation 
The purpose of risk evaluation is to support decisions. In general, the output of this step 
includes a prioritized list of risks, information gaps, and lessons learned. The outcome of 
                                           
109 Theocharidou M, Giannopoulos G, Risk assessment methodologies for critical infrastructure 
protection. Part II: A new approach, EUR 27332 EN, 2015. Available at: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC96623/lbna27332enn.pdf. 
110 Zio, Enrico. (2016). Challenges in the vulnerability and risk analysis of critical infrastructures. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety. 152. 137-150. 10.1016/j.ress.2016.02.009. 
111 Theocharidou M, Giannopoulos G, Risk assessment methodologies for critical infrastructure 
protection. Part II: A new approach, EUR 27332 EN, 2015. Available at: 
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risk evaluation should be recorded, communicated and then validated by the decision-
makers. In the case of CIs, this step allows to focus on critical assets or services, and 
amend plans for their protection and resilience. It is the basis to create a plan with short-
term and long-term actions that need to be taken to mitigate risk. It can also be the 
input for national funding or the trigger for a new regulation. 
See also reference112 for a comparative analysis of risk assessment methods for CIs, with 
an emphasis on security. Therein, the authors discuss both institutional risk assessment 
standards (NIST risk assessment framework SP800-30/30rev1, ISO/IEC 27 005:2008 
and BS-7799-2006) and enterprise models (OCTAVE, Fair, Microsoft).  
 Frameworks, methodologies and tools 13.4
In the previous section, referring to the ISO 31000:2018 standard’s risk assessment 
framework, we discussed some key elements that contextualize this process to CI risk 
assessment. Similar aspects can be traced in other risk management frameworks, 
including those specifically devoted to CIs. For instance, in Error! Reference source 
ot found. we report a representation of the NIPP’s Critical Infrastructure Risk 
Management Framework. 
Figure 26. NIPP's Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Framework 
 
 
Source: US Department of Homeland Security, 2013 113 
In many of the merging contributions about CI risk management, there is an attempt to 
cope with the diversity of perspectives and to offer support all along the failure/recovery 
processes, through a circular process striving for improved response to risk. In this 
sense, as mentioned above in this chapter, emerging policies, methodologies and studies 
in the CI domain stress the importance of the overall risk management process and the 
aspect of resilience114. 
Therefore, in the rest of this section, we discuss methodologies, frameworks and tools 
significant to risk management and resilience enhancement processes for CIs115. It has to 
be observed that some of the tools in place are not limited to the risk assessment step, 
but instead reach the full extent of the risk management process. 
                                           
112 Tweneboah-Koduah, Samuel, and William J. Buchanan. "Security Risk Assessment of Critical 
Infrastructure Systems: A Comparative Study." The Computer Journal (2018). 
113 NIPP 2013 Supplemental Tool: Executing A Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Approach, 
US Department of Homeland Security, 2013. 
114 See also the Resource Guide on Resilience (available at https://irgc.org/risk-
governance/resilience) by the International Risk Governance Council, whose first volume has 
been issued in 2016 and whose second volume is in preparation. This is “an edited collection of 
authored pieces comparing, contrasting and integrating risk and resilience with an emphasis on 
ways to measure resilience”, and it contains various resources relevant to the case of CIs. 
115 See also https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-resources for a list of further CI resources. 
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13.4.1 Frameworks 
A number of frameworks are in place to tackle the broader risk management process 
and, to some extent, resilience enhancement. Many of the existing methodologies 
emphasize the convergence of competences, the cyclic nature of assessment and the 
implementation of multistep evaluation procedures. In a number of cases, the scope of 
such frameworks also includes the provision of practical guidance, to support the 
formulation and actuation of risk and resilience assessment initiatives relative to either 
specific CIs or the same in a broader context, such as at regional levels. 
While an exhaustive review of the existing frameworks is out of the scope of this chapter, 
next we describe some instances of recent proposals in this domain. Our examples are 
partly drawn from ongoing research projects and partly from institutional initiatives. 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience 
The 2013 NIPP116 “elevates security and resilience as the primary aim of critical 
infrastructure homeland security planning efforts”. It “focuses on establishing a process 
to set critical infrastructure national priorities determined jointly by the public and private 
sectors”. In formulating the framework, reference is made to the DHS Risk Lexicon – 
2010 Edition117. Additional documents that aim at facilitating the implementation of the 
plan are: 
 supplement “Executing a Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Approach”, 
which offers practical guidance towards the construction of CI risk management 
approaches comprising the following activities: set goals and objectives; identify 
infrastructure (including the cyberinfrastructure); assess and analyse risks 
(through documented, reproducible and defensible assessments); implement risk 
management activities; measure effectiveness (also towards continuous 
improvement); 
 supplement “Critical Infrastructure Threat Information Sharing Framework: A 
Reference Guide for the Critical Infrastructure Community”, which outlines a 
“multidirectional, decentralized network of formal and informal channels through 
which government entities and the private sector share information”. 
An important aspect of NIPP 2013 is the collaborative dimension of CI security and 
resilience, which calls for a ”partnership-based collective action”. As such, it involves the 
delivery of training courses and other initiatives, such the security and resilience 
challenges issued to foster the cohesion and the capabilities of the CI community118. 
NIST Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems 
The guide119 has been created with the objective “to help communities address these 
challenges through a practical approach that takes into account community social goals 
and their dependencies on the ‘built environment’ – buildings and infrastructure 
systems”. The proposed six-step process to planning for community resilience comprises 
the following aspects: form a collaborative planning team; understand the situation; 
determine goal and objectives; plan development; plan preparation, review, and 
approval; plan implementation and maintenance. 
The planning guide is organized into two volumes, wherein the first volume addresses the 
steps of the process in details and including practical examples, while the second volume 
contains support information and deals with the social dimension of resilience, as well as 
the aspect of buildings/CI interdependencies. 
                                           
116 https://www.dhs.gov/publication/nipp-2013-partnering-critical-infrastructure-security-and-
resilience  
117 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf  
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NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
The Cybersecurity Framework120 (v.1.1, April 2018) “focuses on using business drivers to 
guide cybersecurity activities and considering cybersecurity risks as part of the 
organization’s risk management processes”. A joint related document is the NIST 
Roadmap for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. 
Based on the NIPP Risk Management Framework and the NIST Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk 
assessments have been issued121 for the assessment of threat-vulnerability-consequence 
triads relative to selected CI sectors. These operations see the involvement of multiple 
DHS offices and take into account sector-specific regulatory environments. 
JRC’s CRitical Infrastructures & Systems Risk and Resilience Assessment Methodology 
(CRISRRAM) 
The CRISRRAM methodology developed at the JRC122 proposes a generic approach that 
could be applied by MSs for their NRA scenarios. As illustrated in Figure 27, it involves 
the asset, system and society levels and it designs a multistep, cyclic assessment 
procedure leading to the evaluation of impacts of various nature. 
The first step is to define a hazard scenario that may directly have an impact on the 
society (e.g. flooding, earthquake) but, at the same time, may impact a CI (Society 
Layer). As described in the NRA guidelines, risk is calculated according to a risk matrix, 
based on threat likelihood and (societal) impact assessment. However, this approach also 
considers impacts due to the failure of a CI or other dependent ones (cascade impact). 
These are assessed based on the direct impact of the threat on a CI (Asset Layer) or due 
to the indirect impact of the hazard to other CIs (System Layer). 
Figure 27. Critical Infrastructures & Systems Risk and Resilience Assessment Methodology. 
 
                                           
120 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf  
121 https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688028.pdf  
122 Theocharidou M, Giannopoulos G, Risk assessment methodologies for critical infrastructure 
protection. Part II: A new approach, EUR 27332 EN, 2015. 
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Source: based on Theocharidou and Giannopoulos, 2015 123 
Direct impact on one or more directly affected CI (Asset Layer), can be calculated on the 
basis of historical data, the results of vulnerability assessment of the CI or the presence 
of resilience mechanisms, in collaboration with CI operators or owners. This is usually 
assessed in terms of inoperability level or economic loss per asset. This direct effect to 
each CI – i.e. service degradation, disruption or failure – is related to an impact at the 
societal level. If this is not the case, then this infrastructure should not be considered as 
a CI at first hand. This approach to assessment links asset level disruptions with societal 
impact. In the System Layer, dependency assessment is introduced in the risk 
assessment framework. Identifying and assessing dependencies can allow a MS to take 
into account the additional impact from the cascading failure relative to other CI/sectors. 
However, one limitation to consider is the presence of cyclic dependencies among 
infrastructures, which may lead to a limited-quality estimation of impacts at the societal 
level. 
IMPROVER project’s Critical Infrastructure Resilience Framework (ICI-REF) 
H2020 project IMPROVER (“Improved risk evaluation and implementation of resilience 
concepts to Critical Infrastructure”) considers the relationship between a CI risk analysis 
and a CI resilience analysis and tries to link the two aspects, proposing an approach that 
could also inform NRAs124. This framework, ICI-REF, aims at addressing “the integrated 
process of risk and resilience management”125. In particular, it maps resilience 
management to the risk management process from ISO 31000:2018 discussed above in 
this chapter. See Figure 28 for an illustration.  
Establishing the context is the first stage in both risk and resilience management, and 
this includes the identification of best practices as well as national or sector-specific 
legislations and methods of interest. It also comprises the identification of any nationally 
identified hazards which may be relevant for the considered infrastructure. While 
establishing the context, it is also needed to identify the evaluation criteria to be applied. 
These could be based, for instance, on land use planning curves in the case of risk 
evaluation. For resilience evaluation, assessment criteria might be based on societal 
tolerances, past performance, or minimum quality/quantity of service for a community to 
survive. Establishing the context acts as input to both the risk assessment process and 
the resilience assessment process, regardless of whether these processes are undertaken 
independently of one another or not. Risk identification only needs to be done as part of 
the risk assessment process, as some resilience assessment methodologies are 
independent of hazards and, thus, the risk assessment phase does not actually contribute 
here. 
Typically, a risk evaluation would determine whether or not the assessed risk is below an 
acceptable threshold or if remedial action is necessary. While risk assessment has a focus 
on the consequences of an incident, resilience goes beyond, to include the recovery 
phase. Resilience evaluation, therefore, can be used to enrich the risk evaluation process. 
Risk treatment and resilience treatment are independent processes achieving different 
objectives. In the case of risk treatment, the objective is the reduction of threat, 
vulnerability, impact and, indeed, it can affect associated costs such as insurance 
premiums. In the case of resilience treatment, the objective is to improve the absorptive, 
adaptive or restorative capacity of the infrastructure. The implementation of this 
framework can be done by selecting appropriate tools or methodologies for the different 
stages. 
                                           
123 Theocharidou M, Giannopoulos G, Risk assessment methodologies for critical infrastructure 
protection. Part II: A new approach, EUR 27332 EN, 2015. 
124 Lange, D. et al. (2017b). Incorporation of resilience assessment in Critical Infrastructure risk 
assessment frameworks, In: Safety and Reliability – Theory and Applications, ISBN 978-1-138-
62937-0, p. 1031-1038. 
125 Lange et al. IMPROVER Deliverable 5.1 Framework for implementation of resilience concepts to 
Critical Infrastructure, 2017. Available at: www.improverproject.eu. 
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Figure 28. ICI-REF: integration of resilience management in risk management 
 
Source: Lange et al, 2017 126 
13.4.2 Methodologies 
A number of risk assessment methodologies relevant to CIs have been thoroughly 
reviewed in 127. Moreover, a recent classification was proposed in128, where the following 
aspects were taken into consideration: 
 purpose: risk identification, risk assessment, risk prioritization, risk mitigation 
planning, and effectiveness evaluation (following the phases of the NIPP 
framework); 
 technical modelling approach: empirical approaches, system dynamics based 
approaches, agent based approaches, network based approaches, and other 
approaches129. 
                                           
126 Lange et al. IMPROVER Deliverable 5.1 Framework for implementation of resilience concepts to 
Critical Infrastructure, 2017. Available at: www.improverproject.eu. 
127 Giannopoulos G., Filippini R., Schimmer M., “Risk assessment methodologies for critical 
infrastructure protection. part I: A state of the art,” European Commission, Tech. Rep. EUR 
25286, 2012. 
128 Stergiopoulos G., Vasilellis E., Lykou G., Kotzanikolaou P. and Gritzalis D. Classification and 
Comparison of Critical Infrastructure Protection Tools. M. Rice and S. Shenoi (Eds.): Critical 
Infrastructure Protection X, IFIP AICT 485, pp. 239–255, 2016. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-
48737-3 14 
129 This is based on a classification by: 
 Ouyang, M.: Review on modeling and simulation of interdependent critical infrastructure 
systems, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 121, pp. 43–60 (2014).  
 Empirical approaches analyse interdependencies “according to historical accident or disaster 
data and expert experience”; system dynamics approaches “take a top-down method to 
manage and analyse complex adaptive systems involving interdependencies”; agent-based 
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We will now briefly make reference to some key methodologies addressing the various 
areas of the risk and resilience management process. The presentation is articulated in 
accordance with the stages of the CRISRRAM framework discussed above; see also 130 for 
further details and references about many of the mentioned projects and methodologies. 
Scenario Design and Data Collection 
We observe that only a limited number of existing methods and tools focus on designing 
scenarios. One such example is the Risk and Vulnerability analysis (RVA) by DEMA131, 
which dedicates a specific step to scenario design. Most methods usually address 
particular, predefined threat scenarios or apply the same methodology for selected case 
scenarios. Only in limited cases threat likelihood assessment is included (e.g. 
COUNTERACT, DECRIS, EURACOM, BMI, CIPDSS, etc.). A scenario-based approach to 
NRA was both recommended by DG-ECHO and applied by several MSs. It is also 
supported by the DHS guidelines for National CI Risk Management132. A clever definition 
of scenarios is considered a means to tackle the complexity of the problem; a key 
objective is to “divide the identified risks into separate pieces that can be assessed and 
analysed individually”. The use of such scenarios should identify which infrastructures are 
more critical (potential consequences would be highest) and also where security and 
resilience activities should be focused more133. 
CI Vulnerability assessment 
Regarding vulnerability assessment, the BIRR method introduces the concept of 
Vulnerability Index (VI) and Protective Measures Index (PMI), CARVER assesses the 
accessibility to a physical location, COUNTERACT evaluates the safeguards in place for 
the corresponding risks for the various assets, DECRIS uses a vulnerability analysis step 
to identify which threats should be examined further, and RVA follows a qualitative five-
levels scale for vulnerability assessment. The Sandia Risk Assessment Methodology takes 
into account the protection system effectiveness, expressed in terms of its ability to 
reduce the threat success probabilities. 
CI Resilience Assessment 
In terms of CI resilience assessment134, BIRR introduces a Resilience Index (RI) to 
provide an evaluation of how resilient an asset is, based on Robustness, Resourcefulness 
and Recovery mechanisms. CARVER2 similarly considers the presence of redundancy 
mechanisms, even if resilience is not explicitly mentioned. RAMCAP-Plus includes a Risk 
and Resilience Management step, highlighting how central this aspect is in the 
methodology. 
                                                                                                                                    
approaches “adopt a bottom-up method and assume the complex behaviour or phenomenon 
emerge from many individual and relatively simple interactions of autonomous agents”; 
network based approaches “describe the interdependencies by interlinks”, with the associated 
possibility to portray connectivity and flows. Finally, the other approaches mentioned in 
(Stergiopoulos et al., 2016) summon a number of additional techniques, including economic 
interdependency models and various other methods. 
130 Giannopoulos G., Filippini R., Schimmer M., “Risk assessment methodologies for critical 
infrastructure protection. part I: A state of the art,” European Commission, Tech. Rep. EUR 
25286, 2012. 
131 
http://brs.dk/eng/inspection/contingency_planning/rva/Pages/vulnerability_analysis_model.asp
x 
132 “Supplemental tool: Executing a critical infrastructure risk management approach,” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Tech. Rep., 2013. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP-2013-Supplement-Executing-a-CI-
Risk-Mgmt-Approach-508.pdf. 
133 Haimes YY, Jiang P (2001) Leontief-based model of risk in complex interconnected 
infrastructures. J Infrastruct Syst 1–12. 
134 G. Giannopoulos, R. Filippini, and M. Schimmer, “Risk assessment methodologies for critical 
infrastructure protection. part i: A state of the art,” European Commission, Tech. Rep. EUR 
25286, 2012. 
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CI Consequence Assessment/CI dependency assessment 
Interdependencies are covered by most methods being proposed, as this is a key feature 
for CIs. At the same time, the techniques involved and the level of detail varies 
significantly from case to case. Indirect consequences needing to be assessed include the 
social and economic costs inflicted to the society by the unavailability (or scarce 
availability) of essential services. One way to assess consequences is based on Service 
Availability Wealth (SAW) Indexes, which are implemented in CIPRNet’s Decision Support 
System135. These indexes refer to perceived societal consequences expressed in terms of 
“reduction of wealth” in various societal domains: citizens, availability of primary 
services, economic sectors and the environment. SAW indexes indicate the relevance of a 
speciﬁc service supplied by a CI to a given societal domain. The consequences estimation 
enables to weigh the different disaster scenarios and to compare their severity136. An 
improvement to the model also takes into consideration the mobility of people, to allow 
for a more dynamic and accurate assessment of consequences137. 
Another approach used to assess spreading consequences is through the application of 
input-output inoperability models (IIMs). These are based on the input-output approach 
proposed by Wassily Leontief, which is regarded as a key tool for the quantitative 
representation of interdependencies between different sectors within an economy. Input-
output models are also supported by a number of publicly available economic datasets 
that portray dependencies between different economic sectors at regional, national and 
international levels. In IIMs, the concept of inoperability refers to the inability of a sector 
to perform its prescribed functions, and it can be caused by internal failures as well as 
external perturbations affecting the delivery of a system’s intended output. IIMs have 
been applied to quantify the economic losses triggered by terrorism and other disruptive 
events to economic systems (or industry sectors). In recent years, extensions have been 
proposed in order to dynamically assess resilience to critical events, such as a disruption 
affecting some sectors and propagating through the economy depending on mutual 
dependencies, the centrality of the trigger points, and the response capabilities to the 
overall economy. In this context, a key factor towards the mitigation of monetary losses 
is represented by preparedness, which can be fostered by factors such as the availability 
of inventories able to ensure business continuity despite the temporary unavailability of 
some upstream services. In this perspective, IIMs can support the choice and 
prioritization of actions devoted to enhancing operability levels during and after crises. 
                                           
135 Di Pietro A., Lavalle L., La Porta L., Pollino M., Tofani A., Rosato V. (2016) Design of DSS for 
Supporting Preparedness to and Management of Anomalous Situations in Complex Scenarios. 
In: Setola R., Rosato V., Kyriakides E., Rome E. (eds) Managing the Complexity of Critical 
Infrastructures. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol 90. Springer. 
136 This “reduction or loss of well-being” indicator is composed of four terms: (a) reduction of well-
being of the most vulnerable population (categories concern old, young, disabled people and 
others), (b) reduction of primary services that affect the wealth and the well-being of the 
population; (c) economic losses due to services outages; (d) direct and indirect environmental 
damages (if any) caused by the outages (release of pollutants in the environment etc.). The 
previous criteria are affected directly by the event, but also by the lack of primary technological 
and energy services on different territories, over different time frames. The consequences of 
the scenario on each criterion are calculated on the basis of: (i) the quality of the considered 
services which contribute to wealth (electricity, telecommunication, gas, water and mobility), 
i.e. their level of availability during the event (this is a function of time), (ii) the relevance of 
each service to the achievement of the maximum level of the wealth quantity for a given 
aspect of the criteria, and (iii) the reduction of well being of people (for example the number of 
people affected, in a population segment, during a considered time period). 
137 Grangeat A., Sina J., Rosato V., Bony A., Theocharidou M. (2017) Human Vulnerability 
Mapping Facing Critical Service Disruptions for Crisis Managers. In: Havarneanu G., Setola R., 
Nassopoulos H., Wolthusen S. (eds) Critical Information Infrastructures Security. CRITIS 2016. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10242. Springer. 
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13.4.3 Tools 
Next, we provide some examples of tools that can offer support to risk assessment and 
resilience enhancement of CIs. The first three tools focus on this issue of dependency 
modelling, while the fourth one assists policy makers to define performance goals for 
infrastructures. 
JRC’s Geospatial Risk and Resilience Assessment platform (GRRASP) 
JRC has developed the Geospatial Risk and Resilience Assessment Platform (GRRASP)138. 
This is a World Wide Web-oriented architecture bringing together geospatial technologies 
and computational tools for the analysis and simulation of CIs. It allows information 
sharing and constitutes a basis for future developments in the direction of collaborative 
analysis and federated simulation. Moreover, it takes on board security concerns in the 
information sharing process, in terms of users, roles and groups. Based entirely on open 
source technologies, the system can also be deployed in separate servers and used by EU 
MSs as a means to facilitate the analysis of risk and resilience in CIs. Examples of 
GRRASP modules are reported next: 
 Network metrics, a module to perform graph analysis on directed/undirected 
networks, with a focus on CIs; 
 DMCI (Dynamic Functional Modelling of Vulnerability and Interoperability of 
Critical Infrastructures), a module to perform time analysis of service loss of 
interdependent CIs against critical events; 
 CINOPSYS, a module to analyse economic losses during critical events according 
to an inventory dynamic input-output inoperability model. 
See Figure 29 for a representation of the tiered approach to analysis implemented in 
GRRASP. 
                                           
138 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/grrasp 
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Figure 29. Tiered approach to analysis of CIS in GRRASP. 
 
 Source: Thocharidou et al, 2018 139 
Anytown tools 
Tools of interest in order to assist users (e.g. at the city level) to map their dependencies 
have been developed in Anytown, an initiative by the London Resilience team140. These 
tools include mind maps and onion-skin diagrams mapping the impacts of infrastructure 
disruptions for a variety of initial triggers141. Figure 30, for instance, refers to the case 
of electricity failure and its cascading effects on various sectors. In this representation, 
“the concentric circles capture the ripple effect showing spreading consequences from an 
initiating incident”, which can be considered “a useful metaphor in describing chains of 
causation”. 
                                           
139 Theocharidou M., Galbusera L., Giannopoulos G. Resilience of critical infrastructure systems: 
Policy, research projects and tools. In Linkov I., Trump B., Florin M.V. (Eds.) IRGC Resource 
Guide on Resilience (volume 2) Domains of Resilience for Complex Interconnected Systems in 
Transition, to appear, 2018. 
140 https://www.london.gov.uk/about-us/organisations-we-work/london-prepared/ 
141 Hogan M., Anytown: Final Report, London Resilience Team, 2013. Available at: 
http://climatelondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Anytown-Final-Report.pdf. 
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Figure 30. Onion-skin diagram of Anytown relating to Electricity Failure. 
 
Source: Hogan, 2013 142 
Clrcle tool 
Another tool that supports CI operators in identifying cascading effects together with 
other stakeholders in workshop settings is the ‘Critical infrastructures: relations and 
consequences for life and environment’ (Clrcle) tool143, developed by Deltares. It was 
designed to map CIs and facilities relevant for an area (e.g. a city) and then visually 
represent the dependencies of these infrastructures, especially in order to address critical 
events. A representation of dependency mapping can be seen in Figure 31, while an 
application of the tool to a case study can be found in 144 for a flood scenario relative to 
Cork, Ireland. 
NIST Planning Guide Performance Goal Tables 
Performance goal tables are provided as a complement to the above-mentioned NIST 
Community Resilience Planning Guide for Building and Infrastructure Systems145. In this 
framework, tables are provided for specific sectors (buildings, transportation, energy, 
water, wastewater, and communications) taking into account different building clusters 
(critical facilities, emergency housing, housing/neighbourhoods/businesses, and 
community recovery). Considering the possible diversity in hazard types and levels, 
affected area and disruption level, performance is evaluated in the short-, intermediate- 
and long-term. The specific results are then summarized in an overall performance goal 
table, as illustrated in Figure 32Error! Reference source not found.. 
                                           
142 Hogan M., Anytown: Final Report, London Resilience Team, 2013. Available at: 
http://climatelondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Anytown-Final-Report.pdf. 
143 https://circle.deltares.org/ 
144 de Bruijn K. M., Cumiskey L., Ní Dhubhda R., Hounjet M. and Hynes W., Flood vulnerability of 
critical infrastructure in Cork, Ireland, E3S Web Conf., 7 (2016) 07005 
doi:10.1051/e3sconf/20160707005. 
145 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1190GB-9.pdf 
119 
 
Figure 31. CIrcle diagram of dependencies. 
 
Source: Deltares146 
 Risk Treatment 13.5
While this document focused mainly on risk assessment, the results of the assessment 
have limited value if they are do not form the basis for examining alternative risk 
treatment options. 
IRGC’s 2017 Risk Governance Framework147 discusses the challenges related to dealing 
with complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. These are aspects that also MSs face when 
performing NRAs. Four risk management strategies are then identified for simple, 
complex, uncertain, ambiguous risks. The following two decision-making strategies seem 
most relevant to MSs148: 
— “Complex risks should be dealt with by risk-based decision-making involving internal 
or external experts and relying on scientific models. Complex risks can be addressed 
by acting on the best available scientiﬁc expertise and knowledge, aiming for a risk-
informed and robustness-focused strategy. […] Uncertain risks should be managed 
using precaution-based strategies to avoid exposure to a risk source with large 
uncertainties, and resilience-focused strategies to reduce the vulnerability of the risk-
absorbing systems”. 
— Practical examples of risk treatment options can be found in the London Risk 
Register149, which lists the controls in place together with the risk assessment results. 
                                           
146 https://circle.deltares.org/ 
147 IRGC. (2017). Introduction to the IRGC Risk Governance Framework, revised version. 
Lausanne: EPFL International Risk Governance Center. 
148 The framework also refers to Simple risks, which can be managed using a routine-based 
strategy, such as introducing a law or regulation, or to ambiguous risks which require 
discourse-based decision-making, by involving all stakeholders in order to eventually reconcile 
conﬂicting views and values. 
149 London Risk Register, Version 7.0, February 2018. Available at: 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/london_risk_register_v7.pdf. 
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The US DHS offers a list of measures150 on how to treat risk and increase resilience. 
The list is not exhaustive but offers some best practices and practical solutions for 
risk treatment. Here we list a selection of indicative examples from this guide: 
 “working with partners to develop a picture of how this infrastructure investment 
will fit into the regional landscape of critical infrastructure”; 
 “developing a comprehensive incident response plan that includes such 
components as scenario planning for the most likely risks and clearly articulated 
roles and responsibilities for all partners”; 
 “building redundancy into an infrastructure system so it can handle a localized 
failure”; 
 “budgeting for infrastructure mitigation during the development of a project to 
ensure the resilience of the infrastructure to threats and hazards”; 
 “developing a business continuity plan to ensure rapid recovery from disasters or 
other disruptions”; 
 “planning to conduct periodic updates for the infrastructure asset that can 
incorporate new technologies and/or upgrades that could enhance mitigation”; 
● “determining whether environmental buffers (e.g., dunes or wetlands) can be 
incorporated into the infrastructure design to mitigate the effects of natural 
disasters”; 
● “ensuring there are manual overrides and physical backups built into automated 
systems”. 
                                           
150 https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP-2013-Supplement-Incorporating-
Resilience-into-CI-Projects-508.pdf 
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Figure 32. NIST Community Resilience Guide: performance goals summary table. 
 
Source: NIST, 2018151 
 Gaps and Challenges 13.6
— The body of knowledge on CI risk and resilience management is quite rich and can be 
a valuable source for authorities and operators to explore. Enabling the 
operationalization of resources, models and tools still requires substantial efforts and 
this report is a contribution in this direction. A potential approach could include 
inventories of models, methods and tools provided by specialists. Work on the 
interoperability of models is also needed, especially in relation to current risk 
management practices. Moreover, as discussed, an issue is about the availability and 
quality of data needed for CI risk management. 
— Another key challenge for regulators and governments is to encourage private 
industries to invest in risk reduction and resilience, especially within the current 
                                           
151 Available at: https://www.nist.gov/document/performancegoalstemplatexlsx. 
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economic conditions and considering the changing environment infrastructures 
operate in. Moreover, operators have varying technical, financial, political, 
reputational, legal priorities and constraints, which the policymakers need to 
comprehend when elaborating strategies for risk and resilience. To this end, 
stakeholder involvement and information sharing can be enhanced via the 
participation in networks. For example, Finland’s National Emergency Supply 
Organisation (NESO) sectors and their respective pools provide an interesting 
example of voluntary collaboration between public sector and industry. These 
business-driven groups are responsible for operational preparedness in their fields. 
The pools are tasked with monitoring, analysing, planning, and preparing measures 
for the development of security of supply within their individual industries, as well as 
with determining which enterprises are critical to the security of supply. Similarly, 
Sector-Based Information Sharing and Analysis Centres can be a solution for 
exchange between stakeholders. In the United States, several sector-based 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) assist federal and local 
governments with information pertaining to cyber threats. Australia’s Trusted 
Information Sharing Network (TISN) is another example of a national engagement 
mechanism for business-government information sharing and resilience building 
initiatives. It provides a secure environment in which CI owners and operators across 
seven sector groups meet regularly to share information and cooperate within and 
across sectors, in order to address security and business continuity challenges. In the 
EU, examples of such networks are the European Reference Network on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP)152,153 with its expert groups and its established 
series of CI Operators Workshops, or the Thematic Network on Critical Energy 
Infrastructure Protection (TNCEIP)154, which is made up of European owners and 
operators of energy infrastructures in the electricity, gas and oil sectors. Both 
networks allow stakeholders to exchange information on threat assessment, risk 
management, cybersecurity, and other security-related topics, on a voluntary basis 
and within a trusted environment. 
— Finally, an identified gap remains the need to perform joint exercises to better 
comprehend dependencies between CIs, thus generating more accurate risk 
assessments, and to jointly test risk treatment options. Such exercises need to be 
designed with a different mentality than civil protection exercises which focus mainly 
on the operational capabilities of emergency responders. Crisis scenarios that involve 
both public authorities and infrastructure operators are not widely analysed, but they 
can be a valuable tool to test risk and resilience strategies and plans, as well as to 
enhance collaboration. 
  
                                           
152 https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
153 Gattinesi P. (2018). European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection: ERNCIP 
Handbook 2018 edition, May 2018. 
154 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/protection-critical-infrastructure 
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14 Chemical accidents 
 Overview of chemical accident risk 14.1
Chemical incidents are significantly different from natural hazards and even distinctly 
apart from other kinds of well-known technological disasters, notably in the nuclear 
industry and aviation.  Unlike these technological disaster types, the term “chemical 
accident” is not associated with a specific industry.  Rather, significant chemical accident 
risks are present in a wide variety of industries characterized by vast differences in the 
substances, processes, technology and equipment that create the risk. Chemical accident 
risk155 consists of several components and therefore, understanding accident causality, 
i.e., why chemical accidents happen in the first place, is critical to effective risk 
management and finding dependable means to measure risk management performance. 
Chemical accident risk is highly dependent on the activity of the site, the processes it 
operates and the types of dangerous substances it uses.  There are hundreds of 
processes in oil and gas or chemicals processing industries alone.  They may be present 
in land-based establishments (also known as “fixed facilities), pipelines, transport by rail, 
road and water, and offshore oil exploration platforms. Explosives industries, involving 
manufacture and/or storage of explosives, fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles, are 
also prominent sources of chemical accident risk.  The high use of dangerous substances, 
such as cyanide and arsenic, in metals processing also has elevated the mining industry 
into the high risk category.  
Figure 33 shows the distribution of the ~10,000 Seveso Directive sites (high hazard 
fixed facilities) in the European Union as reported by countries in 2014. In addition, 
numerous other industries that are not part of these hazardous chemicals industries also 
can be sources of chemical accident risk.   
Figure 33. Distribution of Seveso Directive sites (high hazard fixed facilities) in EU and EEA 
countries in 2014. 
 
Source: EC-JRC eSPIRS database, 2018 
                                           
155 In this section, we will refer to chemical accident risk for the sake of simplicity, but the 
principles can equally applied to analysis and management of chemical incidents from intentional 
acts (e.g., sabotage, terrorism).  While the causality may require different prevention and 
mitigation solutions, the potential consequences (fire, explosion or toxic release) are the same and 
the analysis of the scenario to make decisions about how to prevent, control or respond to it, is the 
same.   
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 Prevention and mitigation of chemical releases  14.2
The bow tie diagramme is commonly used for illustrating the dynamics of a chemical 
accident and for focusing attention on prevention and mitigation opportunities. As noted 
in Figure 34, the Loss of Containment is the point that distinguishes between measures 
that are prevention (measures implemented before the loss of containment) and 
measures that are part of mitigation (measures taken after the loss of containment).  
That is, once the substance has escaped from its pipe or vessel, prevention measures 
have failed and mitigation measures must be launched to keep the event from turning 
into a dangerous phenomenon, that is, a fire, explosion or toxic release.   
Figure 34. Bow Tie Illustration of Chemical Accident Sequence of Events 
 
 
The main factors that directly contribute to chemical accident risk are usually defined as 
 The dangerous substance(s) involved (flammable, toxic, or explosive and any 
combination thereof) 
 Process and equipment, that is, their properties and conditions (e.g., pressure, 
temperature, reactions involved, pipes and vessel, safety controls, equipment age 
and mechanical condition, etc.) 
 Safety management systems, including operations, hazard assessment, 
maintenance, inspections, resource planning, personnel selection and training, 
performance monitoring, and emergency preparedness 
 The dangerous phenomena produced (fire, explosion, toxic release) as a result of 
substances, involved, process, equipment and various site conditions. 
To illustrate, Figure 35 shows a typical scenario associated with the storage of 
anhydrous ammonia from Gyenes et al., 2017156.  The “critical event” column indicates 
that three different types of loss of containment that can occur in connection with this 
process.  They are 1) an instantaneous release (rupture of the tank, e.g. from an 
external shock, or excess of pressure or temperature), 2) a leak on the tank, and 3) roll-
                                           
156 Gyenes, Z., M. Wood and M. Struckl. 2017. Handbook of Scenarios for Assessing 
Major Chemical Accident Risks. European Commission Joint Research Centre. EUR 28518 
EN https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/shorturl/minerva/publications  
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over (rapid release of vapours caused by stratification of the liquid into different layers of 
density). 
Using this scenario, an operator will implement a number of risk management measures, 
to prevent and mitigate a potential release, and to control any dangerous phenomenon 
that may result.  A first set of measures, typically embedded in equipment design, 
maintenance routines, and operating practices, will be intended to prevent the loss of 
containment.  These are measures represented on the left-hand side of the bow tie. In 
the event that these measures fail, and a rupture, leak or roll-over event occur, 
measures would be in place to detect that a release has occurred, e.g., ammonia 
sensors, maintenance and inspection practices, at which point some automated 
mitigation measures, such as pressure relief valves and ventilation systems may be 
activated. These measures are on the right-hand side of the bow tie.  Trained emergency 
responders may initiate further actions to prevent the release from turning into a major 
emergency, and precautionary measures, such as site evacuation, may be launched. At 
the very far right end of the bow tie, that is, the very last element of preparedness in the 
potential sequence of events, are emergency response measures to combat the toxic 
release, contain secondary impacts from any explosion, and to limit damages to workers, 
the community and the environment. 
Figure 35. Scenarios for anhydrous ammonia atmospheric pressure refrigerated storage tank 
 
Source: Gyenes et al., 2017 
Controlling and eliminating all causes of chemical accidents is theoretically possible but 
logistically difficult. Such control requires perfect understanding of process and 
equipment conditions at any point in time and how process substances will behave under 
these conditions.  It also means controlling all the decisions that govern any particular 
process and ensuring that they too are perfect at all times.   Given this reality, most 
experts are skeptical that chemical accident risks can be reduced sufficiently such that 
they are no longer a concern for society.  Therefore, mitigation of chemical accident risks 
to reduce impacts as well as land-use planning and emergency response are equally 
important elements of risk management strategy. 
 Principles of effective risk assessment and management  14.3
The likelihood of an accident occurring depends significantly on how well the risks are 
managed (the safety management system) and by decisions of the organisation(s) that 
affect the functional effectiveness of the safety management system. (These causal 
factors are usually referred to as “underlying causes”.)  In current times, there is 
considerable agreement on the fundamental principles of process safety management 
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which, if understood and properly applied, would prevent a large majority of chemical 
accidents that still occur today.   
Risk assessment for chemical accident risk follows a similar simple structure that is 
generally applicable to all technological risks.  This structure is composed of three simple 
questions, often called the risk triplet: 
● What can go wrong? 
● How likely is it that it will happen?  
● If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
 
 Performing a risk assessment 14.4
The scope of this section is to describe different decision pathways bridging the risk 
analysis to land-use and emergency planning for chemical accident risk.  Criteria for 
decisions may vary depending on the national context, but generally depend on various 
social and economic conditions, cultural attitudes towards industrial risk and historical 
events that may have shaped these attitudes.  
The core of risk assessment is the consequence analysis, that is, the fire, explosion or 
toxic release that could result from an unplanned release of a dangerous substance.  The 
core of the consequence analysis is the accident scenario (or scenarios), that is, the 
specific sequence of events that could lead to a major fire, explosion or toxic release. 
All approaches require a consequence analysis. The consequence analysis has numerous 
and very specific data requirements.  Typical inputs include data on substance properties 
(boiling point, vapour pressure, etc.), the source term (how the substance was released, 
e.g., whether a leak or a rupture, how big was the size of the hole, etc.), process 
conditions (pressure, temperature, etc.), the surrounding environment (outside 
temperature, open space versus a building, etc.), human health thresholds in relation to 
certain impact thresholds (toxicity, thermal and explosive effects), population in the 
surrounding area, and other data of specific relevance to the accident scenario selected. 
With the exception of substance properties, the data cannot be generalized but must be 
based on actual conditions at the site in question. The Seveso Directive requires 
operators of upper tier sites (highest hazard sites) to produce risk estimates in the safety 
report.  The site operators are generally responsible for providing risk estimates but 
regulators may run their own calculations using the data provided by the site.   
Risk managers have several options in terms of risk assessment methodology. 
The options for risk assessment approaches are divided into two categories and then 
divided further into two subcategories. The main difference between the two categories is 
whether or not numeric frequencies of accident events are taken into account. The 
categories and subcategories are as follows: 
● Probabilistic approaches 
o Quantitative approach producing a numeric risk estimate 
o Semi-quantitative approach producing a numeric risk estimate  
● Deterministic approaches 
o Deterministic approach that estimates spatial distribution and severity of 
effects and implicitly takes account of frequencies 
o Distance approach that uses table of fixed distances based on generalized 
estimates of the results of the deterministic approach 
The decision to choose a particular method depends on national attitudes to chemical 
risk. Years of experiencing in implementing the Seveso Directive in the European Union 
has proved that the decision on risk assessment of chemical accidents is closely identified 
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with the country’s culture, history, and economic, and social conditions. In addition, the 
decision to use a probabilistic approach may require a consideration as to whether 
adequate data on frequency for certain types of chemical processes are readily available.  
For example, it may be important to know how many times a pressure relief valve did 
not function as expected under certain process conditions.  If these data are not 
available, it may be necessary to choose a deterministic approach. 
The probabilistic approach (sometimes called the quantitative approach) is 
characterized by a final decision based on a numerical risk figure, that is, an estimate of 
the probability of an event, e.g., 1 X 10-5. The numeric estimate of frequency is 
combined with a numeric estimate of severity to produce a risk figure. It is very 
important to understand that this risk estimate represents a relative risk, rather than an 
absolute risk. Data inputs to produce this figure are usually generalized from datasets 
that are not necessarily representative of the universe of possibilities Therefore, these 
inputs carry with them a high degree of uncertainty.  The resulting estimates of 
probability are characterized by uncertainty as well.  Based on these results, risks are 
classified in terms of ranges of probability, with the probability estimates considered as 
indicative rather than absolute measures.   
In contrast, the deterministic approach does not select scenarios on the basis of a 
numeric likelihood, nor does it produce a numeric estimate of risk. The selection of data 
inputs (e.g., the volume of hazardous substance released, threshold of harmful effects, 
etc.) is selected on the assumption that they represent higher frequency events.  The 
output is generally framed in terms of the distribution of certain effects across a certain 
area, usually divided into spatial zones within a certain distance from the source relative 
to higher likelihood of death or level of injury. The fixed distance approach simply 
calculates a fixed distance on the basis of scenarios involving specific substances based 
on calculations of these spatial zones. 
 Selecting accident scenarios for the risk assessment 14.5
The selection of accident scenarios follows the risk triplet, by first identifying what can go 
wrong and then subsequently determining how likely it is to happen and how serious the 
impacts will be. 
14.5.1 Hazard identification (what can go wrong) 
The consequence analysis relies on the selection of an accident scenario or scenarios.  A 
major hazard site may have one or many accident scenarios, with different likelihood of 
occurrence or severity.  The number of scenarios depends on the complexity of the site.   
For example, a large petroleum refinery could have 50 or 100 process units and each one 
of them may have one or more scenarios.  On the other end of the spectrum, an LPG 
storage facility may have only a few scenarios. 
The selection of scenarios generally starts with the hazard identification that has been 
conducted by the operator. There are numerous hazard evaluation methods, of which the 
most common include, checklists, relative ranking systems (e.g., the Dow Index, the 
Substance Hazard Index), preliminary hazard analysis, What – If Analysis, What – If & 
Checklist Analysis, Hazard & Operability Analysis (Hazop), Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA),  Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, Cause – Consequence 
Analysis, Human Reliability Analysis, and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) as shown in 
Figure 36 from CCPS157. 
 
 
 
                                           
157 Center for Chemical Process Safety.  2001. Layer of protection Analysis – Simplified Process Risk 
Assessment.   ISBN 0-8169-0811-7 
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Figure 36. Layers of Protection Model for a Chemical Plant. 
 
Source: according to CCPS 1993 
These methods each help the operator to make a systematic assessment of potential 
hazards associated with a particular process involving dangerous substances.  The output 
of the process often relies substantially on expert judgement.  Often methods may be 
used in combination to produce independent outcomes that can then be compared.  Some 
methods, such as Hazop and LOPA, require substantial input from a multidisciplinary team 
of experts.  The operator will ideally choose hazard identification methods that are suited 
for the processes and substances present on the site. 
A hazard identification produces a list of possible undesirable scenarios. From these 
scenarios, a subset of scenarios will be selected as the subject of the risk assessment. 
14.5.2 Selecting the accident scenarios (How likely is it that it will 
happen and if it does happen, what are the consequences?) 
The selection of the accident scenario(s) for the risk assessment depends on the risk 
assessment approach selected.   
14.5.2.1 Deterministic approach 
The selection of scenarios may be based on a qualitative estimate of the consequences 
only, which means an expert judgment of the expected damage (severe, medium, low). 
But the main problem is the definition of the scenarios before this step. The selectin is 
not based on a numeric evaluation of the risk, but selects incidents judged by experts to 
be undesirable events.  Selection criteria often include one or more of the following: 
 An assumption of a release, or loss of containment (LOC) of all the contents of the 
equipment (vessel or pipe) 
 Assumption of a specific type of LOC (e.g., leak from a pipe of 25cm diameter)  
• Expectation that preventive measures  could  avoid the LOC (so that the scenario 
is no longer considered for the risk assessment) 
• Qualitative criteria to accept or exclude certain preventive measures for a scenario 
(e.g., based on the expected reliability of a measure) For example, automated 
protections, such as pressure relief valves, are often considered more reliable than 
prevention measures that rely solely on human intervention 
Plant Emergency Response 
Physical Protection Devices 
Safety Instrumented System  
Critical Alarms and Operator Intervention 
Basic Process Control System 
 
 
Process  
operations 
control  
Plant 
Design 
Community Emergency Response 
129 
Applying the criteria will generally result on some accident scenarios ranked higher in 
severity than others and on the basis of this ranking, the operator will select scenarios 
for the risk assessment. 
14.5.2.2 Probabilistic approach 
This approach requires sufficient data on the likelihood of plant’ system failures. The 
frequency data may refer to the so-called “top event”, i. e., the LOC or Loss of 
Containment, or to the sequence of events leading to the top event, on the left-hand 
side of the bow tie, or to the performance of any preventive measures (left-hand side) or 
mitigation measures (right-hand side). Despite the fact that specific data referring to the 
individual case is always the most favourable option, generic data are widely used in 
order to avoid extensive research to identify numbers, especially when complete datasets 
from past events occurring on the site may not be available.  
The so-called Dutch “Purple Book”158, the FRED database of the HSE159160, the so-called 
“Taylor-Study”161, NS the “AMINAL-Study”162are all well-known sources of generic 
frequency data for chemical accident risk analysis.  An example of the values for a pipe 
leak is shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
Table 7. Example of pipe failure frequencies 
 Small leak 
(effective 
diameter of 10% 
of the nominal 
diameter 
Leak (effective 
diameter of 22% 
of the nominal 
diameter 
Leak (effective 
diameter of 
44% of the 
nominal 
diameter) 
(Large leak) 
Full bore 
rupture 
 
Nominal 
diameter 
< 75 mm 
1.18.10-5 7.93.10
-6 3.3.10-6 1.22.10-6 
75 mm ≤ nominal 
diameter ≤ 150 
mm 
2.5.10-6 1.11.10-6 4.62.10-7 3.5.10-7 
Nominal 
diameter 
> 150 mm 
1.75.10-6 6.5.10-7 2.7.10-7 1.18.10-7 
 
The second main element of the scenario selection in probabilistic assessment is the 
application of reliability figures for control measures that may prevent the accident from 
occurring or reduce its severity. Similar to the deterministic approach, measures may be 
grouped into the following categories: 
● “Avoid  Measures”:  the  scenario  will  not  occur  (example:  burying  a  vessel  
will  prevent  a BLEVE). 
● “Prevention Measures”: the frequency of a scenario is reduced (example: 
automated systems to prevent overfilling). 
                                           
158 Committee for the Prevention Disasters (CPR), 1999, "Guideline for Quantitative Risk 
Assessment-“Purple Book” CPR18E, SDU, The Hague 
159159 UK Health and Safety Executive. 1999. Failure rate and event data for use in risk assessment 
(FRED). Issue 1. Nov 99 (RAS/99/20). 
160 UK Health and Safety Executive. 2003. New failure rates for land use planning QRA Update. 
Chapter 6K: Failure rate and event data for use within risk assessments. 2/09/2003. 
RAS/00/22.  
161 Taylor, J. R. 2006. Hazardous Materials Release and Accident Frequencies for Process Plant. 
Volume II Process Unit Release Frequencies. Version 1 Issue 7. http://efcog.org/wp-
content/uploads/Wgs/Safety%20Working%20Group/_Nuclear%20and%20Facility%20Safety%20S
ubgroup/Documents/Reldat%20II%207.pdf  
162 Handboek  Kanscijfers  voor  het  opstellen  van  een  Veiligheidsrapport  1/10/2004,  AMINAL  
–  Afdeling Algemeen Milieu- en Natuurbeleid. 
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● “Control    Measures”:  the  size,  severity  or  extent  of  the  scenario  is  
reduced  (example:  gas detectors operating block valves). 
● “Mitigate Measures”: the size, severity or extent of the effects is reduced 
(example: firewalls).  
It is up to the individual user or the national system to determine which types of 
measures are taken into account and what and how the efficiency is assessed. Some 
approaches may only consider passive measures (no human intervention or 
measurement of parameters necessary). 
The third part of the quantitative selection of accident scenarios is the definition of “cut 
– off”.  The cut-off is a set of numerical values that are fixed and indicate the threshold 
of selection, that is, which scenarios have likelihood that is too low for the risk 
assessment.   
 Evaluating the consequence analysis 14.6
The outcome of the risk assessment, regardless of approach is an estimate of the risk in 
terms of likelihood and severity.  The likelihood measure may be expressed either 
numerically, e. g., yearly occurrence of an undesirable event in the range of 10-3 – 10-
9, or qualitatively (e. g. very likely to very unlikely). The severity may be expressed 
quantitatively by numerical effect (e.g., how many deaths), or qualitatively from “low” 
to “high”.   
14.6.1 Evaluating impacts and severity 
14.6.1.1 Dangerous phenomena produced by a chemical accident scenario 
The risk assessment will identify phenomena that can be produced from the accident 
scenario.  The main types of potential dangerous phenomena that may be generated by a 
chemical accident are shown in Table 8. The consequence analysis will identify which 
phenomena are produced by the accident scenario.   
Table 8. Effects related to different kind of scenarios 
Dangerous 
Phenomenon 
Scenario Types 
Thermal 
Radiation 
Overpressure Toxic Effects 
Fireball x x  
Flashfire x   
Jetfire x   
Poolfire x   
VCE x x  
Toxic Clouds   x 
Solids Fire x   
 
14.6.1.2 Human health effect evaluation 
The risk assessment will identify potential human health effects from dangerous 
phenomenon, mainly a fire (thermal radiation), explosion (overpressure) or toxic release. 
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Table 9 below is an example of severity classifications for human health effects. 
Table 9. Consequence classification for human and environmental impacts. 
Consequence Classification 
Effects on human health Effects on the environment 
No injury or slight injuries without sick leave No action needed but surveillance 
Injuries leading to an hospitalization Serious effects on the environment inside 
the establishment 
Irreversible injuries or death inside the 
establishment, reversible injuries outside the 
establishment 
Reversible effects on the environment 
outside the establishment 
Irreversible injuries or death outside the 
establishment 
Irreversible effects on the environment 
outside the establishment  
 
The severity level is determined by reviewing the expected intensity of the impact (heat, 
overpressure, lethality and concentration of the toxic substance) and the spatial area 
over which each level of intensity is sustained.  Impacts of consequences are usually 
expressed in terms of spatial distribution and number of people affected, often displayed 
as a map as in Figure 37. 
Figure 37. Toxic disperson from a catastrophic rupture of a tank wagon containing sulphur 
dioxide. 
 
Source: JRC, 2018 
14.6.1.3 Physical effects of fire and explosions  
The definition of physical hazards is comparatively easy.  The divergence of accepted 
thresholds is not wide and the main difference lies in the decision which levels of 
effects should be taken into account. For thermal radiation and overpressure the 
following values may serve as default figures: 
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Table 10.  Endpoints values of fires and explosions for different severity levels 
Level 
Stationary 
Radiation 
Non – 
stationary 
Radiation 
Overpressure 
No effect 1,6 kW/m2   
Small effects < 3 – < 5 kW/m2 < 125 kJ/m2 < 30 mbar 
Reversible effects < 3 – < 5 kW/m2 125 – < 200 kJ/m2 30 - < 50 mbar 
Irreversible effects 5 – 7 kW/m2 200 - 350 kJ/m2 50 – 140 mbar 
Lethality > 7 kW/m2 > 350 kJ/m2 > 140 mbar 
 
Another distinction concerns the duration of the effect, as shown below: 
Table 11. Stationary, non-stationary and fixed effects. 
Dangerous 
Phenomenon 
Effect Type 
 
Stationary 
Radiation 
Non – stationary 
radiation 
Overpressure 
(fixed value) 
Fireball 
 
x x 
Flashfire 
 
x 
 
Jetfire x 
  
Poolfire x 
  
VCE 
 
x x 
Solids Fire x 
  
 
“Non – stationary” means that the effect is calculated on the basis of an equation that 
takes into account the actual time of exposure which may be very short in the case of 
certain scenarios.  
14.6.1.4 Toxic effects 
For toxic effects the situation is more complex than for physical hazards, taking into 
account the following limitations: 
● Countries with existing concepts only agree one threshold, which is the level 
corresponding to the start of the certain effects (for example irreversible health 
effect). 
● There are various exposure guidelines; the selection of one of them based on 
scientific expertise is difficult (finding evidence of the effects of a given toxic  
substance  in  humans   is  often unmanageable, so the experimentation is 
usually done in animals and the values obtained extrapolated to humans). 
● Each source guideline (e.g., American Institute of Industrial Hygienists 
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines – ERPGs) covers only a limited 
number of substances. 
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● The effects of toxic substances on humans are in some cases related to the 
dose and not to a given concentration. 
● The dose may depend not only on the concentration value and the exposure 
time but also on other parameters which depend on the substance and may be 
unknown. 
● The effects on exposed persons is greatly affected by their health condition, age 
etc, Currently three databases for toxic effects are widely used: IDLH, ERPG and 
AEGL. 
● Immediately Dangerous for Life and Health (IDLH) Threshold Levels163 
● Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) Threshold Levels164 
14.6.2 Consequence and risk assessment modelling tools 
Given the complex nature of consequence and risk assessment of chemical accidents, 
various organisations have developed tools. The following tools are the most well-known, 
but other tools are also available: 
 The JRC ADAM (Accident Damage Assessment Model) Tool.  The JRC 
created this versatile application for competent authorities implementing the EU 
Seveso Directive.  It models consequences for a wide range of substances and 
scenarios and also can incorporate frequency data and produce a risk assessment 
figure.  It is available for free to competent authorities.  For more information, go 
to the website https://adam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/adam/content  
 The ALOHA software tool created by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
is is used widely to plan for and respond to chemical emergencies.  ALOHA allows 
users to enter details about a real or potential chemical release, and then it will 
generate threat zone estimates for various types of hazards.  ALOHA can model 
toxic gas clouds, flammable gas clouds, BLEVEs (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor 
Explosions), jet fires, pool fires, and vapor cloud explosions.  It is available for 
free at https://www.epa.gov/cameo/aloha-software  
 EFFECTS is a commercial software developed by TNO and available at cost for 
safety professionals to calculate and analyse the effects of accident scenarios.  
More information is available at:  
https://www.tno.nl/en/foccus-areas/circular-economy-
environment/roadmaps/environment-sustainability/public-safety/effects-
advanced-easy-to-use-consequence-analysis/  
 PHAST  is DNV’s commercial software for modeling releases and dispersions 
including modelling of pool spreading and evaporation, and flammable and toxic 
effects.  More information is available at: 
https://www.dnvgl.com/services/process-hazard-analysis-software-phast-1675  
 Presenting the risk assessment outcome for decision-making 14.7
The final result of the risk assessment combines the impact analysis with likelihood of the 
event for each accident scenario. This product gives the necessary information for 
decision-makers.  Some common mechanisms for communicating the results of the risk 
assessment are as follows: 
A risk matrix, representing the compatibility between defined level of risk  and  urban/ 
environmental development (see Figure 38). 
The following matrix is derived from the U.K. Health and Safety Executive publication 
‘Reducing Risks Protecting People’ and the UKHSE final report on the Buncefield fire and 
                                           
163 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, USA. Online: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh 
164 Online: http://www.aiha.org 
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explosion. Report: U.K. Health and Safety Executive publication: Safety and 
Environmental Standards for Fuel Storage Sites. 
Figure 38. Example of a Risk Matrix 
 
 
A spatial distribution of the consequences expressed on a geographic map of the area 
(as in Figure 39). 
A chart that shows different zones of risk of any individual being harmed by an accident 
scenario.  The individual risk curves are associated with impact areas with different 
frequency endpoints. The numeric frequencies in Figure 40 can only be produced 
through a probabilistic risk assessment.  However, similar charts can also be produced 
from a deterministic risk assessment, with the zones described qualitatively (e.g., 
likelihood of fatalities or irreversible injury, likelihood of reversible injury, etc.).  Such 
charts may be used to create land-use planning zones or emergency response 
intervention zones.  For example, 10-6 irreversible damage area where only limited 
residential developments are allowed.  The societal risk graph (F/N-curve), is a single 
measure of the chance that an accident (or accidents) could harm a number of people.  It 
can only be produced through a probabilistic risk assessment.  
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Figure 39. Example of an individual risk curve 
 
These outputs can be used directly by decision makers to determine whether the site has 
achieved an acceptable level of risk.  The risk assessment of each accident scenario must 
be within the range of acceptable risk.  When probabilistic risk assessment is used, 
acceptable risk is defined as a numeric risk figure, e.g., 10-5, established by the operator, 
or sometimes by national legislation.  The F/N curve usually represents the collective risk 
of the entire range of critical accident scenarios at a site.  It can generally only be 
produced  through a probabilistic approach. 
Figure 40. Example of an F/N diagramme 
 
 
These outputs can also be used by governments to create standardised distances. 
Table 12. Example of a risk matrix with quantified likelihood. 
Frequency/ 
Likelihood 
Single 
fatality 
2-10 
fatalities 
11-50 
fatalities 
50-100 
fatalities 
100+ 
fatalities 
Likely >10-2/yr Intolerable  Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable 
Unlikely 10-4/yr – 
10-2/yr 
Tolerable 
(Intolerable 
if individual 
risk of 
fatality >10-
Intolerable 
(Intolerable if 
individual risk 
of fatality 
>10-3/yr) 
Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable 
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3/yr) 
Very 
unlikely 
10-6/yr – 
10-4/yr 
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable 
Remote 10-8/yr – 
10-6/yr 
Broadly 
Acceptable 
Broadly 
Acceptable 
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
 
14.7.1 Making decisions based on the risk assessment 
The output of any risk assessment provides an indicator of the magnitude of the risk 
associated with the hazard. Organisations can use this output in numerous ways, 
depending on their role in the process.  
 Operators will use the risk assessment to make decisions about strengthening risk 
management and where to invest resources in a way that reduces risk most 
effectively. 
 Inspectors may make decisions about whether the site is safe and can continue 
operations without significant changes.  
 Land-use planners will use the outputs to make rules about where certain uses can 
be developed, and also to impose restrictions on certain development when 
necessary.   
 Emergency planners will use the information to determine the types of equipment, 
knowledge, and training that emergency personnel will require. They may make 
decisions about when and how to evacuate certain populations, setting up medical 
services around the site, and other intervention components.   
The outputs of risk assessment of chemical incidents have a high degree of uncertainty 
that can make them difficult to communicate to politicians and the public. They are 
complicated to explain and the fact that they are not entirely certain, may undermine 
their importance. In the case of numeric estimates, there can be tendency to 
underestimate the need to prevent and prepare for low frequency high severity events On 
the other hand, the public may see these numbers as frightening. Nonetheless, the 
advantage of having more knowledge about chemical accident risk far exceeds some of 
the challenges it creates.  
 
 References from the European Commission Joint Research 14.8
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15 Nuclear Accidents 
MIGUEL ANGEL HERNANDEZ CEBALLOS, CRISTINA TRUEBA ALONSO, MILAGROS 
MONTERO PRIETO, GIORGIA IURLARO, MARCO SANGIORGI, BLANCA GARCÍA PUERTA, 
Objective of this contribution is to present the steps to follow in order to carry an analysis 
of a single hazard (nuclear accident), stressing the limitations of the methods and the 
opportunities to link them with other hazards. Focus is made on the methodologies and 
tools existing to assess the hazards, exposure and vulnerability to ionising radiation, 
pointing out the requirements of data and expertise, the assumptions made and the 
limitations of the results.  
 
 Context 15.1
It is generally recognized the dichotomy between the advantages and disadvantages 
provided by facilities and activities dealing with ionising radiation. Among the benefits, 
they range from power generation to medicine, industry and agriculture uses. On the 
contrary, the radiation risks to workers, public and environment that may arise from a 
potential accident generate its rejection. The radioactive material once released, 
dispersed and deposited on different environments, causes a situation of exposure to the 
population through different pathways that can lead to doses and health risks. It creates 
that ionising radiation have to assessed and, if necessary, controlled.  
The EU has radiation protection legislation in place to protect human health against the 
dangers arising from ionising radiation. This includes the Basic Safety Standards (Council 
Directive 2013/59/EURATOM), which is supplemented by a number of acts ensuring a 
high level of protection for the public, workers, and patients. In addition, the EU requires 
EU countries to monitor radioactivity in the air, water, soil and foodstuffs. The full test of 
all EU-level provisions currently valid in radiation protection can be consulted in 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/overview-eu-radiation-protection-legislation    
  Risk identification 15.2
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines nuclear accident in its Safety 
Glossary (IAEA, 2016) as “any event involving facilities or activities from which a release 
of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which have resulted or may result 
in an international significant transboundary release that could be of radiological safety 
significance for another State”. The radiological significance of nuclear accidents is 
categorized by the IAEA on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) 
(IAEA, 2008). INES Scale facilitates consistent communication on the safety significance 
of nuclear and radiological events. Based on a numerical rating, from one to seven, the 
scale rates events into incidents (levels 1-3) or accidents (levels 4-7), while events 
without safety significance are rated as level 0. Nuclear and radiological events are 
included in each level by considering three areas of impact:  
o People and the Environment: It considers the radiation doses to people close to 
the location of the event and the widespread, and unplanned release of 
radioactive material from an installation; 
o Radiological   Barriers   and   Control: It covers events without any direct impact 
on people or the environment and only applies inside major facilities. It covers 
unplanned high radiation levels and spread of significant quantities of radioactive 
materials confined within the installation;  
o Defence-in-Depth: It also covers events without any direct impact on people or 
the environment, but for which the range of measures put in place to prevent 
accidents did not function as intended. 
As an example of the INES scale application, nuclear power plant (NPPs) accidents at 
Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi were rated 7 within the People and the Environment 
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area. On the contrary, the event in the Three Mile Island NPP was categorized as level 5 
within the Radiological Barriers and Control area. 
Successfully response arrangements has often turned out to be a major challenge – if not 
impossible – where no prior risk assessment and proper preparedness planning had 
taken place. The main target of nuclear risk assessment is to improve safety and 
minimize risks related to nuclear energy. Risk assessment denotes the total process, and 
the results, of assessing the radiation risks and other risks associated with normal 
operation and possible accidents involving facilities and activities, from which a release of 
radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur (IAEA, 2016). This process normally 
includes consequence assessment, together with some assessment of the probability of 
those consequences arising. 
The NERIS platform (European Platform on Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological 
Emergency Response and Recovery) (https://www.eu-neris.net/), established in 2010, 
is a forum for dialogue and methodological development between all European 
organisations and associations taking part in decision making of protective actions in 
nuclear and radiological emergencies and recovery in Europe. Among the activities 
supported and developed under the umbrella of the NERIS platform, as training 
courses, workshops, or user and working groups, NERIS is also linked to research 
projects, such as the PREPARE project  on innovative integrative tools and platforms to 
be prepared for radiological emergencies and post-accident response in Europe 
(https://www.eu-neris.net/projects/prepare.html). After three years of research 
(2013-2016), PREPARE has improved tools and methods in topics such as long lasting 
releases, source term estimation, model improvements, knowledge gathering and 
exchange of trustworthy information, and it has provided tools and methodologies 
which are either used in national organisation and implemented in decisions support 
systems such as ARGOS and RODOS (Raskob et al., 2016). 
 
 Risk analysis 15.3
Targets of risk assessment are the people and the ecological systems close to the 
location of the event, as well as those potentially under the influence of the radioactive 
material released due to its transport. With this in mind, the final product should be the 
information to determine appropriate defence-in-depth strategies, to develop policies by 
decision makers and public information at global, regional and national levels, as well as 
list of corrective measures that are feasible, rational and in line with social and economic 
objectives. 
In general, risk assessment is included within the scope of safety assessment, which 
covers all aspects of facilities and activities that are relevant to protection and safety of 
technological systems (IAEA, 2016). The evaluation of safety can be addressed by a 
bottom-up approach, i.e., it starts with postulated failures and proceeds to identify their 
consequences, or by a top-down approach, i.e. it starts with postulated end states 
(adverse consequences) and proceeds to identify a set of disturbances to normal 
operation which can lead to the end state (initiating events) (Apostolakis, 2003). While 
the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) follows the bottom-up approach, the 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) applies the top-down approach.  
The evaluation of the nuclear infrastructure vulnerability against, for example, human 
errors, terrorist attacks and natural disasters, as well as preparation of emergency 
response plans is vital to assurance safety nuclear operations and national security 
(Kostadinov., 2011). The international community has agreed to strengthen the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and in establishing nuclear 
security guidance (IAEA, 2011). 
The role and importance of PSA as a technique to numerically quantify risk measures in 
NPP is defined and emphasised in many national and international safety standards (e.g 
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IAEA, 2010a, 2010b, 2012). PSA is a comprehensive and structured approach to 
identifying failure scenarios, constituting a conceptual and mathematical tool for deriving 
numerical estimates of risk (IAEA, 2016). PSA makes possible to examine a complex 
system's potential risk and to study the new design features and evaluate which of the 
safety improvements brings the required safety upgrading in NPP. Therefore, PSA 
provides insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the design and operation of a 
NPP. In all European countries, PSA methodology is used to confirm and enhance the 
safety of NPPs in complement to the deterministic approach. As an example of this use, 
the Nordic project “The Validity of Safety Goals” (2006-2010) (Bengtsson et al., 2011) 
had the aim to provide a general description of the issue of probabilistic safety goals for 
NPPs, of important concepts related to the definition and application of safety goals in 
Finland and Sweden.  
PSA estimates the final measure of risk by combining the consequences with their 
respective frequencies. To this purpose, NPP’s PSAs deal with "internal events" – those 
that start inside the power plant or the electric system it serves – and "external events" 
such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, hurricanes, fires and malicious events. The 
technique in this kind of probabilistic studies is to work with many hypothetical events 
covering a large range of possible outcomes. This allows assessing the probabilities and 
severity of loss. PSA combines estimations of three levels of risk (https://www.nrc.gov): 
o Level 1 PSA estimates the frequency of accidents that causes damage to the 
nuclear reactor core, commonly called core damage frequency (CDF). This Level 
models from the various plant responses, called “accident sequences”, to an 
“initiating event” that challenge the plant operation. Therefore, this level models 
all of a reactor’s protective and accident mitigation systems.  
The ASAMPSA_E project (2013-2016) (http://asampsa.eu/context/), aims at 
promoting good PSActices for the identification of initiating events (e.g. earthwakes, 
tsunamis,…) and external hazards with the help of PSAs and for the definition of 
appropriate criteria for decision-making in the European context. The project gathered 
experts from 28 organisations in 18 European countries and tried to cover the 
consequences associated with extreme external events, in particular flooding, that 
went beyond what those considered in the initial NPP design. 
 
o Level 2 PSA, which starts with the Level 1 core damage accidents, estimates the 
frequency of accidents that release radioactivity from the nuclear power plant. 
Such core damage sequences are typically referred to as severe accidents. This 
Level analyses the progression of an accident by considering how the containment 
structures and systems respond to it. Once the containment response is 
characterized (timing and location parameters, thermal energy release rate and 
quantities of radionuclides releases), the analyst can determine the amount and 
type of radioactivity released from the containment.  
SOURCE TERM is an international research programme carried out by IRSN (L'Institut 
de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire) and CEA (Commissariat à l’Energie 
Atomique). This programme sets out to reduce uncertainties when evaluating the 
environmental release of radioactive products such as iodine or ruthenium following a 
core meltdown accident in a pressurised water reactor (PWR). The experimental data 
gained from this programme are used to develop and validate numerical simulation 
tools needed to assess the consequences of such an accident and to evaluate the 
efficiency of the prevention means. 
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o Level 3 PSA, which starts with the Level 2 radioactivity release accidents, 
estimates the consequences that might result in terms of health effects resulting 
from the radiation doses to the population around the plant such as short-term 
injuries or long-term cancers and economic losses that may result when 
radioactive material reaches the environment. Consequences are estimated based 
on the characteristics of the radioactivity release calculated previously, 
conditioned by several factors such as the dispersion of the plume, the deposition 
pattern, the land contamination and land use, the exposure of population and the 
early countermeasures applied.  
Therefore, only the Level 3 PSA estimates the health and economic impact in terms of 
different offsite consequence measures. U.S. NRC 2013 provides guidance to develop a 
technical analysis approach plan for Level 3 PSA to be used in performing the full-scope 
site Level 3 PSA. However, integrated assessments of the risk emanating from the 
operation of facilities from which a release of radioactive material occurs (e.g. NPPs) is 
scarce, and there is not a state-of-the-art guidance material to address this Level 3 PSA. 
Performance of the full-scope site Level 3 PSA study involves an extensive number of 
technical tasks, and, consequently, the need to obtain or develop numerous models and 
substantial data. The level of effort to accomplish this work is a function of the amount of 
information and models. In general, it is required careful selection of suitable models for 
description of natural phenomena and effects of pollution exposure.  
 Risk evaluation 15.4
Two examples of approaches to the Level 3 PSA are the FlexRisk (Arnold et al., 2012; 
Seibert et al., 2013) and the ANURE project (García-Puerta et al., 2018). Both activities 
are performed with the purpose of estimating the contamination risk from the 
atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides released by NPPs accidents. The common 
characteristic of this kind of analysis is the consideration of many events to cover a large 
range of possible outcomes, and to assess the probabilities and to create a distribution of 
exceedance probability.  
The flexRISK project studies the geographical distribution of the risk due to severe 
accidents in nuclear facilities, especially NPP in Europe. Starting with source terms and 
accident frequencies, the large-scale dispersion of radionuclides in the atmosphere were 
simulated for about 2800 meteorological situations (ten years period). The transport and 
dispersion model FLEXPART simulated the dispersion in the atmosphere and produce the 
contamination patterns of the ground and near-surface concentrations of relevant 
radionuclides. Radiation doses derived from the dispersion calculation are calculate to 
assess the consequences of severe accidents. Maps and diagrams indicate, e.g., where in 
Europe the risk to be affected by a severe accident is especially high, or which 
contribution is incurred by the NPPs of a specific country.  
The ANURE project aims at developing a methodology to elaborate nuclear risk maps, 
considering local factors, to be used by the decision-makers in the preparedness and 
management of a nuclear post-accident exposure situation. The Almaraz NPP in Spain is 
taken as reference in this feasibility study. The methodology and the ANURE’s results are 
based on 1825 numerical dispersion calculations from 5 consecutive years (2012-2016) 
using the Lagrangian mesoscale atmospheric dispersion model RIMPUFF, which is 
implemented in the JRODOS Decision Support System. For this period, the dispersion of 
two different source terms has been simulated, 1) severe accident with relative large 
release and 2) severe accident with small release. The outputs of each dispersion 
calculation, among others, consist of ground contamination on an irregular geographical 
grid. This information is useful to establish the affected area and the probability of 
exceedance of thresholds of contamination. This deposit probability combined with 
detailed information of soil vulnerability and the food chain impact provides an estimation 
of the risk distribution associated with both kinds of nuclear releases. 
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 Risk treatment 15.5
Here, and as case study, is explained the elaboration of a risk map for rainfed cereals 
and 137Cs deposit based on offsite radionuclide release from the Almaraz NPP. Rainfed 
cereals is one of the most widely produced crops in Spain, and therefore, it has large 
health, social and economic impact. The methodology applied to achieve this purpose is 
the one suggested under the ANURE project. For more details about the methodology, 
the reader is referred to García Puerta et al., 2018. The methodology combines the 
predicted deposition patterns of the release obtained from a large amount of numerical 
dispersion simulations (severity deposition map) with the knowledge of factors that 
influence the behaviour of radionuclides in soils and its transfer to food chain 
(vulnerability map).  
Following the general recommendation for this kind of analysis of working with many 
hypothetical meteorological scenarios, the base of this case study is the 137Cs ground 
contamination predicted on a geographical grid spacing by 1387 numerical dispersion 
calculations (2012-2016 period) for 35 hours of offsite radionuclide release. The 
simulation were carried out by the Lagrangian mesoscale atmospheric dispersion puff 
model RIMPUFF of JRODOS System (in the below box is explained the needed steps to 
carry out a JRodos emergency model chain simulation). 
Once performed the set of simulations, the predicted values in each grid cell were 
grouped into five contamination levels taken as reference the segments predefined in the 
Nordic Guidelines and Recommendations (NGR, 2014). Once grouped in these five 
categories, the most frequent 137Cs deposition category for each cell is obtained. The 
corresponding weighted deposition index for each grid cell is defined as the product 
between the most frequent deposit category (from 1 to 5) and its associated probability. 
This new index named “Severity Deposition Index” is, hence, distributed in five classes 
ranging from 1, which represents the minimum deposition severity, to 5, which 
represents the maximum deposition severity. The spatial variability of this index 
identifies those areas largely and continuously affected by high deposits of 137Cs. 
Having obtained the severity deposition map, the vulnerability map, which represents the 
soil capacity to transfer the 137Cs contamination to the cereal crops, is obtained by 
considering empirical values of soil type distribution and soil properties, the land use and 
the soil to plant transfer factors, focused on the rainfed cereals. The values of the 
vulnerability index are grouped in a range from 1 (minimum vulnerability) to 5 
(maximum vulnerability). 
Finally, the priority index for each grid cell is obtained by multiplying the corresponding 
severity deposition index and the vulnerability index for cereals (Figure 41). The results 
are grouped in five prioritisation categories, from maximum to minimum priority (range 
from 1 to 25). The spatial distribution of this priority index, therefore, represents a risk 
map for prioritising actions, considering the rainfed cereals affected by 137Cs ground 
contamination from Almaraz NPP releases. This map raises the overall risk categorization 
and allows identifying priority areas for actions to be undertaken and making decisions 
on recovery investment. For instance, in areas with high priority index (4-5), remediation 
actions should be applied with the aim to minimize the root Cs uptake for the next year 
harvested cereals. 
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Figure 41. Prioritisation map for cereals and 137Cs deposit 
 
 Source: Garcia Puerta et al., 2018 
An example application of the JRodos Emergency model chain 
 
The redesigned Java-based version of the EU nuclear emergency response system 
RODOS (www.rodos.fzk.de) is a decision support system for accident management, in 
continuous updating. The system is free and open source, and available upon request. 
JRODOS is a synthesis of many innovative methods and techniques, being suitable for 
real-time decision-making and for probabilistic analysis, by mean the statistical 
analysis tool for countermeasure planning available. JRODOS has been developed 
within several European research projects and is currently being used in more than 20 
countries worldwide (Raskob 2010). 
 
JRODOS operates on modern information technology platforms and it is fully 
supported by the platforms Microsoft Windows and Linux, and partly Mac OS. For 
straightforward applications, it is sufficient to use a quad core 64 bit laptop with 4 
gigabyte RAM and 200 gigabyte hard drive. The system consists of a Server part for 
computations and system management, a Client part for interactions with the user, 
and a Data Base (PostgreSQL) (KIT, 2017). JRODOS shows good performance and 
operational stability and is user friendly in operation and administration. In addition, 
inherent features and tools allow adapting models, databases, and the user interface 
to national conditions and user preferences.  
 
In the following, the JRODOS user interface is explained by means of an example 
application of the so-called EmergencyLite chain (KIT, 2017). To this aim, we assume 
a hypothetical accident taking place at the Almaraz nuclear power plant, sited in 
Spain, and the use of re-analysis Grib2 NOMADS data: 
 
1) Create a new project: When the User Interface be open, the operator just need 
to click on File  "new project" or in the “create a new project” icon. A pop-up 
window appears to define the project name, project description and model 
chain. In this case, the EmergencyLite chain project is named "Almaraz". Click 
[confirm].  
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2) Tab “Site” (Define the scenario – location of the incident): All European 
operating NPP are already available in JRODOS database. The user can choose 
the country (e.g. Spain) from the list of countries, and the site/unit (e.g. 
Almaraz/Amaraz 1) from the list of available reactors. Click [confirm] 
3) Tab “Source term” (Define the characteristics of the source term): The first 
step is to setup the release time (day and hour) (e.g.02.08.2018 09:35). The 
second one is to define the source term. In an emergency, when the actual 
emissions may be difficult to obtain quickly and a first assessment of the 
emergency situation is needed, source terms already stored in JRODOS 
(“system public” or in “user public”), or previously imported by ourselves (“user 
defined or imported/loaded run”) (e.g. Chernobyl (Waight et al., 1995), 
Fukushima (Stohl et al., 2012)) are usually used.  
 In this case, the user public source term “F6.Tracer_24Hrs_Cs137” is selected. 
Click [confirm] 
4) Tab “Weather” (Specify the meteorological information to run the calculation). 
In the "Prognosis time setup", the prognosis coverage after the starting release 
time, and the timestep of the outputs are defined (e.g. 24 hours and 60 min 
respectively). Meteorological data can be from provider, or defined by the user 
(“user input”). While the latter can be collected on site or from an existing 
nearby sites, the prognostic meteorological data needed to perform 
atmospheric dispersion and deposition calculations, can be obtained from 
different sources. 
o NOAA National Operational Model Archive and Distribution System (NOMADS) 
project; JRODOS is usually pre-configured to automatically download NOMADS 
data, e.g. free global meteorological data from the Global Forecasting System 
(GFS) of NCEP (GRIB1 and GRIB2 files) (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-
access/model-data/model-datasets/global-forcast-system-gfs) 
o National meteorological offices or weather services (e.g. HIRLAM 
(http://hirlam.org/), ALADIN (http://www.umr-cnrm.fr/aladin-old/). They are 
non-free for most organizations. 
o European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) NWP data 
(https://www.ecmwf.int/) 
o In-house Numerical Weather Prediction data: higher spatial and temporal 
resolution (e.g. WRF, Andronopoulos et al., 2014). Better spatial and temporal 
resolution. 
 In case of not having files for the simulating period, nothing appears on the 
data provider label. Click [confirm] 
5) Tab “Run” (select the grid type and the distance to which the calculation shall 
be performed). In this tab, the pre-setting is "Exercise". The spatial coverage of 
the prognosis is defined in this tab. By default JRODOS used 5 rings of the 
grids, and JRODOS offers the option of playing with distance and grid type in 
order to cover the purposes and needs of the calculation (e.g. if the chosen 
radius of calculation is 800 km, it corresponds to a minimum grid cell size of 2 
km. This means that the grid cell size is 2 km around the point of release, and 
it becomes progressively coarser with the distance). Once selected the grid cell 
size (e.g. 800 (2)), click [confirm].  
6) Tab "Summary". This tab reports a summary of the defined inputs. At this 
stage, the user can go back to any tab for inspection or corrections, as well as, 
all input made is saved and can be re-used for future projects. Click [confirm].   
7) “Prognostic calculations”. By using the defined inputs, JRODOS uses the near 
range Atmospheric Transport and Deposition Model, the Emergency Action 
Simulation model and the Terrestrial Food Chain and Dose Module, to carry out 
the prognosis calculations one after the other, without further user 
interference. Time consuming depends on the temporal duration of the 
simulation. In this specific case, the calculation lasts 5 min. 
8) “Visualization” (JRodos User Interface).  JRODOS illustrates the presentation of 
map-type results. The central "Map" tab consists of one or more result and map 
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layers. The list of all layers in the Map tab, the "Map Legend", is visible to the 
right. The available results are offered in form of a "Result Tree" in the 
"Projects" section of the user interface to the left of the Map tab. From the 
"Result Tree", the operator can select the different results provided by the 
simulation of the specified source term and meteorological data 
 
 Gaps and challenges 15.6
In radiation protection, the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
quantified the risk of stochastic effects of radiation and proposed a system of dose 
limitation based on three principles, justification, optimisation of protection, and 
individual dose limitation (Publication 26, ICRP).   
Lessons learned from past nuclear events, such as Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl 
(1986), and the most recent of Fukushima have influenced the nuclear industry 
significantly. The nuclear industry has still to have challenges to maintain and improve 
the safety regarding nuclear activities. We would like to highlight the importance of the 
multiform activities conducted to prevent any accident or to limit its consequences should 
one occur. For instance, the events at Fukushima clearly demonstrate the potential risk 
significance of accidents involving release of radionuclides from multiple sources. The link 
between natural hazards and its impact on nuclear facilities is a topic of wide interest for 
which knowledge should be improved and developed.  
PSA results have positive implications for the day-to-day operation of existing nuclear 
power plants. On top of this, research and development activities should be aimed at 
improving PSA codes, for instance in order to model all the dependencies between 
systems and to properly account for human actions. A greater understanding of how to 
interpret, utilise and communicate probabilistic information is also required. This is 
particularly important, since future development in forecasting systems, lead to forecast 
that are inherently probabilistic. 
PSA results are complex and it cannot be reduced to a single number. Instead, PSAs 
provide a wide spectrum of possible outcomes associated with a frequency distribution. It 
is clear that from the beginning of its use, there have been a change both in quality and 
in maturity of the PSA technique. The level of detail of PSA has changed considerably. 
Mosleh 2014 presented a perspective of strengths, current limitations and possible 
improvements of the PSA methodology. This author reaches several interesting 
conclusions, as current PSA methods can remain adequate for certain problems, but 
there is a need for improving stakeholder confidence and engagement in risk-informed 
decisions through improving and demonstrating credibility of PSAs.   
PSA applications are becoming more and more important. Due to its own nature, PSA 
methods have revealed significant differences in results when the same risk problem is 
analysed by different methods and/or different analysts. The justification of this fact is 
because most of the factors influencing the PSA results can only be determined with a 
high level of uncertainty. Seibert et al., 2013 indicates the following major factors of 
uncertainty to assess the risk in the framework of the FelxRisk project: 1) the accident 
frequency to different NPP, 2) the risk parameter considered, 3) the release fraction 
(source term definition), and 4) the dispersion calculations. Among them, the definition 
of the source term is pointed out as the most important uncertainty factor. Analysts try 
to reduce uncertainty by a) improving and evaluating their models; b) more precise 
parameterizations of physical processes; and c) collecting additional data to improve 
model accuracy. 
Level 3 PSA is the least precise level as consequences depend on several factors affecting 
the transport and impact of the radioactive material. For example, health effects depend 
on the population in the plant vicinity, evacuation conditions, and the path of the 
radioactive plume. The plume, in turn, is affected by meteorological conditions, e.g. wind 
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speed and direction, as well as rainfall or snowfall. Similarly, land contamination depends 
on the characteristics of the radioactivity release and the land use. In this context, an 
important issue to consider at Level 3 PSA studies is the need to take into account local 
and specific data to reduce the uncertainties in the assessment of consequences. 
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16 Natech accidents 
S. GIRGIN, A. NECCI, E. KRAUSMANN 
The impacts of natural hazard events on hazardous industrial facilities, pipelines, offshore 
platforms and other infrastructure that handles, stores or transports hazardous 
substances can cause cascading events such as fires, explosions, and toxic or radioactive 
releases (Showalter and Myers, 1994; Cruz and Krausmann, 2009; Girgin and 
Krausmann, 2016). These so-called Natech accidents are a recurring but often 
overlooked feature in many natural disasters and have often had significant human, 
environmental and economic impacts. 
Major Natech accidents may involve multiple and simultaneous releases of hazardous 
substances over extended areas, damage or destroy safety systems and barriers, and 
down lifelines often needed for prevention and mitigation of the consequences 
(Krausmann et al., 2010; Girgin, 2011). Emergency responders are also usually neither 
equipped nor trained to handle a high number of concurrent hazardous incidents, in 
particular as they also have to respond to the natural hazard consequences in parallel. 
The 2002 river floods in Europe that resulted in significant hazardous substance releases, 
including chlorine and dioxins (Hudec and Lukš, 2004; Gautam and Van der Hoek, 2003), 
the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that caused a meltdown at a nuclear power 
plant and raging fires and explosions at oil refineries (Krausmann and Cruz, 2013), and 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012 that triggered multiple hydrocarbon spills are just a few 
examples of recent major events that highlight the importance of the possible 
consequences of Natech accidents. Especially the Tōhoku earthquake is a case-study 
example of multi-cascading risk, because the earthquake itself caused only limited 
damage due to the stringent protection measures in place, but the tsunami and its 
impact on a nuclear power plant resulted in the most severe technological disaster ever 
recorded in the region whose adverse effects are still persisting (Krausmann and Cruz, 
2013). 
Natech accidents are events that cascade natural and technological hazards and which 
feature complex consequences due to synergistic effects between the two different types 
of hazard. Therefore, targeted prevention, preparedness and response plans are needed 
to prevent Natech accidents and mitigate their consequences. Unfortunately, natural 
disaster risk reduction frameworks do mostly not consider technological hazards and 
technological accident prevention and preparedness programmes often overlook the 
specific aspects of Natech risk, resulting in a lack of dedicated methodologies and 
guidance for risk assessment and management both for industries and authorities 
(Krausmann et al., 2017). 
Natech risks exist both in developed and developing countries where hazardous industrial 
sites are located in natural hazard regions. Natech events are often assumed to be 
possible only for major natural events, e.g. strong earthquakes or floods. However, it 
does not necessarily require a major natural disaster to cause a Natech accident; they 
can be triggered even by more frequent, minor natural hazard events (Necci et al., 
2018). Industrial growth, climate change, and the increasing vulnerability of society that 
is becoming more and more interconnected increases the likelihood of such events in the 
future. Successfully controlling a Natech accident has often turned out to be a major 
challenge where no prior risk assessment and proper preparedness planning had taken 
place. A comprehensive multi-sectoral and multi-hazard national Natech risk assessment 
is therefore crucial to pinpoint potential risk hotspots and see the overall picture including 
potential economic and environmental consequences that require special attention. A 
detailed discussion on how and in which setting Natech risks should be assessed in the 
NRAs is given by Girgin et al. (2019). 
 Risk Assessment Context  16.1
Hazardous industrial installations are inherent vulnerabilities for the socio-economic 
systems in which they are nested. Therefore, Natech risk assessment and management 
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requires a comprehensive understanding of the interdependencies of related natural, 
technological and societal systems. The risk assessment can be challenging even for the 
impact of a single natural hazard on a single industrial installation. Consideration of 
multiple natural hazards and multiple installations at the same time while bearing in mind 
possible secondary hazardous events that can be triggered by the primary Natech events 
(i.e. domino events) requires a regional, multi-hazard and multi-vulnerability risk 
assessment involving a complex chain of risk scenarios with multiple cascading events. 
Some hazardous industries with a Natech potential, especially the ones in the energy 
sector such as refineries, power plants, and oil and gas pipelines, are usually considered 
as critical infrastructure. It is common practice to analyse critical infrastructure as a 
separate pillar in national risk assessment (NRA) by focusing on natural-hazard related 
interdependency and business continuity aspects. However, it is also important to 
consider Natech scenarios for such critical infrastructure due to the large quantities of 
hazardous substances that they contain, so that they can be protected effectively to 
ensure service continuity. Therefore, in some cases national Natech risk assessments 
should also be multi-sectoral. 
Due to these complexities, Natech risk assessment requires a multidisciplinary approach 
involving stakeholders from both the natural and man-made hazards fields. It concerns 
on the one hand industry operators and authorities in charge of chemical accident 
management and on the other hand the public and civil protection. Occasionally, natural 
hazard conditions may result in hazardous consequences that might be retained in a 
limited area to reach a wider extent causing cross-boundary problems. Especially flood 
hazards have a high potential to create cross-boundary Natech accidents (UNEP/OCHA, 
2000). When countries share environmental resources or critical infrastructure, 
commerce and supply chains which might be affected by such accidents, they can face 
significant economic and social disruptions (Lindell and Perry, 1997). Therefore, in some 
cases national Natech risk assessments may also need multinational involvement. 
Although they are recognised and even highlighted as an important emerging issue, 
Natech risk is currently not considered in a systematic way in NRAs. Usually Natech 
scenarios are only accounted for some of the hazards, but not for the others. This 
heterogeneity becomes a problem in the national risk evaluation when hazards that 
include the Natech risk in their assessment are ranked alongside the hazards that do not 
include the Natech risk. The key point for a proper Natech NRA is to consider all natural 
hazards and their interactions when assessing the potential for Natech accidents due to 
the presence of technological hazards. For this purpose, Natech risk can be calculated as 
part of the risks assessment for each natural hazard separately, or they can be 
considered as part of the risk due to technological hazards. In the first case, Natech 
contribution to the overall natural-hazard risk is better presented which is useful for 
hazard ranking purposes, whereas in the second case the importance of different Natech 
scenarios can be better spotted. In fact, consideration of both aspects can be beneficial, 
but it is important not to count the overall Natech risk contribution both under natural 
and technological hazards, as this leads to double-counting of the same risk and the 
related impacts that could mislead the final evaluation. Good documentation and 
bookkeeping practices would allow Natech-related contributions to be recorded properly, 
so that they can be easily separated from the overall analysis if necessary.  
As many natural hazards have regional extent, the EU NRA guidelines suggest localised 
risk assessment only for advanced risk assessment. However, industrial installations are 
usually point assets at national or regional level. They are also not uniformly distributed 
but concentrated at certain regions for operational or logistic purposes. Therefore, 
technological hazards are usually localised and this aspect needs to be considered in the 
NRA. It is therefore necessary that Natech-related assessments are performed at local or 
regional level, and then subsequently combined at higher levels.  
In order to assess Natech risk, industrial installations located in natural hazard zones 
should be identified and the expected on-site severity and impact potential of each 
natural hazard should be determined separately. This requires not only natural-hazard 
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specific information, but also detailed technical data on the installations. Information 
(e.g. natural hazard risk maps, industrial equipment data) that is already gathered 
through related regulations, but more specifically in the other sections of the NRA 
framework, should be utilized as much as possible in a time- and cost-effective manner. 
Considering Natech aspects during hazard-specific data collection and effective 
coordination of data collection and analysis activities may prevent repetition and 
duplicate work for Natech-specific needs. For this reason, the authority designated to 
manage the NRA should open communication channels with each actor and involve them 
effectively in the Natech risk assessment process. 
Natech risk assessment methodologies are mainly based on industrial risk assessment 
methodologies that vary from qualitative to fully quantitative approaches. For Natech risk 
assessment purposes, these methodologies need to consider equipment damage models 
for natural-hazard impacts, the possibility of multiple events at several equipment or 
installations simultaneously, release and consequence scenarios considering natural 
hazard conditions, and the unavailability or malfunctioning of accident control and 
mitigation measures including lifelines due to natural hazard impact. Some technological 
risk control regulations (e.g. the EU Seveso III Directive) requires that hazardous 
installations assess accident scenarios triggered by natural hazards and document the 
results in safety reports. Besides their original purposes, such information can also be 
utilized for NRA purposes. Frequently, however, the industries carry out the assessment 
of natural hazards autonomously for these studies and although providing valuable 
information for the Natech hazard at the facility level, some of the natural-hazard related 
assumptions and scenarios may not be compatible with those used in the NRA. A better 
approach for assessing the Natech hazard in the NRA is one in which the authority 
provides the information about the risk scenarios used in the framework of the NRA for 
each natural hazard to the industry. In turn, the industry can identify and build relevant 
Natech risk scenarios that are coherent with all the other risk scenarios chosen for the 
NRA. Following a systematic selection approach, possible Natech scenarios can be 
reduced into a manageable set of reasonably-to-be-expected or worst-case scenarios 
which should be analysed in detail for each installation separately. For consistency at the 
regional or national level, the Natech scenario building and analysis methods should be 
standardized throughout the NRA study and use of significantly different methods for 
different installations should be avoided. 
The systematic evaluation of Natech risks in the NRA framework will not only result in 
informed decision making, but also in a better identification and prioritization of 
protection measures which can be implemented to reduce and control Natech risks in a 
cost- and time-effective manner. 
 Risk Identification 16.2
The first step in national Natech risk assessment should be identification of the industrial 
installations which might be affected by natural hazards. Major natural disasters can 
impact large areas and Natechs can occur at any hazardous installation in the affected 
area, meaning that potentially multiple and simultaneous releases of hazardous 
substances can be triggered at various locations. Natural hazards having such an impact 
potential are normally covered in their own hazard-specific sections under the NRA. 
Therefore, the available natural hazard and natural risk information including maps can 
be utilized for Natech risk assessment purposes. However, not only extreme natural 
disasters but also high frequency-low impact hazards can result in cascading effects at 
individual installations if vulnerabilities exist and risks are not handled property (Pescaroli 
and Alexander, 2015). Therefore, such hazards should also be considered wherever 
possible. 
Industrial risk control and prevention regulations usually focus on industrial production 
and storage facilities that are located onshore. In addition to these facilities, other 
industrial installations such as offshore platforms, onshore and offshore pipeline systems, 
and onshore transportation systems handling or storing hazardous substances should 
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also be included in national Natech risk assessment. Consideration of hazardous military 
installations, mining activities, and polluted sites which are usually excluded from the 
conventional industrial risk management process, is also recommended for the sake of 
completeness of the assessment. 
Because each natural hazard has the potential to affect different geographic areas with 
different intensities, some industrial installations are not vulnerable to certain natural 
hazards simply because they are not located within the impact area. Hence, they are not 
required to be assessed for possible Natech scenarios. However, the national Natech risk 
assessment should always start with the complete inventory and exclude installations on 
a case-by-case basis depending on location. Linear and networked infrastructure, such as 
pipeline and transportation systems, which usually cross long distances through a wide-
range of climatic and geographical zones, require special consideration. Especially 
pipelines are usually located in the countryside where the detection of releases can be 
delayed, leading to major spills and significant economic damage particularly at special 
locations such as river crossings (Girgin and Krausmann, 2016). Time-variant operational 
characteristics should be further assessed for transportation systems. 
If the number of industrial installations that should be analysed is numerous, a hazard 
ranking of the installations by using a preliminary but systematic methodology that 
considers Natech-specific constraints is suggested to select the most critical installations. 
For major natural hazards, which have a potential of multiple and simultaneous Natech 
events, not only major but also medium-sized installations should be included in the 
ranking, as they may result in a significant overall impact although their individual 
impacts may not be considerable. The list of upper and lower-tier industrial 
establishments covered by the Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EC) can be utilized as a 
baseline industrial facility inventory, which should be complemented with other industrial 
installations (e.g. pipelines, offshore platforms). As the tiers are determined according to 
the hazard characteristics and qualifying quantities of substances potentially present at 
the installations, the list can also be used for ranking purposes. In order to simplify the 
analysis, industrial parks or industrial zones where multiple installations are located in 
close proximity can be handled as single entities. 
Following the identification of the Natech-prone installations, potential Natech scenarios 
should be developed for each installation. The main hazard scenarios in case of Natech 
accidents are fires, explosions and toxic releases. These hazards are obviously linked 
with the hazardous properties of the substances involved, but also with other factors 
such as, the substance inventory, the energy factor, the time factor, the intensity-
distance relations, exposure and intensity-damage/injury relationships (Lees, 2012). All 
the methods available for hazard identification for conventional industrial accidents (e.g. 
checklists, hazard surveys, hazard and operability studies, and safety reviews) can be 
used for building Natech scenarios, provided that they take into account Natech-specific 
conditions: 
— For a complete Natech analysis all the release events resulting from each possible 
damage mode should be addressed. 
— Performance variations due to natural hazard impact should be introduced in the 
hazard identification and each release event should be fully developed 
— Experts should carefully assess the potential unavailability or malfunctioning of 
industrial items, in particular barriers and protection layers 
— Scenarios should consider not only the Natech-related release events but also their 
evolution given the potential contemporary unavailability of protection barriers and 
resources. 
A damaged item is very likely to produce uncontrolled variations, but impacts on 
performance can be expected in undamaged items, as well. Examples of such scenarios 
are explosions of chemical reactors due to loss of reaction control or the release of 
substances into the environment, instead of being captured or thermally degraded. 
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Complex industrial processes may result in a large number of hazardous situations given 
the same operational deviations. Therefore, such scenarios should be carefully analysed 
when considering natural hazard conditions. 
Natural-hazard specific mitigation measures (e.g. flexible connections, anchorage) may 
increase the resilience of equipment to certain natural hazards. It should be noted, 
however, that there is the misconception that structural and organizational protection 
measures in place to prevent and mitigate conventional industrial accidents would be 
sufficient to protect against Natech events (Krausmann et al., 2017). In contrast, the 
natural event that damages or destroys industrial buildings and equipment can also 
render unavailable safety instrumentation (e.g. sensors, alarms), engineered safety 
barriers (e.g. containment dikes, deluge systems) and lifelines (e.g. power, water, 
communication) needed for preventing an accident, mitigating its consequences and 
avoiding its further escalation. Generally, for conventional technological accidents, 
emergency management systems consider that all safety systems are available, while for 
Natech events many of these could actually be unavailable at the same time. 
Assumptions on the availability of safety measures and personnel drastically affect the 
Natech scenarios. Therefore, care should be taken in scenario development when 
considering Natech-specific conditions. 
Electricity is critical for the proper operation of an industrial installation and it is a lifeline 
that might be unavailable due to natural hazard conditions. This includes the primary 
power grid, but also back-up generators. Cable snapping, short circuits and floods are 
frequent causes of onsite power loss at industrial installations. As documented in past 
events, power loss alone can trigger a Natech accident (ARIA, 2009). In addition, safety 
systems and barriers implemented to prevent or mitigate accidents may be unserviceable 
due to lack of electricity. Water supply, both external and internal, might also be 
unavailable in case of a major natural disaster. Underground pipes and connections, as 
well as water reservoirs, tanks, and pumping systems, are frequently damaged in 
earthquake, tsunami and flood events (Girgin, 2011). The natural disaster may either 
damage the equipment directly or cut the power supply required for its operation. 
Besides acting as the primary firefighting agent, water also serves for cooling purposes to 
control dangerous exothermic reactions. Therefore, a lack of water may not only hamper 
effective response activities, but may also result in adverse cascading events. Safety 
barriers play an important role in the prevention and mitigation of accidents. Due to 
natural hazard impacts, some or all of these systems may become unavailable or 
unserviceable. Affected barriers can be structural (e.g. containment dikes, deluge 
systems) or organizational (e.g. communication). For example, containment bunds lose 
their capacity to retain accidental spills during flood events. Similarly, firefighting 
equipment, such as sprinkler systems, can fail to activate after being damaged in 
earthquakes. 
With respect to crisis response, onsite response teams may be hampered by natural 
hazard conditions. For instance, the industrial site may be flooded and may hence only 
be accessible by boat. In some cases, response personnel may be adversely affected by 
hazardous substance releases, rendering them incapable of combatting the consequences 
of the Natech accident. Fear and worry for their own lives and the lives of their families 
possibly affected by the natural hazard, can result in underperformance, as well. Offsite 
response teams may not always be available as they might be overwhelmed by having to 
respond to requests related to natural-disaster impacts on the population. In some cases, 
although they are available they may not be able to reach the accident site as access 
routes can be blocked or otherwise rendered unusable (Necci et al., 2018). 
 Risk analysis 16.3
Once the risk scenarios have been determined, the impacts of each scenario can be 
analysed by using available conventional methods that calculate the relations between 
natural hazard impact, physical or operational damage, release of hazardous substance, 
consequences of the incident, and the impact area. Analysis priority can be given to the 
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scenarios which are expected to result in the highest impact. Natech risks should be 
considered in all impact categories, i.e. human, economic and socio political impacts. A 
Natech accident may not only result in short-term harm to public health and the 
environment, but also cause significant business interruption. 
The severity of the hazardous consequences (i.e. fire, explosion, toxic dispersion) 
following the physical damage depends on several factors. The quantity of hazardous 
material and the rate at which it is released are probably the two most important factors. 
In conventional industrial risk assessment, different top events are often grouped into 
release categories having certain scenarios. This is because different top events, even 
though they originate from different mechanisms, could indeed release a similar amount 
of substance. This principle is at the basis of the bow-tie approach for industrial risk 
analysis and Natech incidents are no exception. Christou (1998) provides a generic but 
concise overview of the most common consequence phenomena and the associated 
models used in the analysis. TNO (2005) give a more detailed description of available 
models and the conditions under which they should be used.  
The nature and the extent of the consequences also highly depend on the environmental 
conditions. For this reason, conventional industrial accident scenarios are generally built 
on assumptions regarding the typical conditions at the facility and its surroundings. For 
Natech scenarios, environmental conditions might be significantly different from such 
typical conditions. For example, in case of weather-related events (e.g. storm, hurricane) 
the atmospheric conditions are usually close to extreme and unstable conditions rather 
than typical stable conditions. Similarly, the release environment might be different from 
the normal environment (e.g. release into water instead of ground in case of flooding). 
For accurate results, such hazard-specific environmental conditions should be property 
considered in the analysis. For a coherent analysis, environmental data should be 
provided by the natural-hazard related authorities of the NRA to the experts performing 
the Natech risk analysis. 
Natech accidents may result in exposed areas in all environmental compartments (i.e. 
air, soil, groundwater, and surface waters) that are much greater than for conventional 
industrial accidents. For example, if a flood causes an overflow of containment dikes at 
an installation, any released substance that would normally be captured within the 
containment dikes can easily be dispersed by the flood waters and contaminate the 
environment up to hundreds of kilometres through a river system (UNEP/OCHA, 2000). 
In the case of earthquakes, cracks that occur in containment dike floors due to ground 
movement may leak liquid substances that can eventually lead to significant groundwater 
pollution (Girgin, 2011). When the vulnerabilities due to the natural hazard are manifold, 
potential multiple releases from different parts of an installation and also from multiple 
installations simultaneously should be taken into account when assessing exposure. The 
possibility of on- and off-site secondary cascading events (i.e. domino effects) should be 
considered as well. In case of multiple simultaneous or cascading toxic releases, the 
overall extent of the toxic cloud can be significantly larger compared to a conventional 
chemical accident with a release from a single source.  
The exposure and vulnerability of the population may also significantly vary during 
Natech conditions. For instance, when there is toxic atmospheric dispersion caused by an 
earthquake, shelter in-place might not be possible because of structural damage to 
buildings. Also, evacuation from the location of a Natech accident might not be feasible 
because of the blockage of escape routes by debris or flooding. In addition, people might 
be reluctant to evacuate a hazardous area if relatives are still trapped under the debris 
(Girgin, 2011). Such factors should be considered in undertaking exposure and 
vulnerability analysis.  
In order to identify the Natech likelihood, the entire ensemble of industrial equipment at 
risk of damage (i.e. targets) should be assessed. Targets may sustain physical damage if 
the intensity of the natural hazard is sufficiently high or simply malfunction in case of 
lower impact severities. Damaged targets may directly release hazardous substances or 
trigger events that lead to loss of containment, while others can create an uncontrolled 
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deviation in the system that can eventually result in a release. Some targets may have 
the responsibility to control or mitigate undesirable events; hence, their failure can 
contribute to a release or amplify the consequences.  
Natech likelihood depends strongly on the vulnerability of equipment to the natural 
hazards at each site. Vulnerability to different natural hazards varies for a given 
equipment type. Atmospheric storage tanks, especially those with floating roofs, appear 
to be particularly vulnerable to natural hazards. This is critical from risk point of view, as 
these units usually contain largest amount of hazardous substances. In addition, in case 
of flammable releases the likelihood of ignition is high in earthquake and lightning 
triggered Natech accidents, which may escalate into major fires or explosions and result 
in cascading (domino) accidents (Krausmann et al., 2011). Physical damage is usually 
caused by buckling of the tank shell, displacement of the tank (e.g. by floating or 
shifting), external impact (e.g. collision with other equipment items), or collapse of tanks 
supports (e.g. foundation or legs) (GDL Natech, 2016). Other equipment (e.g. reactors, 
columns, separators, pumps, heat exchangers) also retain significant amounts of 
hazardous substances and can be affected by natural hazards similar to storage tanks. 
Onsite pipes and pipework are also frequently damaged by the displacement of 
equipment or by external impact such as collision with moving (e.g. floating, falling) 
objects usually launched by the natural hazard. In detailed Natech risk assessment, 
besides direct physical damage, indirect effects such as uncontrolled operational 
variations can also be assessed.  
Unless detailed numerical methods are used, the conventional approach for the damage 
assessment is based on damage states (DS) which group different and possibly 
numerous damage conditions under a set of qualitative damage categories ranging from 
no damage (DS1) to total collapse (DS5). For most of the industrial equipment, historical 
Natech accident and near-miss data is used to deduce reliable damage probabilities for 
each damage state. Simplified fragility functions in the form of fragility curves are 
available for storage tanks for earthquakes (Fabbrocino et al., 2005), floods (Landucci et 
al., 2012), and lightning (Necci et al., 2013). However, these curves cover only specific 
conditions (e.g. equipment characteristics, operational conditions) and for other 
conditions and also for other equipment some expert judgement is usually necessary in 
the assessment process. Among all possible damage states, the actual damage state that 
may happen in case of a certain natural hazard impact depends on a number of factors 
such as construction characteristics (e.g. design criteria, material), current physical state 
(e.g. corrosion, aging, fatigue), and operative conditions (e.g. filling level, pressure). For 
this reason, it is hard to establish what damage state is to be expected for a given 
equipment for a given natural hazard scenario. Therefore, in most cases all plausible 
damage states should be analysed. Because the damage states are usually defined in 
qualitative terms (e.g. minor, moderate, extensive), it is difficult to associate a damage 
state to a well defined release event and the current practice is limited to the use of very 
generic scenarios that are based on expert judgement. 
Each Natech scenario has a conditional probability of occurrence given a natural hazard 
trigger. The overall Natech event probability can be calculated by summing a set of 
conditional event probabilities including damage, release, and consequence-related 
events (e.g. ignition, explosion), which can be calculated by various methods (Lees, 
2012). For estimating the conditional probability of release following a damage, the most 
simplified assumption is to select a single release scenario for each damage state. In 
reality, multiple release scenarios can be associated with each damage state by varying 
conditional probabilities. Unfortunately, there is no established method to determine 
conditional release probabilities in case of Natech accidents. Therefore, in case of 
multiple release scenarios for each damage state, conditional release probabilities are 
either taken as equal to one or assigned by expert judgment. It is usually recognised that 
the vulnerability of an asset changes if two independent hazards occur in a short time 
lapse. However, intermittent natural hazards, even if they are not major events may also 
affect the vulnerability of industrial equipment. For example, high flow conditions during 
medium-sized floods may increase riverbed scouring which reduces the cover on 
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pipelines at river crossings, eventually leading to pipe breaks due to excess external 
forces or debris impacts (Girgin and Krausmann, 2016). Whenever it is feasible, such 
factors should be considered while estimating the probability of possible damage. 
 Risk evaluation 16.4
Being an inherent cascading multi-risk, the adequate evaluation of Natech risk requires 
proper handling and ranking of cascading risks in the NRA process. Natech risk can be 
evaluated: 
— as a part of the risk assessment of a natural hazard in the so called multi-hazard risk 
analysis; 
— as part of the risk assessment of technological hazards; 
— as a separate dedicated risk assessment. 
In the process of ranking the risks, it should be clearly stated if Natech risks are included 
for each risk, and how they are assessed. As a general rule, risks that include Natech risk 
assessment should not be directly compared with risks that do not include this 
assessment. Comparison could still be carried out, provided that the contribution of 
Natech risk was fully explicated. Keeping track of Natech risk contributions also allows 
the comparison of the level of Natech risk with the risk of the other natural and man-
made hazards.  
Consequences beyond the local extent are quite common especially if critical 
infrastructure is directly involved or affected by the Natech events, or if the impacts 
areas are extended, e.g. during floods. This results in amplified economic impacts, which 
can sometimes be as big as or much bigger that the impact of the natural hazard itself. 
For example, the March 5, 1987 earthquake in Ecuador (Ms 6.9) caused the destruction 
of more than 40 km of the Trans Ecuadorian Oil Pipeline due to massive debris flows 
following the earthquake. Approximately 100,000 bbl of oil spilled into the environment 
and the loss of revenue during the five months required for repair was 800 million USD, 
equal to 80% of the total earthquake losses (NRC, 1991). Therefore, it is important to 
quantify Natech damage not only considering the cost of direct physical damage, but also 
considering all cascading consequences. Similar to industrial and nuclear risks, the long-
term adverse effects of released environmentally persistent and carcinogenic substances 
on human health and the environment should be evaluated for Natech risk while 
evaluating socio-economic impacts.  
Besides ecological damage, large areas may become unfit for human use (e.g. 
agriculture, drinking water, living), and comprehensive clean-up and restoration may be 
needed. Especially groundwater and surface water clean-up operations are very costly 
and may require long time periods. Similar to other hazards, the socio-economic 
implications of Natech accidents are difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, historically all 
major Natech accidents have had a strong impact on both EU's and member states' 
policies. Therefore this aspect is important for overall evaluation.  
The potential impacts of Natech accidents are numerous and target-specific. On top of 
this, the perception and tolerance of decision makers and the public to different types of 
technological consequence scenarios are usually very different. This makes difficult the 
quantification and evaluation of consequences, especially if they are originating from 
multi-cascading events. Usually a shared decision making by all stakeholders is required 
similar to the other hazards considered by the NRA. Specific to Natech risk, the 
stakeholder group should include both natural and man-made hazard related actors. The 
following guidelines may be useful for evaluation of the impacts:  
— Toxic vapour clouds may have the largest impact on the population, but lower impact 
on the environment and almost no impact on the asset. 
— Fires and explosions may have the largest impact on the asset, but lower impact on 
the people and very low impact on the environment. 
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— Liquid spills of chemicals, solvents or fuels may have the largest impact on the 
environment, but lower impact on the asset and almost no impact on the population. 
— Nuclear accidents with loss of radioactive material may have high impact on both the 
population and the environment and lower impact on the asset. 
Figure 42 summarizes the expected maximum impact of some of the most common 
major accident typologies in case of Natech accidents.  
Figure 42. The maximum potential levels of socio-economic impacts as ranked for different types 
of consequences. 
 
The EU NRA guidelines emphasise the importance of a periodic review of NRAs to keep 
them updated as risks emerge and evolve. For Natech risks, such reviews should not only 
consider the changes in the natural hazard risks (e.g. due to factors such as climate 
change or availability of new information), but also changes in the industrial installations 
due to process or capacity modifications and upgrades, which are quite common during 
the operational lifetime of the installations. 
Risk analysis methodologies for both natural and technological hazards have inherent 
uncertainties that need to be stated explicitly in the analysis phase and considered in the 
decision-making process. Because Natech risk assessment unites methods from both 
fields, it also compounds and amplifies uncertainties. Therefore the results should be 
evaluated with care. Documentation of the Natech scenarios and the analysis methods 
utilized to estimate the probable extent and impact of hazardous consequences is 
important not only for keeping track of uncertainties, but also for being able to merge 
and compare the results properly, especially if local or regional assessments are 
conducted as part of national assessment. 
 Good Practices 16.5
Being an emerging risk even in developed countries, Natech risk is hardly assessed by 
national competent authorities in a comprehensive manner. Although there are no 
detailed NRAs, there are national and international programs and regulations that require 
the assessment of Natechs in safety documents of hazardous installations and adoption 
of measures necessary to reduce the related risks. Usually these rules have been 
implemented in the aftermath of one or several major Natech accidents (Lindell and 
Perry, 1997).  
In the European Union, Directive 2012/18/EC on the control of major-accident hazards 
involving dangerous substances (Seveso III Directive) that regulates chemical accident 
risks at fixed industrial installations explicitly addresses Natech risks and requires the 
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installations to routinely identify environmental hazards, such as floods and earthquakes, 
and to evaluate them in safety reports. With its latest implementation, the directive also 
demands an assessment of accident scenarios triggered by natural hazard impact. In 
France, the new zoning regulation for industrial installations in seismic areas divides 
industrial establishments into two risk groups to identify Natechs risks and to facilitate 
emergency planning: normal risk and special risk (Decrees 210-1254165 and 2010-
1255166). Installations in the second category have to guarantee the containment of 
hazardous materials under seismic loading by complying with specific mechanical 
resistance requirements to ensure a structure’s capability to withstand a given value of 
ground acceleration, chosen in accordance with the seismic zone it is in (Planseisme, 
2016). In Germany, the rule TRAS 310 requires industrial establishments with major 
chemical accident potential to assess the risk of flood-triggered accidents at their 
installations, to take necessary risk reduction measures, and to consider the possibility of 
an increase of flood risk due to climate change (TRAS 310, 2012). They also introduce 
the innovative concept of "accident despite precautions", which requires the inclusion of 
Natech scenarios into emergency plans, even if their risk has been mitigated. 
The Natech Addendum to the OECD Guiding Principles on Chemical Accident Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response contains amendments to the guiding principles for guidance 
on Natech accidents (OECD, 2015). In Japan, the Law on the Prevention of Disasters in 
Petroleum Industrial Complexes and Other Petroleum Facilities was updated after the 
Tokaichi-oki earthquake triggered several fires at a refinery in 2003 (CAO, 2012). 
Moreover, the amended Japanese High Pressure Gas Safety (HPGS) Law requires 
companies to take any additional measure necessary to reduce the risk of accidents, to 
protect its workers and the public from any accidental releases caused by earthquake and 
tsunami (Cruz and Okada, 2008). In the US, the state of California released the 
Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) program, which calls for a risk assessment of 
potential hazardous materials releases due to an earthquake (CalARP, 2014). 
No risk assessment tool that is currently available can capture all aspects of Natech risk. 
However, recently, risk assessment tools and methodologies capable of estimating 
regional Natech risk have become available. The JRC's Rapid Natech Risk Assessment 
and Mapping System (RAPID-N), which is publicly available at 
http://rapidn.jrc.ec.europa.eu, allows quick local, regional and national Natech risk 
assessment including natural hazard damage assessment and accident consequence 
analysis with minimum data requirement (Girgin and Krausmann, 2012; Girgin and 
Krausmann, 2013). Other available tools are ARIPAR for a quantitative treatment of the 
problem (Antonioni et al., 2009), and PANR for a qualitative assessment methodology 
(Cruz and Okada, 2008). Although currently limited to selected natural hazards and 
certain types of installations, the tools are in active development to cover additional 
hazards and industries, and they can significantly facilitate NRA studies. 
 Gaps and Challenges 16.6
A number of research and policy challenges and gaps exist that can prevent effective 
Natech risk management. These include a lack of data on equipment vulnerability against 
natural hazards, and the unavailability of a consolidated methodology and guidance for 
Natech risk assessment, which has, for instance, resulted in a lack of Natech risk maps. 
The few existing Natech risk maps are usually only overlays of natural hazards with 
industrial site locations and are therefore only Natech hazards maps. Proper Natech risk 
maps must also include an estimate of the potential consequences, which may differ 
significantly from site to site. Attention should be paid to the inherent limitations of 
existing equipment vulnerability models originating from non-Natech applications if these 
are used to substitute for Natech-specific models. 
By analysing past Natech accidents, conclusions can be drawn concerning the 
vulnerability of industrial equipment to different natural hazards, common damage and 
                                           
165 https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2010/10/22/2010-1254/jo/texte 
166 https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2010/10/22/2010-1255/jo/texte  
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failure modes, and the hazardous substances mostly involved in the accidents. Incident 
databases are important tools for this purpose. The JRC's Natech accident database 
(eNatech) is such a database specifically designed for the systematic collection, analysis, 
and dissemination of worldwide Natech accident data. It is publicly available at 
http://enatech.jrc.ec.europa.eu. 
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